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   The project examines the relationship between perception and action, and is divided into 
two parts. The first establishes a detailed philosophical critique of recent sensorimotor or 
enactive approaches to perception, targeting in particular the work of Alva Noë. In the 
second part I defend what may be called an 'action-space' account, according to which 
conscious experience is constituted by an agent's representing his surroundings in such a way 
as to enable a certain suite of actions.  
 
   The enactive approach, I argue, misconstrues the relationship between perception and 
action and fails in its aim to provide an explanation of consciousness. It faces difficulties, 
too, when it comes to illusion, hallucination and non-visual perception. The action-space 
model, by contrast, drawing upon work by Andy Clark, Daniel Dennett and Philip Pettit, has 
the resources to provide a reductive, functionalist account of phenomenal consciousness; an 
account that locates consciousness where we want it - in the service of fluid world-
engagement by embodied, active perceivers.  
 
   Thus the perception/action interface is taken to be less direct than on the sensorimotor 
interpretation, but is nonetheless deep and important. The approach I endorse, furthermore, is 
consistent with and informed by empirical results from the cognitive sciences, including 
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Chapter 1: Introduction.  
 
   To be a perceiver is to be an actor. This is the claim of a recent movement1 towards 
analysing conscious experience in terms of an agent's possession and exercise of particular 
suites of bodily and sensory skills. These action-oriented views aim to answer certain 
fundamental questions in the philosophy of mind - questions concerning the content and 
character of conscious experiences - by emphasising that perceivers are not passive receptors 
of sensory information but are active creatures who engage in exploratory, inquisitive 
movements within their environments. Perception, on enactive or sensorimotor versions of 
this approach, involves the employment of sequences of dynamic interaction with the world 
and the ability to understand, in some suitable sense, the sensory significance of one's 
actions. Rather than conceiving of visual experience, for example, as the delivery of a neutral 
description of objects and surfaces by one's sensory systems, it is to be understood as 
essentially bound up with one's ability to move one's eyes, head and body, and to keep track 
of the systematic ways in which the appearance of the world changes as one exercises these 
skills. With this shift in emphasis come philosophical implications that challenge traditional 
views on perceptual consciousness: the role of the brain - in isolation from the active body - 
is diminished; representational content in experience is constrained by whole-animal 
activity; novel explanations of phenomenal properties are entailed. 
 
   It is my task in this project to critically assess competing action-oriented interpretations of 
perception, and their consequences, before proposing a positive account that captures the 
importance to conscious experience of active interaction between agent and world without 
having to accept certain negative consequences of full-blown enactive analyses. 
   Ultimately, I endorse a particular species of the action-oriented approach that we might call 
an 'action-space' account. On this model, the action-oriented flavour comes in at the level of 
the contents of experience:  the contents of perceptual representations concern possibilities 
for action and intervention. In becoming consciously aware of her environment the perceiver 
is presented with a space of opportunities for acting; a suite of actions and responses that are 
suitable for the accomplishment of her ongoing goals and plans, and for integration into 
reasoning and rational action-guidance. The world appears a certain way to her when it 
confronts her in this way as an arena for goal-satisfaction, exploration and reward.      
     
   The aim is for this proposal to provide a satisfying functionalist explanation of what it 
takes for conscious experience to arise that is not only consistent with those features that 
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traditionally govern philosophical theories of perception - that it is a personal-level 
phenomenon, that the possibility of misperception must be accommodated, and so on - but 
that takes steps towards a dissolution of the Hard Problem of consciousness. Roughly, my 
treatment is designed to motivate a deflationary account of phenomenal consciousness, 
claiming that a convincing story of what it is for a portion of the world to appear a certain 
way to an agent would be an exhaustive one as far as 'phenomenal properties' are concerned.   
 
   My first undertaking is to distinguish among alternative interpretations of the relationship 
between action and perception, and I begin (chapter 2) by surveying the space of options 
available to advocates of a sensorimotor or enactive view. This kind of approach maintains 
that perception is tied fundamentally to, and perhaps constituted by, active exploration of the 
environment. Being a perceiver involves a creature's moving around her environment and 
understanding the ways in which it impinges upon her; the contents of her experiences are 
said to be determined by the ways in which such movements are performed and the 
understanding that the agent has of how these lead to changes in the way things appear to 
her. As such, the paradigm sensory modality is that of touch rather than vision, which has 
been the traditional focus of enquiry into perception. Tactile perception takes place when the 
agent moves part of her body into contact with objects and surfaces; when she brings into 
play her implicitly-known bodily skills and keeps track of the sensory feedback she receives 
in response. Imagine, for example, an octopus enveloping its prey with multiple, writhing 
exploratory tentacles. Sensorimotor views generalise this kind of explanation - the other 
modalities, too, operate by way of skilful investigative probing rather than the passive 
reception of information. Eyes and ears, say, are tools to be transported to where they can be 
employed effectively to gather sensory information; indeed, the transportation itself is a 
skilful sensory activity. The contribution of action to perception, on views of this kind, is a 
deep and important one: actions allow us to ask perceptual questions of the world. 
   This enactive approach, I argue, can be carved up in a number of ways that depend upon 
how certain of its key components are to be interpreted. Importantly, Sensorimotor 
Contingencies, the patterns of dependence that hold between perceptual inputs and the 
relative motion of object and perceiver, can be cashed-out in multiple ways. They can be 
construed as the effects that an agent's movements have on stimulation of her sensory 
systems at the subpersonal level, or on perceptual contents themselves, or on non-
representational, qualitative properties. In the visual case, it could be the dynamics that hold 
between movements and patterns of retinal or visual-cortical activity, or movements and 
'how things look from here', or movements and visual sensations of some sort. 
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   Similarly, the form of sensorimotor understanding the exercise of which is said to be a 
requirement for perception can be analysed in a variety of ways - as bodily, as conceptual, as 
implicit and so on.   
   Each of these options entails distinctive consequences for further features of the enactive 
approach and, more generally, for its explanatory power. What the theory says about these 
details affects what it must say about wider issues concerning perceptual content and the 
nature of phenomenal properties, both issues about which the approach aims to make bold 
claims.       
 
   Having made these consequences explicit, I proceed in chapters 3 and 4 to highlight a 
series of flaws that I perceive to exist within the sensorimotor account, both generally and 
for the individual construals. There are problems, I suggest, whichever option is taken up. 
Briefly, the enactive theorist is faced with a dilemma: either he pitches sensorimotor 
understanding at the subpersonal level - in which case there are difficulties when it comes to 
describing what it is for a person or animal to have experiences - or he takes it be a personal-
level capacity, in which case it becomes unclear quite what it is that is supposed to be kept 
track of in experience (quite what it is that forms each side of a sensorimotor contingency). It 
is the description of the content of experience that comes out of the enactive view that is 
problematic - it fails on phenomenological grounds and it doesn't satisfy the epistemological 
role required of it. Experiential states must provide a justification for the beliefs they ground, 
and content that simply specifies how appearance properties change in response to 
movements leaves such states justificatorily powerless.  
   My concern, too, is that the contribution of active movement to perception is overplayed 
by the sensorimotor story, especially when it comes to perception that is neither visual nor 
tactile. While it is true that at least some experiences from these two modalities are naturally 
described as the products of exploratory probings, or as being constituted by them, the same 
does not obviously hold when it comes to hearing or, especially, taste or smell. The active-
exploratory nature that is characteristic of the cases that are dealt with comparatively 
successfully by the sensorimotor view appears to be missing here. The content of 
experiences of this nature, then, appears not to rely on the direct relationship with action that 
is put forth by enactive theorists.      
   Ultimately, I take it that the enactive model does not do enough to secure a plausible 
account of perception that extends across perceptual contents and modalities, or which does 
any more than touch upon the problems associated with the explanation of phenomenal 
consciousness. The alternative action-space model, while taking on board a number of 
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lessons from the enactive standpoint including its focus on the perceiver as embodied, 
embedded agent, offers a viable competitor on both of these aims.  
 
   Chapters 5, 6 and 7 develop this alternative in the context both of traditional philosophical 
debates and of emerging cognitive-scientific evidence. Whereas the enactive view stresses 
sensorimotor understanding - the grasp of how perceptual inputs are affected by movement - 
the action-space story takes the contribution of action to perception to be rather less direct, 
and specifies a rather different kind of action as being the important contributor. To 
summarise the view defended here, a perceiver is someone who is not only capable of 
behaving in a way that is appropriate to some encountered piece of the environment - that is, 
of responding in ways that are sensitive to available objects and properties - but who is 
additionally capable of integrating spaces of possible and appropriate actions into his 
ongoing powers of planning and reasoning. It is thus a grasp of what one can do that 
determines the contents of one's experiences, and not the character of the movement-input 
loop. The aim is thus to tread a sustainable line between purely behaviourist views on the 
one hand and full-conceptualist views on the other. The nature of the understanding or grasp 
that the account takes to be fundamental to perception is to be spelled-out in nonconceptual 
terms; it is to be the sort of grasp of the environment and its possibilities that we take to be at 
the disposal of at least some non-linguistic animals and children2. It allows us to ascribe 
consciousness to these individuals, as is in line with our intuitions, without thereby having to 
ascribe it to mere processors of information.   
   The space of actions with which an agent is confronted in experience is not limited to those 
that are bodily or movement-oriented, but is to be extended - along the lines of Philip Pettit's 
2003 treatment - to those that we might call cognitive or epistemic. Part of what it is for an 
agent to be a perceiver of colour, for example, is for her to understand the ways in which she 
can sift, sort and track particular objects and surfaces on the basis of their visual similarity 
and difference; to categorise and discriminate, compare and contrast and so on, where these 
are mental 'actions' that do not require the exercise of physical skills. Once we give a rich 
enough account of these abilities, my proposal continues, we make headway in the 
explanation of both perceptual content and qualitative character. The account here shares 
similarities with the central features of the theory of perception developed by Rick Grush 
(1998, following Evans, 1985), although I develop more fully a treatment of both the 
relevant action-types and their accessibility to the agent.     
 
   Here (chapter 6) is where the second strand of the overall project comes in: to defend the 
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claim that the action-space account would, if successful, provide a fully exhaustive 
explanation of the phenomenal properties of experience by resisting the challenge from those 
who maintain the existence of qualia. A qualia-conservative position, as I shall use the term, 
is one that ascribes to experiences intrinsically-phenomenal, private, irreducible features that 
determine how the experience feels to its subject. Such views abound in the literature 
(varieties can be found in Block, Chalmers, Jackson), and are notoriously difficult to 
undermine. Both the sensorimotor and action-space views, however, employ similar 
resources in an attempt to do so. These take Dennett as their starting point, and central to the 
strategy is an argument from conceivability3: once the relevant skills and their integration are 
in place - whether sensorimotor or action-space in nature - it becomes impossible to conceive 
of the absence of qualitative awareness. The presence of phenomenal consciousness (or, 
perhaps more appropriately, the apparent presence of qualia or the tendency to think that 
there are qualia) is, in Andy Clark's phrase, implied by the exercise of a particular body of 
understanding.  
   The qualia-conservative goes wrong in thinking that the effects of a perceptual episode - as 
my view has it, suites of enabled actions and their grasp by the agent - can be separated from 
the way that the episode feels from the point of the view of the subject, and in considering it 
sensible to take there to be further phenomenal facts over and above what it takes for the 
world to appear a certain way to the agent. We cannot imagine a case in which a perceiver 
has an experience with a red quale, say, but who cannot discriminate its object, sift, sort and 
track it in a range of relevant ways and so on, or who can perform all of these actions at will 
but whose experience lacks such a phenomenal character, and this motivates the claim that 
the one constitutes the other. There are no qualia traditionally conceived - nothing could 
match the proposed criteria of effect-independence, intrinsic phenomenality and third-person 
inaccessibility. Their 'nearest real-world correlate'4, however, can be accounted for in terms 
of what it takes for the world to look (hear, feel, taste etc) to the perceiver - namely for her to 
confront a space of enabled actions. Provided we can offer a description of this 
'confrontation' that does not itself rely upon sensory or qualitative properties (as I think we 
can; this involves filling-out what Pettit has called the constraint of manifestness), then there 
is hope for a non-circular explanation of perception.     
 
   The action-space story is given an essentially representationalist treatment (chapter 7): 
experience is constituted by an agent's possession of various content-bearing mental states 
that present the world as an environment providing particular opportunities for action, where 
this content features in transactions enabling ongoing engagement with that environment. 
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This is a form of representationalism, of course, that diverges from traditional versions in 
emphasising the action-oriented nature of perceptual content rather than taking that content 
to be action-neutral or objective, and it has a precedent in the work of Ruth Millikan (1989; 
1996) and of Andy Clark (1997). Such a move carries with it both advantages and potential 
pitfalls. In the plus column goes its ability to give a natural interpretation of certain facts 
about the role of experience in the lives of creatures who must get by in their environmental 
niches in real-time. Being directly presented with opportunities for goal-fulfilling action is 
conducive to efficient and appropriate behavioural response. The goals of catching food and 
avoiding predators, for instance, are well served by systems with few computational steps.   
   A further benefit of the action-oriented content interpretation is its ability to allow for a 
level of nonconceptual content in experience by setting only moderate demands on the 
cognitive resources of experiencers. Alternative accounts that rely on an agent's 
understanding in the determination of content may be forced to say that fully conceptual 
resources are required to grasp objective, action-neutral features.  
   One possible entry in a negative column is the suggestion that it gives an unnatural account 
of what the contents of experience are but this can, I argue, be given a satisfactory rebuttal. 
The worry might be that telling an action-space story of perceptual content is still too action- 
or movement-centred; that what perceivers are really presented with in experience are agent-
independent properties of objects. I propose that in some cases, at least, it is advantageous to 
resist this model of content and that in others the action-space picture is consistent with 
intuitive commitments to perceptual content's world-directed nature.   
 
   The account is consistent, too, with certain neurophysiological and neuropsychological 
results that threaten other theories of perception. It squares nicely, for example, with the 
division of visual labour into two functionally-separable streams of processing5. We can take 
the role of the conscious visual stream to be one of presenting the agent with types-of and 
targets-for actions6 and that of the unconscious stream to be one of regulating the fine details 
of their performance. The indirect contribution of action to perception on this view, in 
contrast to the claims of the enactive approach, means that this separation can be made 
unproblematically. 
   Secondly, the action-space model avoids what Susan Hurley has called the 'Classical 
Sandwich'7. This includes the assumption that there are three distinct layers of subpersonal 
processing - input, central cognition and output - and that input and output map neatly onto 
personal-level perception and action respectively. The sandwich picture is a prevalent one in 
the history of philosophical treatments of perception, argues Hurley, but it fails to respect the 
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deeply integrated, feedback-involving nature of biologically-grounded channels of input and 
output. No clear functional separation can be identified here, and the contents of both 
perceptual and intentional states, we must conclude, may be a function of either. The 
contents of action-oriented perceptual representations, I maintain, are determined by the 
wide role (defined in broadly teleolofunctional terms) they play in an agent's cognitive 
economy, and this may be fixed by either input or output, both, or the relations between 
them. Thus the account faces no particular threat on these grounds.      
 
   Two final features are argued for that help to determine the place of the action-space story 
within traditional constraints. The possibility of misperception - both illusion and 
hallucination - is given a straightforward treatment, characteristic of representationalist 
stories. An experience counts as an illusion or a hallucination just when what its content 
describes comes apart from the way the world really is - so, where the agent is presented 
with a space of actions that fails to track those opportunities that the current environment 
really presents. When the two parallel lines of a Mueller-Lyer diagram appear to be different 
lengths, for example, this is constituted by the perceiver's taking them to present different 
action-spaces (for one to be sifted apart from the other on the grounds of length; for them to 
be picked-up using grips of different width and so on) when in fact such differences are not 
appropriate to the lines' real properties.   
   Secondly, the action-space model gives us interesting resources to draw upon when it 
comes to explaining the function of consciousness and how it arose in living systems. To 
overcome the challenges from epiphenomenalism and conscious-inessentialism we must 
show, respectively, that phenomenal consciousness plays some causal role in the lives of 
those who possess it and that it is necessary for this role. Qualia-conservative theories deal 
with such challenges badly; they have separated by definition the qualitative component of 
an experience from its effects, and so find it problematic to demonstrate what qualia are 
supposed to do, or how they came about. Functionalist / deflationary treatments, on the other 
hand, can simply appeal to the roles played by whatever functional attributes are to be 
identified with phenomenal properties or appearances (here, fast and fluent engagement with 
the world in ways appropriate to present the opportunities for goal-satisfaction). It is no 
mystery why capacities such as these should have developed over the course of creatures' 
evolutionary history.   
   The general approach that the action-space view takes towards answering questions about 
the nature of consciousness is consistent with a widespread recent trend that focuses on 
whole, physically-embodied, environmentally-embedded systems8 and that has anti-
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Cartesian sympathies. This wide-ranging perspective on the place of experience and 
cognition, and the action-space theory's views on perception, should be taken to be mutually 
supportive.  
 
   The action-space perspective places appropriate demands on what it is to be a conscious 
perceiver. Genuine experiencers must have reached a certain level of cognitive 
sophistication; they must be able not only to respond in an input-then-output way, even if the 
output suits the input in some sense, but to behave in ways that are flexibly dependent upon 
both their current and ongoing goals and the opportunities that the environment presents. 
Conscious perceivers confront, in experience, suites of options for action, and this 
confrontation takes place at the animal-level. The operation of particular neural mechanisms 
of detection, then, is not sufficient. Consciousness is not something that emerges in isolation 
from its effects on the perceiver as an integrated whole, for it just is those effects. There are 
no 'islands' of consciousness built up from unused phenomenal properties; no mental 
tapestries of qualia.  
   At the same time, though, the bar for consciousness has not been raised too high by the 
current proposal - it is not that any creature must be able to pause and deliberate upon what 
he can do in a given situation in order to be a perceiver, but rather that the space of options 
feeds directly into his capacities for intentional, world-engaging action. The implications that 
the action-space story has for which kinds of systems are conscious and which are not are 
thus in line with our intuitions.  
 
   There are four central explanatory strands to the project: Action (first strand) is an 
important contributor to perception, but in an indirect way (second strand); experience 
involves transactions among representational states (third strand), rather than the possession 
of intrinsically-qualitative properties (fourth strand). If any progress is to be made on the 
problems of consciousness - if, that is, we reject the possibility that it is simply beyond the 






Chapter 1 Notes.  
 
 
Footnote 1: Central proponents of which include Alva Noë (especially 2004, 2006b, 
forthcoming), J.Kevin O’Regan (O’Regan & Noë, 2001) and Susan Hurley (1998, 2005).  
 
Footnote 2: Where, of course, this attempt is shared by the enactive viewpoint.  
 
Footnote 3: We find this in section 7.2 of O’Regan & Noë (2001), and developed more fully 
in Clark (2000a).  
 
Footnote 4: As Andy Clark has put it, in conversation.  
 
Footnote 5: A division that has been made plausible by, especially, David Milner & Mel 
Goodale (1995).   
 
Footnote 6: Along the lines of the “tele-assistance” model proposed by Goodale (1998) and 
endorsed by Clark (2001).    
 
Footnote 7: I focus on certain central features of the Sandwich model, as Hurley (1998) 
presents it, and remain silent on others with which I need not take issue.   
 
Footnote 8: See, for example, Clark (1997; 1999a), Clark & Chalmers (1998).  
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Chapter 2.  The Sensorimotor Approach to Perception.  
 
   This section charts the space of options available to the sensorimotor theorist. The main 
claims of the sensorimotor approach, as we shall see below, can be interpreted in a variety of 
ways, each with differing implications for the scope of the explanation provided and for its 
plausibility. I will identify three such competing interpretations in order to fully demarcate 
the available possibilities for further discussion. This chapter is not concerned with providing 
a detailed critical analysis of each option, but only to clarify the proposals that each is 
required to make. The remarks in section 1 are designed to give a flavour of the general 
commitments of the sensorimotor approach, and issues raised here will be the focus of more 
detailed examination in following chapters.  
 
2.1: What are the central claims of the sensorimotor account of 
perception? 
 
   The central claim of the sensorimotor thesis is that perceiving is a form of acting. To 
perceive the world, agents must be capable of taking part in its active exploration, using their 
bodies to probe the environment in which they are embedded. This is in contrast to a passive 
construal of perception, on which agents undergo perceptual input simply in virtue of 
making themselves receptive to it - for example in opening their eyes and being confronted 
with a rich and sensuous visual experience. The sensorimotor (or 'enactive') theorist proposes 
not only that exploratory skills are instrumentally necessary for perception, but rather that 
their being brought to bear is constitutive of perception. Once we interpret experience as an 
act and not as an inert registration of sensory stimulation, this account proposes, we can see 
that it is an agent's mastery of certain sensorimotor skills that yields the perceptual content 
and character of his experiences.  
   At a first approximation, an agent has a 'mastery of sensorimotor skills' when she has an 
understanding of the ways in which the appearances of objects change in response to her 
movements; when she exercises her ability to partially control her sensory inputs. According 
to the enactive view, it is by grasping these sensorimotor contingencies that the agent is 
capable of experiencing the world and its constituents. It is with the different possible ways 
of interpreting the means by which perceiving agents get in touch with these appearances - 
and with the nature of these appearances themselves - that this chapter is concerned. There is 
a certain lack of clarity in the recent literature over how best to construe the relation that 
holds between perceivers and appearances - whether it is itself a perceptual relation, say, or a 
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subpersonal one - and my aim here is to illuminate the larger-scale differences that emerge 
with the theory from local differences in the interpretation of this relation.  
   To start with, though, it will be helpful to sketch the general thrust of the enactive account 
prior to examining its finer points in detail. Considering some hypothetical creatures who 
possess more or less sophisticated 'sensorimotor' skills will allow us to gain a basic 
understanding of what is being proposed here. These cases are purely for illustrative 
purposes, it must be noted, and any underlying philosophical commitments that may be 
detected here should not be taken too seriously - it is these very assumptions that will be 
investigated in the following chapters. First, then, consider the case of a primitive insect 
creature who is capable of responding to the presence of a fixed light source in an automatic, 
input-output fashion. Here, the incoming light triggers a motor response that directs that 
insect towards the source with no awareness or sensation involved in the process; the light 
source is not represented by the insect. This creature, it seems clear, has no experience of the 
light: it is a zombie insect.  
   Secondly, a somewhat more sophisticated insect that undergoes a sensation of brightness 
when in the presence of the light source, under some suitable intuitive interpretation of 
'sensation' on which they resemble, perhaps, our own visual afterimages. However, he has no 
knowledge - either conscious or implicit - of the ways in which the occurrence of this 
sensation varies with his own movements - he merely swims around and is occasionally 
confronted with a feeling of brightness that is more or less intense. It is intuitive, argues the 
sensorimotor account, to suppose that this creature has no awareness of the light qua part of 
the world located in space and so, while it may be legitimate to say that he has a 'brightness 
experience' of some sort, the enactive model denies that he possesses a truly contentful 
experience.   
   Thirdly, an insect that undergoes a sensation of brightness when the light is present, and 
who has mastered the ways in which the presence and intensity of this sensation is dependent 
upon his movement. He knows (in an implicit, skilful sense) that the brightness increases 
when he moves in one direction and decreases when he moves in the other, and likewise the 
changes in intensity that come with movement in all other directions. He knows that when he 
moves from right to left, say, the intensity of the brightness rises to a peak and then recedes. 
The knowledge that he possesses takes the form of expectancies: he knows which sensations 
to expect with any of the movements he is capable of producing. In mastering these 
sensorimotor contingencies, he is able to get a sense of the fact that the light source is 
external to himself, and that it is located in space - he has an experience with genuine 
content.  
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   Externality and location in space, then, are the hallmarks of perceptual content on the 
enactive account - perception involves an awareness of objects as situated out in the world, 
independently from the agent. This 'over-againstness', furthermore, is possible only for 
agents who have integrated the patterns of input that they receive with their own movement, 
and thus who can understand that they are interacting with and exploring an external world. 
Again roughly, the idea is that the second creature above fails to register that the sensations 
that he undergoes - which may be identical to those undergone by the third creature - are 
caused by an external body, while the third insect does understand that this is the case 
through his mastery of the contingencies that hold between movement and sensation1. 
Furthermore, a sensorimotor interaction with the world - as opposed to a passive reception of 
sensory input - is a necessary condition on being able to take objects to be external and 
independent in this way.  
 
   The illustrative cases above have been set up in such a way that the changing states of 
which perceiving agents gain understanding are those that have so-called phenomenal 
properties, those that there is 'something it is like' to have. Here, it is only the creature who 
successfully integrates his movements with 'sensations of brightness' who is capable of 
contentful experience. This crude construal of the situation belies the alternatives that are 
available to the sensorimotor theorist, though. While in this case the sensorimotor 
contingencies hold between sensations and movements, the enactive account gets its strength 
and scope through working with contingencies that hold between movements and 
appearances, where the latter are interpreted as follows.  
   J. Kevin O'Regan and Alva Noë (O'Regan & Noë 2001; Noë 2004) locate appearances 
"firmly on the world side of the mind/world divide" (Noë, 2004, p176). That is, appearances 
are real, objective albeit relational, properties that hold between objects and spatial locations. 
The visual appearances of objects, for example, are those properties that an object presents to 
any visually-sensitive agent located at a point external to the object. The object presents a 
different visual appearance to each discrete spatial point located around it. For instance, a 
flat square surface presents a square appearance to a point that is located directly in front of 
it, but a diamond-shaped appearance to a point located off to its side, while a circular object 
presents an elliptical appearance to any agent who is located at a point that is tangential to it. 
There is an objective way that the whole environment in which an agent is situated visually 
appears to him from his current location, then, and there is a different way that the same 
environment appears from every other location. Some of these differences will be the result 
of the relative locations of the objects that are present, rather than of their intrinsic 
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properties. That is, it may be that one object occludes another object when observed from 
this location, but that the reverse is true when they are observed from that location. So the 
appearance presented to a point by the whole environment is dependent upon the properties 
of its objects and their relative locations with respect to that point and to one another.    
   Similarly, objects present non-visual appearances to the other sensory modalities. Solid 
objects present tactile appearances, for example, that alter as the observer moves a part of his 
body over the object's surface. An object whose 3D shape is a cube presents a different set of 
tactile appearances from one that is a sphere.  
 
   In locating appearances out in the world the sensorimotor theory's interpretation does, it 
must be conceded, differ from a natural reading of "appearance" on which these properties 
are mind-dependent and qualitative. In the insect cases, for example, it does not offend the 
language of sensations to say that they 'appear bright', or that there is a 'bright appearance'. 
Likewise, traditional secondary properties such as colour are often said to be mere 
'appearances', where this is supposed to threaten their objectivity. So the objective-relational 
construal of appearances of the enactive view is a departure from this ordinary-language 
interpretation, and one that can lead to confusion. Even Noë's recent work tends to elide this 
distinction on occasion, as he talks in the early chapters of 'Action in Perception' as though 
appearances are sensations or patterns of sensory input.  
   It must be taken seriously, then, that on the sensorimotor account appearances really are 
out there in the world rather than being internal or phenomenal properties. For the visual 
case this is a relatively simple proposition; we can understand visual appearances as being 
mind-independent and external, and nonetheless possessing determinate and mathematically-
specifiable geometric properties, for instance. For the tactile case this becomes more 
difficult, and the situation is more problematic still for the modalities of smell and taste. The 
discussion below will clarify the options that are available to the sensorimotor theorist when 
it comes to specifying the nature of these appearances - where they differ according to which 
enactive account is being evaluated - but for present purposes it is enough to construe tactile 
appearances as just those parts and properties of objects that are available to the sense of 
touch, and which change in response to the movement of a body-part over the object. As 
before, they are not to be identified with tactile sensations of hardness or coldness or 
smoothness or similar, they are relational properties of external objects. Similarly, if we are 
to take O'Regan & Noë’s 'world-side of the divide' claim to hold consistently across the 
sensory modalities, olfactory-appearances and gustatory-appearances (associated with how 
things smell and taste, respectively) should be taken to be relational properties that hold 
 14
between agent and object too, properties which are likely to change along the dimension of 
intensity, clarity and so on in response to the agent's movement.  
 
   So, sensorimotor contingencies are those that hold between an agent's movements - of his 
eyes, limbs and so on and of his whole body through space - and the appearances of the 
objects in his environment which change in accordance with these movements. The enactive 
thesis, to reiterate, states that only agents who are capable of understanding the changes in 
appearance that come with exploratory bodily movements can possess contentful 
experiences, and that such understanding is constitutive of perceptual ability: to bring to bear 
this understanding is to perceive. Sensorimotor skills are what enable agents to get a 
perceptual grasp of the real, invariant properties of objects in spite of only ever being in 
touch with their appearances at any given instant. For example, it is knowledge of the ways 
in which a circular object's elliptical appearances change as the agent moves around it that 
provides him with a perceptual grasp of the object's real shape - it is only through mastery of 
these contingencies that he takes the object to be round rather than elliptical. So we can think 
of sensorimotor skill as performing a role of ambiguity-resolution. An individual elliptical 
visual appearance may be presented by either an elliptical object or a circular one, so 
appearances do not unambiguously correspond to real properties. However, a changing set of 
appearances does unambiguously fix an invariant property, in the sense that there is a unique 
shape (say) that presents any given changing set. Only a circular object presents just this set 
of elliptical appearances in response to a movement from one location to another. An 
elliptical object, meanwhile, presents a different set of visual appearances with the same 
movement. The characteristic set of appearances that belongs to a property according to a 
given movement is its 'sensorimotor profile'. For example, a smooth transition from position 
A to position B, where these lie above a circular object and to its left and right respectively, 
results in a unique sensorimotor profile made up of a certain set of elliptical appearances. 
The same movement performed over an elliptical object yields a different sensorimotor 
profile, a different set of elliptical appearances. Strictly speaking, the sensorimotor profile of 
an object or property is the full set of appearances that it presents in response to any 
movement around it (this is true in the case of vision; the set of tactile appearances it 
presents in response to any movement over its surface is the object's tactile s-m profile and 
so on).    
   This notion echoes the observations of J.J. Gibson (1966; 1979), whose theory of 
perception proposes that information about the invariant properties of objects is contained in 
the 'ambient optic array' - the way in which the space around an object is filled with light2. 
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While in almost all scenarios this array undergoes constant change and flow - as the objects 
in the environment move, or as an agent situated among those objects moves - the ways in 
which these changes progress are fixed by the unchanging properties of the environment and 
its constituents. The patterns of light projected to a point by a circular object may alter as the 
object moves from left to right, but the character of the change in pattern is uniquely 
specified by the circular shape of the object. There are mathematically-specifiable 
constancies within the changing optical array and perception, for Gibson, is a matter of 
picking up this information about constancies by exploring the world with one's body.  
   On the enactive account, such constancies are the real, invariant properties of objects such 
as their shapes, sizes, textures and so on. Sensorimotor skill is said to provide creatures with 
the ability to perceive constant properties in addition to, or in spite of, having immediate 
access only to appearances. For example, for a creature to have a tactile experience of the 
shape of a sphere, say, in spite of only immediately accessing those parts of the object's 
surface that are in contact with his hands, he must understand the ways in which the tactile 
appearance of the sphere changes as he moves his hands over its surface. Such exploratory 
movements reveal the constant property of being a sphere from the changing profile of 
appearances3.   
 
   Some sensorimotor contingencies, in addition, hold not between changes in appearance 
and the agent's movements, but between appearance changes and the movements of the 
object itself with respect to the observer. A moving object - either one that is in transition 
across a plane, or one that is rotating on its axis - presents a series of changing visual 
appearances (in the majority of cases - perhaps a smooth rotating sphere is an exception) to a 
suitably located observer; a changing series of tactile appearances if the object is in contact 
with the observer's body and so on. As before, the structure of these changes is determined 
by the invariant properties of the object - the appearance of a moving circular object, say, 
changes in a way that is unique to circular objects and likewise mutatis mutandis for a square 
object, a triangular object etc.  
   In fact, characteristically motor contingencies are a subset of a larger range of 
contingencies that hold between the appearances of objects and the conditions of observation 
more generally. Conditions of illumination, for example, affect the visual appearances that 
are presented by a coloured object. An object presents a different visual appearance with 
respect to colour when it is lit by red light than when it is lit by green light, and its 
appearance depends, too, on the relative intensity of the light by which it is illuminated and 
on the location of the source of the light in relation to both object and observer. While this 
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adds a non-motor constraint to the ways in which the visual appearances of an object change 
in response to changes in viewing conditions, these contingencies are themselves law-like in 
the same way as before. The visual appearance of a red object, for instance, changes in a 
unique way in response to a change in lighting conditions. The perception of the real colour 
of an object, according to the sensorimotor account, involves understanding these law-like 
relationships in such a way that allows the detection of the invariant property amid the 
changing appearances, just as was the case with motor contingencies. Colour constancies are 
perceived in spite of a surface's looking different with respect to colour in different 
situations.  
   Unless otherwise stated, I shall use 'sensorimotor contingencies' to encompass all 
contingencies that hold between the appearances of objects and alterations in the conditions 
of observation, be they the result of movements of the agent, movements of the object or 
changes in relevant environmental conditions. This is standard practice in the literature. 
Where necessary, though, I will discuss the non-motor cases individually as they present 
issues that are important for the overall success of the sensorimotor project.    
   Of course, it is not plausible for any theory of perception to require that any agent who has 
an experience must actually perform an exploratory movement of the sort proposed by the 
sensorimotor account. This condition would rule out the possibility of an agent's remaining 
motionless and yet still being capable of perceiving his environment. With the possible 
exception of tactile perception, it is clear that one can undergo experiences without moving; 
it is obvious that one can see one's surroundings without moving even one's eyes, can hear 
noises without moving relative to their sources, can smell and taste items while remaining in 
the same position. It is somewhat more plausible to demand that every tactile perception 
involves a movement - even if limited to slight pressure against a surface - but even here this 
is far removed from sophisticated exploration. 
   In light of this, the sensorimotor account must provide an explanation of how inert 
perception is possible - perception, that is, where there are no actual changes to appearances 
that can be understood and no movements performed. Again, sensorimotor skills and the 
exercise of enactive knowledge are said to play the key role. The agent must bring to bear a 
predictive knowledge of the ways in which appearances would change were he to move in a 
certain way. In this manner, the ambiguity inherent in any individual appearance can be 
resolved as before: the agent is confronted with a single appearance (say, a single ellipse), 
but by bringing to bear his knowledge of the ways in which the appearance would change as 
he moves around the object (his knowledge of which set of elliptical appearances would be 
presented to him during his movement) he perceives its invariant properties.     
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   This is, once again, merely an initial characterisation of a central claim of the enactive 
proposal, and there is much more to be said about the nature of 'predictive knowledge' and 
about how it yields the perception of real properties. This issue highlights, however, the 
importance of developing an acceptable understanding of what it is to possess and to 
exercise sensorimotor mastery. Sensorimotor skills must be the kinds of thing that can be 
performed in the absence of movement4.   
 
   So far the proposal that appearances are relational properties that alter in response to a 
change in the observer's location is silent on the question of how observers access, register or 
acknowledge these appearances and their properties, and so it is silent on how perceivers 
come to understand those changes that are brought about by movements. The enactive 
proposal is that sensorimotor skills involve an understanding of the contingencies that hold 
between appearances and movements. In order for this understanding to be manifested, 
however, perceivers must have some access to the appearances that change as they explore 
the environment. The sensorimotor theorist must tell a story about this relation in light of the 
way that appearances have been set up. 
   As I read O'Regan & Noë, the appearances employed within their enactive account are not 
the same as Gibsonian properties of the ambient array, which are properties of the structure 
of the light itself, but relational properties that hold between objects and points in space that 
may be inhabited by an observer (Noë is explicit about this in his recent work: 
"[Appearances] do not depend on sensations or feelings... [They] depend on relations 
between the perceiver's body and the perceived object." (2004, p176)). As such, appearances 
change (by definition, as it were) in response to a change in the observer's location - because 
this change is a result of an alteration in the relationship between the object and agent. On 
the definition of 'appearance' currently under discussion, it makes sense to say that there is a 
set of visual appearances that the objects in my environment present to me, even when my 
eyes are shut. Appearances are not dependent, that is, on my access to them or on my status 
as a potential observer, but simply on the relation between my location and the object 
presenting the appearance.  
   In addition, visual appearances require the presence of illumination; auditory appearances 
the presence of a medium of sound-transmission (air, say); olfactory appearances the 
presence of a medium through which smells can travel and so on. It is only when such 
conditions are present that the object can 'present' an appearance of the relevant nature.  
 
   With closed eyes, of course, I cannot access visual appearances. What the enactive view 
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needs is an account of what happens when my eyes are open – of what it takes for there to be 
a perceptual encounter with appearances themselves. Only then will we able to articulate and 
assess the contribution of sensorimotor skills and their exercise to perceptual content and 
character.  
 
2.2: Version 1 – A Subpersonal Treatment:  
 
   The first interpretation of the relation that holds between perceivers and appearances 
proposes that a creature's access to appearances is a subpersonal matter. The account 
proposed in the original O'Regan & Noë article is an example of this first version, although 
Noë's recent work suggests a move away from this interpretation. Many of the claims set out 
in this section are mentioned explicitly by O'Regan & Noë (O&N), although I hope to have 
clarified some issues in a form that makes a comparison of this version of the theory to the 
others more achievable. This section, too, is purely expository - objections to and criticisms 
of this model will be deferred until the next chapter. 
 
   On a Version 1 sensorimotor theory, changes in external appearances are tracked by way 
of tracking changes in patterns of subpersonal stimulation. Images on the retina, for 
example5, are (under suitable conditions of illumination and when the early visual system is 
functioning correctly) causally dependent upon properties of visual appearances. The 
elliptical appearance of a circular object, for example, will result in an elliptical pattern of 
stimulation on a suitably receptive and located retina. The retinal image covaries with the 
changing visual appearance as the agent moves around the object. So alterations in 
appearance that come with the agent's movements show up in the changing patterns of 
stimulation.  
   Note that on this interpretation it is not the case that there are mental, sensational objects 
being integrated with movements, so this model is unlike the basic insects case I identified 
above. In visual perception, the current version states, the agent does not keep track of 
'sensations of brightness' or similar - instead it is input to the visual system that varies in 
intensity, structure and so on that forms the sensory side of the sensorimotor contingencies. 
Similarly, it is not the case on this account that the agent's relation to the appearances of 
objects is itself a perceptual one, at least not necessarily. That is, the properties of 
appearances - apparent shapes and colours and so on, in Noë's terminology - needn't form 
any part of the content of experience. It is the invariant properties of objects (their real 
shapes, locations, textures etc) revealed in the changing patterns of stimulation that are 
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specified in the content of an experience.   
   Just as the changes in the appearances that an object presents to a moving observer are 
constrained by the object's real properties, so the changes in patterns of stimulation that are 
undergone by a suitably located agent are uniquely determined by these constancies. The 
agent keeps track of changes to appearances by keeping track of how these show up in 
perceptual input. The patterns of visual stimuli that are presented to an observer who is 
moving around a circular object, for example, change in a way that is characteristic of 
circular objects, even if any individual time-slice of stimulation-pattern is ambiguous with 
respect to the object's properties (for example, an elliptical object may result in an identical 
pattern of stimulus on the retina - so this individual pattern is ambiguous over whether the 
object is circular or elliptical). This point is just the familiar issue about the difficulty of 
inferring or calculating the real nature of the environment from the properties of retinal 
patterns - the problem is, famously, ill-posed. A static retinal pattern does not contain enough 
information to uniquely specify the properties of the external world. A nearby object, for 
instance, may yield a pattern of identical size and structure to that which is caused by a 
distant object. This sensorimotor theory recognises this difficulty and places its focus upon 
stimulus patterns that evolve continuously over time: sensorimotor skill involves detecting 
constancies in changing patterns of stimulation, which correspond to constancies in changing 
appearances, which correspond to the invariant properties of objects.  
 
   In fact, on O'Regan & Noë’s original treatment, these constancies may be the only 
properties that are shared by appearances and patterns of stimulation. Retinal patterns, for 
example, need not share any structural properties with the appearances by which they were 
caused - an elliptical appearance need not result in an elliptical pattern of visual stimuli. In 
such a case, though, visual perception will be possible as a result of (visual perception will 
be constituted by) the agent's picking up on the constancies that exist within the evolving 
stimulus patterns. On the perception of a straight line, O&N state: 
 
"Even if the optic nerve had been scrambled arbitrarily, or if the retina were 
corrugated instead of spherical, thereby causing the image of the line to be 
wiggly instead of straight, or if the eye's optics gave rise to horrendous 
distortions, movement of the eye along the line would still not change the 
pattern of cortical stimulation. We see that this particular law of sensorimotor 
invariance is therefore an intrinsic property of straight lines, and is independent 
of the code used to represent them." (O'Regan & Noë, 2001; section 2.2.).  
 
   The contingency in question is that which holds between the pattern of retinal stimulation 
and the movement of the eye along the straight line. With this movement, there is no change 
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in the stimulus activity. With a different movement however, say a shift from looking-up to 
looking-down, a different contingency will be in place. During such a transition there will be 
a change in stimulus activity, in contrast to the case of the first eye-movement. This change 
in input, too, will behave in a law-like way that is characteristic of a straight line - the 
straightness of the line determines a whole suite or profile of contingencies. Again, though, 
none of the properties of the line need to be recapitulated by the pattern of stimulus - that is, 
the shape of the retinal pattern needn't itself be straight.  
   It is easy to lose sight of this point in the case of the visual experience of shape and size 
and so on, because it is easy to conceive of the role of images on the retina as that of 
constructing an inner picture of the outside world - to imagine, say, a square retinal pattern 
as the result of confrontation with a square object. However, when it comes to properties like 
colour we can see that such a proposal is obviously mistaken - it isn't the case that the retinal 
image of a blue surface is itself blue, for example. Any underlying commitment of this 
version of the sensorimotor theory to the claim that patterns of stimulation share properties 
of appearances is misguided. The perception of colour, like the perception of other visual 
properties, is here a matter of picking up on constancies in the ways that patterns of 
stimulation change. Colour properties are invariant features just as shape and size are; the 
visual appearance of a red object changes in regular and characteristic ways just like that of 
any other visually-relevant property. Colour perception, then, involves sensitivity to these 
changes, and we do not have to ascribe colour properties to the patterns of stimulation 
themselves, as we might be tempted to do in the shape case. Likewise, non-visual perception 
involves understanding the law-like relationships that exist between changing patterns of 
input and movements of parts of the body, where these patterns do not share properties with 
the entities or characteristics that are being perceived.    
   Even in a situation in which the properties of the input pattern do match those of the 
property of the appearance under investigation - say, where the shape of the retinal image is 
the same as that of the perceived object's appearance - this will not form a relevant part of 
the sensorimotor contingencies that are in play. It is the constancies in changes alone which 
are important. This means that there are no privileged patterns of stimulus when it comes to 
fixing the content of an experience. Consider the visual perception of an equilateral triangle: 
it may be the case that the images that are projected onto an agent's retina as he moves 
around the figure are the same shape as the appearances that the object presents, and thus 
that when the observer is located directly in front of the object his retinal image is triangular. 
Yet this pattern does not hold a privileged position as far as the agent's seeing the shape of 
the object is concerned; again, it is his knowledge of the sensorimotor contingencies 
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characteristic of triangle, as they show up in dynamic patterns of input, that does this work.  
 
   It is the changes in patterns of stimuli in response to an agent's movements that fix the 
sensory modality to which a neural region belongs, according to O'Regan & Noë. The 
activity of the visual system is responsive to movements of the body, head and eyes but not 
to those of the hands, for example, while systems responsible for audition are those whose 
inputs alter in response to variations in the position of the ears.  
   Some of the changes in activity that take place within a sensory system, furthermore, are 
constrained by the physical makeup of that system rather than the properties of the objects in 
the environment, as in the case mentioned in the quote above - the shape of the retina itself 
constrains the patterns of stimuli in which constancies are embodied. This observation yields 
a distinction, argue O&N, between sensorimotor contingencies that are induced by visual 
apparatus and those attached to visual attributes, and similarly for the other sensory 
modalities (O&N, 2001; section 2.3). That is, it yields a distinction between those 
contingencies that hold between movements and patterns of stimuli as a result of the nature 
of a creature's perceptual systems and those that hold as a result of the properties of objects 
and appearances themselves. Each sensory modality will involve sensorimotor contingencies 
that differ along both of these dimensions - the physical constitution of each sensory system 
is different, and the appearances that are accessed by way of each modality are different.  
   A subpersonal mechanism that is sensitive to sensorimotor contingencies will keep track of 
the changing patterns of stimulation, and in doing so will keep track of those contingencies 
that are the result of the properties of appearances by way of keeping track of the 
contingencies that are the result of the physical constitution of the sensory apparatus. On this 
version, that is, sensorimotor knowledge is embodied in a system that is capable of 
recognising changes in patterns of input that correspond to invariant properties of external 
objects, in spite of the character of these patterns being determined by the perceptual 
systems' physiology. O&N contend that this division maintains something of the spirit (at 
least) of the traditional distinction between sensation and perception - the correlates of 
'sensations' here are the patterns of stimuli, while perception proper is something more: the 
understanding of sensorimotor contingencies that yields awareness of constant properties. 
I'm not sure that this analogy (which is presented as more than an analogy (O&N, 2001; 
section 2.3)) is entirely helpful, as 'sensation' has connotations of mentality and qualitative 
character to which this account is not congenial.  
    
   The sensorimotor contingencies that hold between the appearance of an object and any two 
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discrete movements are, typically, different. Correspondingly, the contingencies between 
patterns of stimuli and any two non-identical movements are different, as the straight-line 
example shows. A movement of the eyes from the left to the right results in an unchanging 
pattern of stimulus, while a movement of the eyes (or the head) from top to bottom results in 
a varying pattern of visual input. Every other movement of visually-relevant parts of the 
body will yield a different pattern. It cannot be the case, given limited neural resources, that 
knowledge of each and every possible contingency is individually encoded. Instead, the 
proposal is that there are law-like relationships that are abstracted from the infinite set of 
possible sensorimotor contingencies (O&N, 2001, section 2.2).   
   Being in possession of sensorimotor skills, understanding how patterns of stimulation 
change in response to movements, is not a matter of having explicit mastery of a body of 
propositional knowledge. It is not that a perceiving agent must be able to report or reflect 
upon the relationships that hold among movements and sensory inputs; indeed it is typically 
the case that the agent has no conscious access to subpersonal dealings of this nature. 
Sensorimotor knowledge is not knowledge-that it is, up to a point at least, knowledge-how. It 
is knowledge of how to explore the changing appearances of the environment actively in 
such a way that allows the agent to be in touch with its invariant properties. Again we must 
note, though, that the actual performance of a movement that yields changes in input patterns 
is not a necessary requirement for any particular episode of perceiving. It is not the case, for 
instance, that an agent must move his hands over the surface of an object in order to undergo 
a tactile experience of its shape. Instead, his implicit understanding of sensorimotor 
contingencies is brought to bear on the current, 'instantaneous' pattern of stimulation - the 
subpersonal mechanism that embodies this knowledge is capable of recognising the changes 
that this pattern would undergo were the agent to move, and it is capable of detecting the 
constancies that exist within these changes as before. So sensorimotor mastery is not a purely 
skilful activity in the way that mastery of karate, say, is. There is a recognitional or detective 
element involved too - it is not enough to perform an exploratory movement, an agent must 
have an understanding of the changes to input that is the result of this exploration, an 
understanding that it embodies a law-like relationship that corresponds to an invariant 
property of the world6.  
 
   On this first version of the enactive account, the content of a perceptual experience is 
determined by the agent's grasp of the constancies that exist within changing patterns of 
input. In addition to this, though, the account aims to dissolve the Explanatory Gap - it aims 
to establish why and how there is 'something it is like' to undergo an experience, even though 
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the experience can be explained in purely physical terms. 
   The solution to (or dissolution of) the Gap offered by O’Regan & Noë relies, first of all, on 
an interpretation of the problem that differs from standard views. The Explanatory Gap, they 
argue, is not the conceptual divide between descriptions of qualitative properties of 
experiences and physical properties of their neural substrates, because phenomenal 
properties do not, on the enactive view, supervene on brain states alone. They can concede 
that of course it would be mysterious to explain the feel of a visual experience of colour, for 
example, in terms of the brain states that subserve it, but maintain that this is not the 
appropriate kind of explanation to advance. What needs to be explained, instead, is how 
active exploration of the environment, mediated by a knowledge of sensorimotor 
contingencies, gives rise to qualitative character in experience. According to O’Regan & 
Noë, there is no Gap here - once we see what is involved in enactive perception there is no 
further question as to how or why experiences should feel a particular way to their subjects.  
   Recall that the account locates the properties that are experienced, including colours and 
other so-called secondary qualities, out in the world as properties of appearances. Colours 
(etc) are not features of experiences, they are features that are experienced; there is, argue 
O&N, "nothing answering to the theorist's notion of qualia" (2001, section 6.8). This is not to 
deny, they are keen to stress, that there are genuinely qualitative aspects of experience; it is 
just that these are associated with the skills and mastery of sensorimotor contingencies and 
not with mysterious, intrinsic phenomenal properties. Their strategy, then, is to offer an 
alternative explanation of phenomenal character that does not rely on any conception of 
brain states as the generators or building blocks of consciousness; perception is something 
that is done by the whole animal rather than by the brain. 
  
   O&N propose that the phenomenal qualities of experience can be modelled on what it feels 
like to drive a Porsche (2001, sections 6.4, 6.6 and 6.8). There is, they suggest, a qualitative 
character associated with driving a Porsche, but it is not the case that what is needed to 
explain this feeling is an explanation of its basis in the brain. Instead, there is nothing more 
to the qualitative character than one's knowledge of the sensorimotor contingencies involved 
in this activity - mastery of the ways in which the car responds to one's commands and so on. 
"There are characteristic ways in which the vehicle accelerates in response to pressure on the 
gas pedal. There are definite features of the way the car handles in turns, how smoothly one 
can change gears, and so on." (section 6.4). Mastery of these contingencies is said to be a 
skilful or practical matter, an active interaction between agent and machine. To master the 
sensorimotor contingencies of Porsche-driving is to be able to successfully manipulate the 
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behaviour of the car, and to anticipate and respond to its feedback.  
    
   To object that there remains the further question of how such knowledge yields 
phenomenal character - that is, to reintroduce the Explanatory Gap question at the level of 
sensorimotor mastery - is, according to O&N, to miss the point of the enactive project. It is 
to misunderstand the nature of the current proposal. They give the following example as 
further illustration of their point: you hold a bottle in your hand and you feel the whole bottle 
in spite of being in direct contact with only a limited part of its surface. Your feeling of the 
presence of the whole bottle is part of the qualitative character of your experience, and it is 
constituted by your knowledge of how to move your hand over the object; how to keep track 
of the sensorimotor contingencies associated with tactile exploration of solid objects: 
 
"[P]henomenologically speaking, the feeling of presence of the bottle is not a 
conjecture or an inference. The feeling you have is the knowledge that 
movements of the hand open up and reveal new aspects of bottle surface. It 
feels to you as if there is stuff there to be touched by movements of the hand. 
That's what the feeling of the presence of the bottle consists in. But the basis of 
the feeling, then, is not something occurring now. The basis rather is one's 
knowledge now as to what one can do." (O&N, 2001; section 6.8).  
 
   The same is true, the argument proceeds, for all other cases of qualitative feel. The 
phenomenal character of an experience of a red surface is nothing more than the knowledge 
of how the appearances presented by a red surface change in response movements of agent 
or object. 
 
"It consists in the (implicit) knowledge associated with seeing redness: the 
knowledge that if you were to move your eyes, there would be changes in the 
incoming information that are typical of sampling with the eye; typical of the 
nonhomogeneous way the retina samples colour..." (op cit. section 6.4).  
 
   This version of the sensorimotor view, then, is ambitious. Its aim is to account for the 
central features of conscious experiences by making essential reference to skilful activity and 
the exercise of sensorimotor understanding. Perception is taken to involve an agent's 
employing bodies of implicit knowledge of how sensory inputs change systematically in 
response to her movements, and in response to certain other modality-specific conditions of 




2.3: Version 2 – A Perceptual Treatment:  
 
   Recall that the relevant differences between possible sensorimotor accounts are presently 
taken to be grounded in their respective claims concerning what it takes to be in touch with 
the appearances of objects, where these have been defined as external rather than mental 
properties. The second interpretation of the sensorimotor theory holds that the relation that 
exists between perceivers and appearances is a perceptual one. Sensorimotor skill, on this 
version, is said to bridge the gap between how things appear and how they really are, and we 
can talk of two levels of perceptual content, one for each of these sets of properties. This 
version of the enactive account is, as I read it, the one to be found in Noë's recent work, and 
is especially evident in 'On What We See' and 'Action In Perception'. Again, my 
characterisation of Version-2 theories is built around this work but makes explicit the 
differences between this and competing versions of the enactive approach.   
 
   The second interpretation of the enactive view shares the same central structure as the first; 
perceiving is again construed as a form of active exploration of the environment. As an agent 
moves around, the appearances that are presented to him by the objects in his environment 
change and, given that he stands in a perceptual relation to these appearances, his experience 
of them undergoes corresponding changes too. There are changes to what we can call the 
first level of his perceptual content, that which specifies the appearances of objects. 
Sensorimotor skills allow the agent to perceive constancies amid these changes, to 
understand the changes as corresponding to certain real properties. It is these observer-
independent properties that enter into the second level of perceptual content.  
   We can use several cases discussed by Peacocke in 'Sense and Content' (1983) to 
determine the contents of the first level, although there are two possible readings of these 
examples that result in different implications for this version of the enactive account. 
Consider the case of the perception of two trees located at different distances away from the 
observer (Peacocke, 1983, p12; and discussed in Noë, 2002, p59 and following). The first 
reading of this situation, which Noë attributes to Peacocke, is that while the experience 
represents the sizes of the trees as being identical to one another, the experience possesses 
additional sensational, non-representational properties according to which the 'image' of the 
nearer tree is larger than that of the further tree. That is, the nearer tree presents a larger 'size 
in the visual field' than the further tree. Such sensational properties can be specified by 
determining the character of the image that objects in the environment would project onto a 
perspex screen located perpendicular to the line of sight. Holding such a screen up in front of 
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the two trees and drawing around their respective profiles would result in a bigger image for 
the closer tree (as Noë puts it, you would need a bigger 'patch' to occlude the image of the 
first tree). Similarly, drawing around the projected profile of a circular object would yield an 
elliptical image, the profile of a square object would yield a diamond-shaped image and so 
on. These properties too are said to belong to the experience of such objects, although they 
do not form a part of the content of that experience; they are sensational properties of the 
experience. In these cases, the shape-relevant contents of the experiences will be 'round' and 
'square' respectively. While the distinction is said to be between 'representational' and 'non-
representational' properties, this should not be taken to be indicative of any commitment to a 
representationalist account of perception. An equivalent but neutral way of putting the 
difference would be to say that it holds between properties of what is experienced and 
properties of the experience.  
 
   The way that Noë has defined 'appearances' though - as relational properties holding 
between objects and observers - allows him to resist the conclusion that the properties that 
are dubbed 'sensational' by Peacocke must be attributed to non-representational features of 
experience. Appearances are relational properties that can themselves be perceived and these 
properties are identical to those that emerge from Peacocke's examples: the nearer tree 
presents a larger visual appearance to a suitably located observer; a plate or a coin presents 
an elliptical visual appearance while a table or a postage stamp presents a diamond-shaped 
appearance. Once we allow that these can be perceived, these properties can form a part of 
the content of an agent's experience. The plate looks elliptical; the table looks diamond-
shaped. Noë calls these properties variously 'occlusion properties', 'P-properties', 'apparent 
properties', but I shall stick with the latter. The plate presents an elliptical apparent shape, 
and two plates located at different distances away from the observer present different 
apparent sizes.  
   Sensorimotor skill, argues this version of the enactive theory, is what allows the agent to 
perceive the real properties of objects in addition to these apparent properties. So an 
experience of an object will possess two levels of content - one which specifies the object's 
apparent properties and one which specifies its real properties. The plate looks both round 
and apparently-elliptical. Since apparent properties are relational properties - specifying how 
things look from here - such a story does not involve experiences that possess contradictory 
content. The first level of content specifies how things looks from this perspective while the 
second level depicts how things really are with the object.  
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   Unlike the first version of the enactive account, then, we are not here dealing with the 
activity of subpersonal stimulation, but with perceptual content. So what is tracked or 
understood in bringing to bear sensorimotor skill is not a changing pattern of input, or a 
changing series of sensations, but a changing experience of a relational property of the 
world. And it is changes in content that are understood, not changes in non-representational 
properties (that is a further option that will be considered below). As an agent moves around 
an object the visual appearances that are presented to him change, and so does his experience 
of those appearances. In experiencing apparent properties, part of the content of an agent's 
experience specifies his own relation to or perspective on the objects in his environment. But 
this content is ambiguous in an important sense, just as the patterns of stimulation were 
ambiguous in the previous version of the enactive story. A single appearance does not 
uniquely determine the nature of the object presenting that appearance. For example two 
objects, one of which is a rectangle and the other a parallelogram, may present identical 
apparent shapes (may project the same image onto a perspex screen) to a suitably located 
point in space. However, the overall profile of apparent shapes presented by each object to a 
series of different locations is uniquely specified by its real shape. A rectangular object 
presents a particular pattern of visual appearances to a moving observer, while a 
parallelogram presents a different and distinctive pattern, even though from certain angles 
they look the same with regard to shape.   
   As before, the account emphasises the law-like connection between the invariant properties 
of objects and the appearances they present, and therefore between the invariant properties 
and the content of experiences of their appearances. Perception is the active process of 
exploration of objects by way of keeping track of the changes in how they look. It is the 
bringing-to-bear of knowledge of how appearances change with movements to reveal the 
constancies that are present amid these changes.  
   Objects present apparent colours, too, and these are dependent upon the conditions of 
illumination of the scene and upon the relations between the agent, object and light-source. 
So an agent's perspective on an object includes these conditions in addition to his spatial 
relationship to the object, and a grasp of changes to these conditions is part of what 
determines perceptual content in certain cases. The apparent colour of an object can be 
thought of as the shade of paint that would have to be used to make a life-like image of how 
the object looks from here. The apparent colour of a red chip under white light, for instance, 
may be the same as that of a white chip under red light; each could be painted with the same 
shade of red paint. An individual object that bears a single colour can have parts that present 
different apparent colours, too, as when a wall is unevenly lit or partially veiled by shadow. 
 28
The sensorimotor understanding required to perceive the conditions-independent colour (as 
we might call it) of the wall will involve a grasp of the potential dynamics of these patterns 
of apparent colour as they change in response to movements or alterations in lighting 
conditions.  
 
   Non-visual perception follows the same model, although each involves a somewhat 
different interpretation of the agent’s perspective on the perceived object. Sounds, for 
example, present apparent volumes: two sounds whose sources are located at different 
distances from the observer may present the same apparent volume. The sound of a distant 
car may appear to be the same volume as that of a nearby recording of a car - their volumes 
are the same-from-here. But their apparent volumes will alter in different ways - according to 
different laws - in response to a movement on behalf of the agent or sound-source, just as the 
apparent size of an object does. There are constancies present amid the changes in 
appearance.  
   While vision and audition involve a perception of appearances that alter in response to 
movements around, away or towards an external object, tactile perception involves 
exploratory movements over their surfaces. So a 'perspective' on an object from a tactile 
point of view is just the relation between the part of the body that is in contact with that 
surface and the part of the surface in contact with the body. The tactile appearance of an 
object is just that part of the object that is available to the agent without moving over its 
surface; that is, the part that is available to him at any given instant. So, the tactile 
appearance that is presented to an agent who places his hand on a flat surface, say, is hand-
shaped. The low-level, appearance-specifying content of a tactile experience depicts this 
hand-shaped part of the object. It is by keeping track of the ways in which this appearance 
changes as the agent's hand moves over the surface of the object that the real properties of 
the object are revealed. The feeling-the-bottle case described by O'Regan & Noë can be 
reiterated: feeling the real shape of the bottle in spite of experiencing only the tactile 
appearance of the bottle at any given instant is a matter of knowing that the different parts of 
the bottle are accessible by moving one's hands over its surface, knowing the characteristic 
ways in which the appearance of the bottle changes. So the real shape of an object is 
perceived in spite of the fact that the agent is only ever, strictly speaking, in contact with a 
hand-shaped part of the object. Changes in appearance are understood when changes in the 
low-level content of experience are understood, since the latter map onto the former by 
specifying them.  
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   The possibility of perception without movement must, as before, be retained. An agent is 
capable of experiencing the objects in his environment even when he does not employ any 
exploratory movements that yield changes in appearance. In the absence of movement, it is 
not the case that the agent only experiences the apparent properties of objects, for example 
the elliptical apparent shape of a plate. He experiences its real round shape too. According to 
this version of the enactive story, this is only possible for an agent who brings to bear his 
predictive sensorimotor knowledge of how the content of his experience would change with 
respect to apparent properties were he to make a movement of his body. In seeing the plate 
as round and elliptical-from-here, he brings to bear his knowledge of how the latter would 
change were he to move around it. He knows that round objects present appearances that 
change in characteristic ways, and he knows those characteristic ways. More generally, the 
enactive account is committed to the view that perceptual content is determined not only by 
the kinds of properties to which an agent is perceptually sensitive but by her understanding 
of those properties and the ways in which they are delivered to her. As such, the account is 
analogous to a strong conceptualist model of perception on which an experience's content is 
constrained by the subject's conceptual repertoire. On the enactive story, similarly, it is the 
bringing-to-bear of particular bodies of sensorimotor knowledge (rather than concepts) that 
helps to fix what is perceived.   
    
   The contents of perceptual experiences, then, are said to be partially determined by the 
exercise of sensorimotor skill. When it comes to their qualitative character, though, it is not 
obvious that a sensorimotor account that appeals to a relation between agents and 
appearances that is itself perceptual can, without more work at least, be offered as a solution 
to or dissolution of the Explanatory Gap. As with any theory of perception, there are options 
available when it comes to the explanation of this perceptual relation; that is, in explaining 
how agents' experiences come to have content that specifies apparent properties. The option 
chosen will, in turn, affect the nature of the agent's sensorimotor understanding as this 
involves keeping track of changes in the contents of experience.  
   Noë's recent account, although it is a version-2 theory, is somewhat inexplicit about how 
the perception of appearances is to be treated. In 'On What We See', he talks of 
"encountering" apparent properties, of "discovering" them, even of "having sensations" 
(Noë, 2002, pages 63, 64 and 66 respectively). Given the general thrust of his thesis, though, 
it is likely that he intends this to be read as a direct-realist theory of perception, with an 
unmediated relation between agent and appearance. Thus changes in appearance that come 
with movement can be accessed directly; the agent has an immediate acquaintance with 
 30
apparent properties and so his sensorimotor knowledge is about them in a straightforward 
sense (in contrast to the previous view on which sensorimotor knowledge is of changes to 
patterns of stimuli, and of apparent properties only indirectly). Direct realist accounts are 
susceptible to arguments from illusion and hallucination, as will be discussed in chapter 4.  
 
   A final possibility for this version of the enactive account is that the perceptual relation 
that holds between agent and appearance is an indirect one. Here, perception of apparent 
properties is mediated by perception of sense-data, and it is an understanding of changes in 
sense-data in response to movements that constitutes sensorimotor knowledge. This is 
equivalent to taking Peacocke (as Noë reads him) at face value, and claiming that 
experiences have non-representational, sensational properties. So, the sense-datum attached 
to a nearby object is bigger than that of a far-away object, even if both are represented as 
being the same size in experience; the sense-data attached to a circular object are elliptical, 
and so on. Sensorimotor skill, on a view of this sort, can be interpreted in two different ways. 
It is either changes in the content of the experience that are understood, or it is changes in 
non-representational properties of sense-data. Therefore it is either the case that the indirect 
perception of an object involves two levels of content, as this version of the account has so 
far proposed, or it is the case that the only real content possessed by an experience is that 
which specifies real, invariant properties. If the latter, then sensorimotor knowledge 
produces content out of non-content; it produces content out of sensational character. Colour 
perception, for instance, would involve keeping track of changes in the qualitative character 
of one's colour sensations as changes in the conditions of perception alter.   
   The cases of sensory substitution discussed by Noë (Noë, 2002; O'Regan & Noë, 2001) 
seem to involve a commitment to this interpretation of the enactive theory. Here, the vision-
like phenomenology of an experience induced by a tactile-visual substitution system (TVSS) 
is explained in terms of the vision-like sensorimotor contingencies that hold between 
sensational output from the TVSS and the movement of the agent's head and body. What is 
important are the changes to tactile sensations that come from such movements - actions of 
the head and body result in changing patterns of tactile sensation (on the tongue or back, 
typically), and these changes embody constancies that exist in the environment. This does 
not appear to involve tactile perceptual content specifying these constant properties (shape, 
say, or size), and so the sensorimotor aspect does appear to provide a higher level of content 
from changes in a lower one. It seems, on the face of it at least, to involve perceptual content 
being constituted by knowledge of changes in patterns of sensation; changes to non-
representational properties. So the TVSS case is more like that of the primitive insects case 
 31
discussed in section 1 above than it is of the other Version-2 options here.   
 
   To clarify, the options available to a sensorimotor theorist who proposes an indirect theory 
of perception has two options: 1) Experience involves two levels of content. The first level 
specifies apparent properties and it is a sensorimotor understanding of changes in these that 
yields the second level, that which specifies real properties. I have indicated that Noë’s 
favoured interpretation of the perceptual relation to appearances is a direct realist one.  2) 
Experience has only one level of content, that which specifies real properties, but 
experiences have additional, sensational properties the sensorimotor understanding of which 
yields perceptual content. The second option shares similarities with both the first, 
subpersonal version of the enactive account and with the second, perceptual version.  
   If sensorimotor skill is construed as the understanding of non-representational properties, it 
needn't be the case that the changing properties of sensations that are understood mirror 
those of the appearances of external objects, just as was true for the changing patterns of 
subpersonal stimuli in the first version of the theory. The shape, say, of a sense-datum 
needn't match that of the object to which it is attached. Instead, what is important is that 
sensations change in law-like ways that are characteristic of the real properties that are their 
causal basis. For example, it needn't be the case that the sensation that is caused by 
perceiving an elliptical appearance is itself elliptical, so long as changes in that sensation that 
come with movement behave in a regular fashion that can be understood by the perceiver. It 
needn't be the case, furthermore, that the redness of a sensation is a property that is shared by 
the appearance or object, but so long as changes in this sensational property uniquely 
determine an external property (perhaps a surface reflectance property), the agent's relation 
to the latter is perceptual. In the TVSS example, the sensations felt on the agent's back or 
tongue need not share any of the properties of the objects that are perceived by way of 
sensorimotor mastery. The perception of a large object need not involve a sensation which is 
felt on a larger region of the back than that which is felt during the perception of a small 
object, for instance. It is, as always, the changes to the relative patterns of sensation that fix 
the perceived properties.     
 
   To summarise - Version 2 of the enactive approach proposes that the access that perceivers 
have to the appearances of objects is perceptual in nature, and the content of such perception 
specifies 'apparent properties' which, in the visual case, can be identified as the properties of 
the image that an object would project onto a perspex screen perpendicular to the line of 
sight, and more generally as the properties that objects (sounds, smells etc) seem to have 
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from a given perspective. Sensorimotor skill involves understanding changes in the content 
of an experience of appearances. It is either the case that bringing this understanding to bear 
constitutes the perception of the real properties of objects, or that it results in an experience 
with a second level of content specifying real properties that is constrained by the perceiver's 
independent understanding of those properties.  
   On an indirect theory of the perception of appearances, a further option emerges. Rather 
than being an understanding of changes in the content of experience, sensorimotor skill 
could be an understanding of changes in non-representational properties of sense-data. The 
explanation that this version of the enactive approach provides concerning the qualitative 
character of experience will depend upon how the perceptual relation between agent and 
appearance is elucidated.  
   I have termed all of these options ‘Version-2’ accounts because they share the view that 
the relation that holds between the perceiver and the apparent properties of her environment 
is a personal-level phenomenon, in contrast to the construal of Version-1 stories.  
 
2.4: Version 3 – A Simpler Perceptual Treatment.  
 
   The third version of the enactive approach again interprets the relation between agent and 
appearance as a perceptual one but involves a rejection of 'apparent properties' as Noë 
construes them, and so the contents of perceptual experiences come out differently. Although 
it again shares their central features, I have separated this version of the account from those 
in the preceding section because its implications are importantly different. It remains the 
case, on this third option, that sensorimotor knowledge brings about a new level of content 
that is inaccessible to perceivers who are ignorant of sensorimotor dynamics, but the objects 
and properties that are specified at each level are not the same as those entailed by the kinds 
of enactive theory outlined so far.  
   In the visual case, to begin, rather than taking there to be appearances construed as 
properties that an object would project onto a perspex screen perpendicular to the line of 
sight, what are perceived prior to the exercise of sensorimotor understanding are simply 
those parts of objects that are visually accessible from a perceiver's location. From where she 
stands, a visually-sensitive perceiver can directly see only the facing sides of solid objects. It 
is not part of the content of her visual experience on the current view, though, that these 
objects possess apparent properties. The side of a cube is seen as being square and bearing a 
particular spatial orientation with respect to the observer, and not as being diamond-shaped. 
Rather than looking bigger, a nearer tree looks the same size as a further tree and closer. This 
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conception brings the visual case in line with the tactile case, for example. Tactile 
appearances, we saw, are just those parts of an object or surface that are accessible to an 
agent at a single time; the hand- or finger-tip-shaped area of a flat surface, for instance. On 
the current interpretation of visual appearances the same is essentially true; they are those 
areas of an object that are visible in an environment that may be cluttered with occluding 
surfaces. It is not the case, though, that these are to be specified in terms of two-dimensional 
occlusion properties or patches.  
 
   Noë's account, by contrast, results in there being a quite different explanation for the cases 
of visual and tactile perception respectively. Visual appearances taken as apparent shapes, 
sizes and colours are not the same as parts of objects. The perception of the appearance of a 
round surface from an angle, for example, does not involve perceiving merely a part of the 
round surface - it involves seeing it all at once, as being elliptical-shaped. So this case cannot 
be compared straightforwardly with a tactile example, because these do involve the 
perception of parts of objects, and there are no 'apparent shapes' in the relevant sense: no 
properties that are not possessed by the object are perceived. Noë's account, then, must 
propose one sensorimotor story for the tactile case - the real shape of the object is revealed 
by exploring the different parts of the object - and another for the visual case - the real shape 
of the object is revealed by exploring its changing apparent shape. The current proposal is a 
rejection of the claim that agents perceive apparent properties at all, so these properties do 
not show up as contents of their experiences on any level. Instead, it is real properties - real 
shapes, real sizes and real colours - that are perceived prior to the exercise of sensorimotor 
knowledge.        
 
   If this move is made, though, the role of sensorimotor skill is diminished - there is more, 
essentially, in the first, pre-sensorimotor level of content. On a Version-3 account, there is no 
need for a sensorimotor story to explain how agents come to see the real shapes, sizes and 
colours of objects - or their spatial relations to the observer - the content that is to be fixed by 
any putative enactive ability is additional to that which specifies these properties. There is 
still a role to be played by the exercise of sensorimotor understanding in helping to 
determine perceptual contents on this view, though. Although only ever having immediate 
visual access to the facing side of an object (by which I mean visual access that doesn't 
require moving around the object; we can remain noncommittal over whether the perception 
of the facing side is 'direct' or 'indirect' in a more technical sense at this stage), this account 
states that we nonetheless have a sense of the presence of the far side of the object too, and 
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that this sense is genuinely perceptual. We have, that is, a perceptual sense of the 3-
dimensional shape of the object, of its continuity through space with parts that are occluded. 
A sphere looks spherical, in spite of the fact that only a hemispherical part of the object is 
visible; a line looks straight and continuous even though part of it is concealed from view. 
Furthermore, objects look solid and extended even though only their surfaces are accessible 
to vision. 
 
   The third version of the sensorimotor account argues that it is this content that is acquired 
by way of enactive skill. Therefore the third version allocates a more modest role to 
sensorimotor skill - just to the determination of 3-dimensional-shape and extension content 
rather than to 2-dimensional shape content and so on. Again, we can consider sensorimotor 
skills as abilities to resolve ambiguity. The first level of content, specifying how things look 
from here, is ambiguous over the real properties of the objects that present these 
appearances. It could, for instance, be that the thing that looks like a sphere from here could 
be a half-sphere, or that a straight line is in fact broken in the region occluded by some 
surface. These cases present visually identical parts to a suitably situated observer, and so 
result in identical experiences under normal circumstances. Movement, though, reveals - or 
would reveal - the hidden parts of the world to the observer, and thus reveal objects' real 3-D 
shapes and extension. It is through understanding the changes in how-things-look-from-here 
that agents perceive these properties. Noë himself uses these cases, for example in his 
discussion of the perception of a tomato (2004b, p3), but treats them, wrongly, as being of 
the same type as the apparent-properties, Peacocke-style cases of before. He thinks, that is, 
that seeing the facing side of the tomato and knowing how new parts of it will come into 
view in response to movement is the same as seeing a round plate as looking elliptical and 
knowing how this apparent property changes with movement. While these cases may be on a 
continuum as far as possible constructions of the enactive view go, they don’t involve the 
same kinds of perceptual content.    
    
   Another 'apparent property' that is eliminated by this version of the theory is that of 
apparent colour. The proposal of the previous version was that surfaces appear to possess 
different apparent colours in regions that are illuminated by different lighting conditions - so 
a brightly lit patch of wall, say, has a different apparent colour from a more darkly lit patch. 
The apparent colour of each region is identical to the shade of paint which would have to be 
used by an artist if he were to create a faithful representation of the wall. On such an 
account, sensorimotor skill (more particularly, an understanding of how apparent colours 
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change in response to changes in movements or in conditions of illumination) yields a 
perceptual grasp of the surface's real colour, so the wall is seen as both apparently-bright-
here-and-apparently-dark-there and as being uniformly coloured across its whole surface.   
   Version 3, however, rejects the claim that apparent colours enter into the content of visual 
perception. Instead, the content of an experience of a surface specifies both the real, uniform 
colour and the conditions of illumination. The wall is seen as being the same colour across 
its surface and as more brightly lit here, less brightly lit there. Whereas in the case of the 
perception of shape and size it is the relative spatial arrangement of objects in the 
environment that is specified in the content of a visual experience (along with real shape and 
real size), in the colour case it is the wider conditions of observation that pertain to 
illumination. This includes the relative location of light sources, reflective surfaces, shadows 
and so on. It is not the case, argues Version 3, that surfaces look different colours in regions 
that are differently illuminated - such patches look the same colour, the colour possessed by 
the whole object. It may be true, this version can concede, that paints of different shades 
would be needed to create an accurate image of the surface, but this need have no bearing on 
how best to specify the content of colour perception.   
   The rejection of apparent colours as contents of visual experience again attenuates the role 
of sensorimotor skill. It is the real properties of objects, along with conditions of lighting, 
that are perceived and this has no sensorimotor basis: it does not involve understanding any 
changes in appearance. The enactive part of this version of the theory accounts only for the 
perception of the properties of 3-D shape, extension and solidity.  
 
    In reducing the role of sensorimotor skill to fixing only the content that specifies 3-D 
shape and extension, this version of the approach has multiplied the work that needs to be 
done by whatever theory of perception is employed to account for the experience of 
appearances - that is, whatever theory we use to account for the rest of the content of 
experience. What is required is an explanation of how agents come to perceive the real 
properties of objects and their own perspective on them, which includes conditions of 
illumination. This content is not derived from sensorimotor skill on this model, and so an 
independent theory of perception must be brought to bear. As a result, the Version-3 enactive 
model is consistent with a range of both direct and indirect theories of perception. A 
representationalist account, for instance, could deal with these perceptual contents in 
intentional terms: in visual experience, objects are represented as having certain intrinsic 
properties and as bearing certain spatial relations to oneself.  
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2.5: Summary and Conclusions: 
 
   The three versions of the enactive theory, and the space of options that exist within these 
three interpretations, represent genuine differences when it comes to the role and nature of 
sensorimotor knowledge. 
 
   Version 1 construes the access that perceivers have to appearances as a subpersonal 
registration of stimulation, and sensorimotor skill as an understanding of the changes that 
patterns of such input undergo in response to movements. The changes embody invariant 
properties of external objects, and perception is the task of registering those invariant 
properties by keeping track of changing patterns of stimulation. Features of an agent’s 
sensory systems may constrain the properties of those patterns of stimulus that must be kept 
track of in experience, but the ways in which they change are nonetheless law-like and 
systematic. Some sensorimotor dynamics involve changes that are not (or not only) the 
consequences of movements, but are instead the result of alterations in conditions of 
observation such as lighting intensity and hue.  
   The second and third versions construe the relation between agent and appearance as a 
perceptual matter, although the two interpretations differ over which properties are specified 
in the pre-sensorimotor content and so also over which properties are perceived through the 
exercise of enactive skills. 
 
   Version 2 describes the phenomenology of visual experience thus: agents perceive both 
apparent properties and real properties, where the former are possessed by appearances and 
the latter by objects. Sensorimotor skill allows the agent to perceive real properties in spite 
of only ever being confronted by apparent properties at any given moment. As before, 
apparent properties - and the experiences thereof - change in regular ways in response to 
movements, and these regular ways correspond to invariant properties of objects. Two 
options are open to the sensorimotor theorist here - either sensorimotor skill involves 
understanding changes in the content of experience, or changes in the non-representational 
properties of experience.  
   Visual appearances are to be understood as the properties that objects would project onto a 
2-dimensional screen perpendicular to the line of sight; apparent shapes, for example, are 
specified by the outline that would be drawn on such a screen, while apparent sizes 
correspond to the size of the patch that such a profile would occlude on the screen.   
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   Version 3 limits the role of sensorimotor skill to the determination only of perceptual 
content that specifies the 3-D shape and extension properties of objects. Apparent properties 
as Version-2 models construe them are rejected, and the first level of perceptual content is 
taken to concern those parts of objects that are accessible to the perceiver from his current 
location, which includes the posture of his arms and hands and so on in the tactile case and 
takes into account occluding objects in the visual and auditory cases. Sensorimotor skill 
provides the perceiver with a perceptual sense of the presence and nature of those parts of 
objects that are outwith the current appearance, rather than with the perception of real 
properties out of apparent properties.  
   There are relational properties that show up in the contents of experience on this view: the 
parts of objects and surfaces that are in view from a particular perspective are constrained by 
the observer’s location and that of other entities in a cluttered environment. These object-
parts are not to be confused with properties of profiles on a hypothetical 2-dimensional 
screen, none of which are perceived.     
 
   An additional possibility is that two or more of the versions presented above are 
compatible with one another, and that the sensorimotor theorist can adopt the claims of each. 
In arguing that enactive skill can yield both perceptual content which specifies real 
properties rather than apparent properties (where real properties are 2-D shapes, orientations, 
sizes, colours and so on) and content that specifies 3-D shape and extension, Noë's view 
appears to be consistent with both versions 2 and 3, for example. Such a story would involve 
two levels of sensorimotor skill - one which brings about the perception of real properties 
from apparent properties and the other the perception of 3-D shape and extension from a 
grasp of the ways in which the first level of content changes with movement. For instance, 
the visual perception of a cube would involve an understanding both of the ways in which 
the visual apparent properties of the cube change with movement, and an understanding of 
the ways in which new parts of the object would be revealed to view with movement. The 
plausibility of such a mixed version of the theory will rest upon that of its constituents. 
 
   In the next chapter, I outline a series of challenges to each version of the sensorimotor 
theory, and to the approach more generally, and conclude that none is satisfying in 
unqualified form. We can use the taxonomy I have drawn up in this chapter to assess more 
clearly what the possible components of an enactive perspective might be; we can 
understand that a simple appeal to 'the sensorimotor account of perception' is likely to 
confuse the details I have set out.  
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Chapter 2 Notes.  
 
Footnote 1: Nothing I have said so far rules out that the second creature could essentially 
become the third creature through learning about sensorimotor contingencies; I will say little, 
in fact, about the origins of sensorimotor skills.  
 
Footnote 2: In the visual case; it would be a further task to extend this treatment to the other 
sensory modalities.  
 
Footnote 3: As we shall see, there are versions of the enactive approach that permit that this 
contact with appearance is not immediate in the traditional sense, but may involve 
representation. So we should take 'immediate' here to mean simply unimpeded, in the way 
that is true of the facing side of a table, say, but not its reverse.  
 
Footnote 4: We might think that at least some movement is required in every perceptual 
episode – say, a movement of the eyes or head in the visual case. However, it is important to 
note that there will be an anticipatory or counterfactual component to every experience, in 
that it is not the case that every possible sensory-relevant movement will be carried out 
during each perceptual encounter. One sees a cube, say, by bringing to bear one’s knowledge 
of its full sensorimotor profile – i.e. the ways in which its visual profile would change in 
response to one’s movements – but one doesn’t need to actually carry out each and every 
movement in that profile in order to do so.  
 
Footnote 5: Here "images on the retina" is used as a shorthand for whatever patterns of early-
visual-system activity need to be appealed to by the enactive theorist. I take it that O'Regan 
& Noë’s use of the same terminology is doing a similar job in their paper, and that they are 
not committed to its being (only) retinal image changes that are understood in visual 
perception.  
 
Footnote 6: Indeed, such movements are not even necessary – the idea is that the law-like 






Chapter 3: Difficulties Facing the Sensorimotor Approach.  
 
   Having outlined three competing versions of the sensorimotor theory in the previous 
chapter, the task now is to determine the plausibility of each interpretation, and that of the 
approach as a whole. I argue that the first two versions face significant challenges and that 
the third, while interesting, does not present us with genuinely explanatory resources when it 
comes to the difficult philosophical issues of perception and consciousness. I start by 
examining each of the options in turn and assessing how well they stand up to philosophical 
scrutiny before turning to some more general worries that face the enactive approach. 
   The three sensorimotor accounts developed in the last chapter vary in their explanatory 
ambition, with the first version being the most substantial and the third version the most 
limited in scope. The first version aims to account for both the content and qualitative 
character of perceptual experience while the third version attempts only to explain how one 
level of perceptual content - that which specifies 3-D shape, extension and solidity - is 
acquired. The second version has moderate ambition, since it hopes to bestow the 
sensorimotor aspect of the theory with an explanatorily significant role in the determination 
of content. As a result, as far as the genuinely sensorimotor components of each version go, 
the first account is susceptible to a wider range of challenges than is the third version, as we 
shall see.  
    
3.1. Version 1: 
 
   Recall that this account states that sensorimotor knowledge concerns the ways in which 
subpersonal patterns of stimulation change in response to movements. The changes that 
occur to input patterns - images, for example, on the retina - embody constancies that are 
present in the changes in appearances, which in turn correspond to the real properties of 
external objects. Perceiving, then, is a matter of detecting or coming to be in touch with these 
constancies by way of understanding actual or possible changes in sensory input. In 
explaining perception purely in terms of the understanding of subpersonal stimulation, 
furthermore, O'Regan & Noë offer this version of the enactive theory as one to which the 
traditional problem of the Explanatory Gap – the problem of how to explain the qualitative 
features of experience in physical terms - does not apply. It is with this strong claim, and the 
nature of the sensorimotor understanding that is at play here, that this section is concerned. I 
will argue that the cases that O&N present as exemplifying a successful explanation of 
qualitative character in experience fail to secure their wider conclusions concerning 
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Explanatory Gap closure, and that they fail to adequately respect the division between 
personal and subpersonal levels of explanation.  
 
   The primary argument for the claim that there is no Explanatory Gap on Version 1 of the 
enactive account rests upon a particular interpretation of the kinds of conditions that would 
yield a Gap, and the rejection of those conditions on this theory. There is an explanatory 
divide between a description in physical terms of activity of the brain during a perceptual 
episode and a description of 'what it is like' to undergo that episode, because the two 
domains are conceptually isolated (see, e.g. Chalmers, 2006). However, Version 1 maintains 
that there is no such divide between the qualitative character of an episode and its occurrence 
understood (in physical terms) as an extended, skilfully-mediated interaction between 
perceiver and environment. So the solution offered by the enactive theorist involves a 
reassessment of what it takes to constitute a conscious experience, and a description of those 
conditions that appeals only to physical events and processes.  
 
   As mentioned in the previous chapter, the two central cases to which O'Regan & Noë 
appeal in support of this strategy are that of the tactile perception of a bottle, and the analogy 
with the exercise of skills in driving a Porsche. I suggest that neither of these does the work 
that they are intended to do. On a Version-1 account, the exercise of sensorimotor 
knowledge involves anticipating or understanding the patterns of subpersonal sensory 
stimulation that are result of particular movements. The bottle case, however, does not 
obviously involve bringing to bear knowledge of this sort; in fact, it appears to rely on what I 
have called a Version-3 interpretation of the view on which what changes, and what is 
understood, is how different parts of the bottle will feel when one's hands travel over its 
surface. That is, it relies upon an agent's grasp of how a perceptual relation (a personal-level 
phenomenon) changes with movement, and not of how mere stimulation will change. In 
conflating these two accounts, I propose, the example results in a question-begging solution 
to the Explanatory Gap, one that is dependent upon the prior presence of phenomenal 
properties1.   
   A perceptual contact with the surface of the bottle, however limited, carries with it a 
phenomenal character of its own. The part of the bottle with which my hand is in contact, 
that is, feels a certain way to me (cold, perhaps, or smooth), even if the perceptual presence 
of the rest of the bottle is constituted by my sensorimotor knowledge. At best, then, the 
example as it stands may be sufficient to account for the qualitative feel of the presence of 
the whole bottle (if we accept that this comes into the character of the experience), but leaves 
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untouched what it is for bottle-parts to feel cold, smooth and so on.  
 
   One way in which this case might be spelled out within the Version-1, subpersonal-
tracking framework is to propose that the phenomenal component attached to one's current 
grasp on the bottle - prior to any movement - is itself a product of one's sensorimotor 
knowledge of the ways in which patterns of stimuli associated with the feeling of 
temperature and texture (etc) vary with movements. This is to acknowledge that there is a 
qualitative aspect to one's current, pre-movement grasp of the bottle, but to explain this too 
in sensorimotor terms. The third version of the enactive account as I have presented it makes 
a contrasting proposal - that sensorimotor skill provides the agent with a further level of 
content in virtue of keeping track of a lower level which itself has a qualitative feel. In the 
bottle case, the agent's sensorimotor mastery provides him with an experience of the 
presence of the bottle - its 3-D shape and solidity - through his understanding of the ways in 
which his experience of the bottle's coldness and smoothness vary with his movements. The 
version 1 story, on the other hand, claims that the agent's sensorimotor mastery provides the 
experience of the coldness and smoothness as well as the presence of the object, and we are 
owed an account of how this is.  
   If this suggestion is adopted, and I think that it is at least implicit in O&N’s account, then 
the task will be to explain how sensorimotor mastery of subpersonal activity should feel like 
anything at all. After all, if the Porsche-driving example is to be believed, it is the perceiver's 
grasp of the ways in which patterns of input respond to bodily movements that carries with it 
- or rather constitutes - the phenomenal component of his experience. Without bringing to 
bear his sensorimotor expertise, that is, the inputs to his sensory systems have no intrinsic 
phenomenality. For a successful closure of the Explanatory Gap, what we need is not only an 
account of why performing certain suites of sensorimotor interaction with the world has a 
qualitative feel, but also why bringing to bear implicitly-held sensorimotor knowledge, in the 
absence of movement, should have a qualitative feel.    
 
   The Porsche-driving analogy does not satisfy the second of these tasks. Consider the 
requirement that an agent's predictive knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies be sufficient 
for his perception; that it is possible to have an experience with content and a phenomenal 
feel even without performing an exploratory movement. This shows that the qualitative feel 
associated with an episode of perceiving cannot be necessarily grounded in the performance 
of such an action, assuming that perception based upon predictive knowledge has a 
qualitative feel, and there is no reason to suspect that it does not. That is, the phenomenal 
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character of an experience, on an enactive approach, cannot be limited to what it feels like to 
perform an exploratory movement, and it cannot be limited to what it feels like to track 
patterns of changing input that are the responses to these movements. This is because 
experiences can take place in the absence of movements, and in the absence of such 
changing patterns of input.  
   There is, as far as I can see, no analogous qualitative feel attached to not driving a Porsche 
but knowing how it would respond were you to do so. While there may be such knowledge, 
and it may be possible to bring it to bear in some sense, perhaps whilst sitting in a Porsche, it 
is difficult to see how doing so yields any qualitative feel (beyond, perhaps, something akin 
to mental imagery). This failure of the analogy to match enactive perceptual cases is a 
symptom of the excessive emphasis that this part of O&N’s discussion places on the bodily-
exploration aspect of the sensorimotor theory. While many episodes of perceiving do involve 
physically exploring the environment with one's body, and it may even be the case that the 
possibility of perceiving without acting is in some sense dependent upon these cases, it is the 
understanding of the changes in input in response to movements that is important for the 
business of perception, even where a movement is performed. The possibility of perception 
through bringing to bear one's predictive knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies, which is 
a condition that the enactive view must uphold, shows that there are cases in which 
perception is possible without movement and without changing input, and thus that it is the 
agent's expectations concerning possible changes in input that here constitute his perception - 
an understanding of the ways in which the current input would change with movement. This 
understanding is based on expectancies, and these expectancies correspond to an implicit 
knowledge of the invariant properties that underlie sensorimotor contingencies.  But the 
same must be true when an exploratory action is made, at risk of having to provide a 
radically different explanation of how perceptual content is acquired in the movement and 
no-movement cases respectively2. That is, it must be the understanding of sensorimotor 
contingencies that does the work in both cases rather than just in those situations where the 
understanding takes the form of predictive or anticipatory knowledge.  
   The challenge for Version 1 of the sensorimotor account is thus to explain how bringing to 
bear knowledge of changes in subpersonal activity - however this 'knowledge' is to be 
spelled out - can result in or constitute perceptual experience, and in such a way that 
dissolves the explanatory gap. An appeal to how it feels to act in a sensorimotor-skilful way - 
like that made in the Porsche-driving analogy - will be insufficient for this task.  
 
   A further condition on perceptual awareness, and one which receives only a comparatively 
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brief treatment in O&N’s paper, is the requirement that an agent's knowledge of 
sensorimotor contingencies be integrated with his higher cognitive capacities. To have visual 
awareness, for example, the agent must not only master the ways in which patterns of visual 
input vary in response to the movements of his eyes, head and body, he must also recruit this 
understanding into his reasoning, planning and action-guidance. Perceptual consciousness, 
then, comes only when sensorimotor skills are put to use by higher cognitive faculties3.  
   This condition is introduced to allow for cases in which sensorimotor knowledge is 
exercised to a certain extent, or for certain purposes, but where these are insufficient for 
consciousness. It is an attempt, that is, to refine the notion of 'bringing to bear sensorimotor 
skill' in such a way as to secure all and only cases of genuine perceptual awareness. The 
suggestion is that when an agent is making use of his sensorimotor understanding, but not 
integrating his knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies with his higher level functions, he 
is unaware of the objects and properties that underlie those contingencies. This is evidenced, 
argue O&N, in such cases as when an agent is driving a car and holding a simultaneous 
conversation with his passenger (section 2.6). Although the driver's brain is 'tuned to' the 
sensorimotor contingencies that are associated with the visual properties of the scene outside 
the windscreen, and can use them for the purposes of controlling the car, what he lacks is any 
awareness of the scene, due to his attending to the conversation. Awareness comes only with 
(and is constituted by) the exercise of sensorimotor knowledge for the purposes of planning 
and reasoning; employing such knowledge in the service of action-guidance is not sufficient.  
   More generally, the strategy aims to eliminate the possibility of there being a Zombie agent 
who is in possession of all the sensorimotor skill and understanding that has so far been 
discussed. Recall that a philosophical Zombie is a creature who is in possession of certain 
physical or functional attributes that are proposed by a theory as sufficient conditions for 
consciousness, but who nonetheless lacks any phenomenal awareness. If the conceptual 
possibility of such a creature is sustainable, then the relevant sufficient conditions are shown 
to be inadequate - we can conceive of a Zombie who satisfies the conditions without being 
conscious. Sensorimotor skills, especially on Version 1 of the approach and especially when 
we consider the predictive or anticipatory cases, look like prime candidates for attributes that 
could be possessed by a Zombie. That is, at least at first glance, it seems possible to conceive 
of a creature who has mastered all of the ways in which his subpersonal patterns of 
stimulation vary in response to his movements but who nonetheless fails to have any 
phenomenal experiences. This is simply a way of bringing out the intuition that knowledge 
of any sort, still less knowledge of brain activity, is an unlikely candidate for constituting 
perceptual consciousness in the first place.  
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   The additional requirement that higher capacities such as planning and reasoning be 
integrated with such knowledge, though, appears to reduce the force of the Zombie claim, in 
that it becomes difficult to see what more would have to be added to give phenomenal 
consciousness. 
 
   Could a Zombie exercise sensorimotor skills for the purposes of planning and reasoning? 
O&N observe that such a creature would have to be endowed with what Block (1995) has 
called 'superblindsight' (O&N, section 7.1 and following) - the ability not only to make 
reliable discriminations between object properties in spite of having no conscious access to 
them (as a blindsighter can, to a certain extent) but to have access to the information on 
which those discriminations are made, still in the absence of phenomenal awareness. 
Blindsighters are required to 'guess' the nature of the stimulus, but perform at above-chance 
levels of accuracy. Superblindsighters, on the other hand, are indistinguishable in their 
behaviour and speech from normal perceivers because they have access to the information on 
which their 'perceptual' judgements are based; they don't need to be prompted to make a 
guess. On an enactive account of perception, the superblindsighter is an agent who has 
mastered sensorimotor contingencies, can make perceptual discriminations on the basis of 
exercising this mastery, and who has access to the contingencies on which perceptual 
judgements are made while still lacking phenomenal consciousness. 
   O&N deny that superblindsight is conceptually possible. It is not possible, they argue, to 
conceive of an agent who is capable of performing just like a normal perceiver in the 
absence of phenomenal consciousness. While blindsighters are limited to making fairly 
crude discriminations - between lines that are horizontal versus those that are vertical, say - a 
superblindsighter would exhibit a far wider range of 'perceptual' skills, such a wide range 
that the claim that he has no phenomenal consciousness diminishes in likelihood:  
 
"[I]f we imagine [the] informational content greatly enriched, as would seem 
required in the case of superblindsight, then the claim, on the part of the subject, 
that he lacks P-consciousness, becomes highly implausible. It is difficult to 
make sense of the claim that a person might offer an accurate description of a 
painting say, describing all the colors and the geometry of the composition in a 
natural manner, all the while having no experience of the painting. One loses all 
grip on what it could mean to say that the subject has no experience." (O&N; 
section 7.2, emphasis in original). 
 
   If this is right, then it is not possible to conceive of a Zombie who has access to the basis of 
his perceptual discriminations; that is, one who on the enactive view has access to the 
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sensorimotor contingencies that underlie his perception of the world. O&N propose that any 
agent who is capable of verbally reporting on the contingencies that are the basis of his 
perception, or of using them for the purposes of reasoning and planning has the requisite 
kind of access that threatens his status as a Zombie. For any agent who is able to use his 
mastery of contingencies for the purposes of reasoning and planning, in a way that is as rich 
and skilful as that of a normal perceiver, we 'lose all grip' on what it could be for the agent to 
lack experience.  
   This, as O&N note, is to 'cut across' Block's traditional distinction between Access-
consciousness and Phenomenal-consciousness. Rather than there being a sharp line between 
conscious access to information and conscious phenomenal properties, or qualia, it may be 
appropriate to interpret at least some of the latter in terms of the former. At least, it may be 
inappropriate to insist that there are phenomenal properties that must be introduced and 
explained over and above one's explanation of an agent's access to and use of sensorimotor 
contingencies.  
    
   The proposal that a creature who can self-prompt his perceptual discriminations and 
responses but who is nonetheless unconscious is inconceivable is made, too, by Andy Clark 
in 'A Case Where Access Implies Qualia?', albeit in a way that involves an alternative 
conception of what it takes to self-prompt. This kind of strategy, furthermore, is one that I 
endorse and that I investigate fully in chapters 5, 6 and 7. It should be noted that the rather 
brief treatment I provide in this section is largely introductory – much more will be said 
about this important feature as I proceed.  
   Clark considers the possibility of an organism who can not only make certain perceptual 
discriminations but knows that he can when he can by being in touch with the sensory 
modality that underpins his discriminatory ability. Being in touch with a modality, I argue, 
involves being able to integrate facts about its operation into one's higher-level capacities of 
planning and reasoning and so is identical to O&N’s condition of cognitive access.    
   I take the organism discussed by Clark in the opening of this paper, who can "be 
interrogated about his own acts of perceptual difference-detection" to be essentially the same 
as a superblindsighter. And again, the argument is that once we conceive of this case in the 
right way, as involving a creature with the right kind of Access-consciousness, it is 
impossible to imagine what could conceivably have to be added to get Phenomenal-
consciousness4. To be interrogated about one's acts of perceptual difference-detection is just 
to be asked whether one needs to guess about the informational basis of one's 
discriminations.  
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   In response to an interrogation concerning a particular perceptual discrimination, Clark's 
creature can respond, he argues, in one of two ways. Either it must report no access to the 
means by which the discrimination was made; or it must report that it has some, perhaps 
limited, access to the sensory modality by which the discrimination was made. If the latter 
response is given, the agent is a putative superblindsighter whose access tells him, for 
example, that his discriminations are visual rather than tactile (Clark, 2000a, p1). In this case 
the creature's abilities exceed, in fact, those which O&N ascribed to their superblindsighter. 
As Clark puts it, "I have access not just to the products of my sensory activity, but also to 
certain aspects of the sensory activity itself" (p1, my emphasis). I take it that O&N’s 
superblindsighter possesses only the former access: access to the sensorimotor contingency 
information on which a discrimination was made, which enables him not to have to guess in 
the manner of the non-super blindsighter.   
 
   However, the extra access proposed by Clark is easily accommodated by the enactive 
account. All it is, by hypothesis, is a non-inferential awareness of the sensory modality that 
is in use during a particular episode of perceiving. On the enactive account, information 
about sensory modality is available from two sources: 1) it is embodied in the contingencies 
that are encountered by the agent - visual sensorimotor contingencies behave in ways that are 
characteristic of vision, while tactile contingencies behave differently, and so on. 2) different 
modalities typically employ different parts of the body, or at least involve using them in 
characteristic ways (one may both touch and see by moving one's head, but one will move 
differently in each case). All that is needed for the kind of access that Clark suggests is 1) a 
means by which this information is recognised as being indicative of the modality in 
operation, and/or 2) a means by which the agent comes to know which parts of the body he is 
using and the way in which he is using them. Both of these, and especially the latter, appear 
to be eminently plausible candidates for capacities that are possessed by normal perceivers. 
Furthermore, they are non-inferential ways of accessing the modality in question - it is not 
that the agent uses his knowledge of which body-part is in action to infer the modality in use, 
it's rather that to know which body part is being used for the active exploration of the world 
just is to know the modality. This is because the enactive view interprets perceiving as 
exploring, so it is not that bodily action simply moves our sensory apparatus around, it 
partially constitutes our perception. So knowledge of sensory modality that is acquired in 
this way is unlike the example of an inferential access to modality that Clark himself gives: 
knowledge that closing one's eyes leads to an inability to make the desired discrimination.   
   Likewise, to pick up on the characteristic sensorimotor contingencies of one modality just 
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is to know that it is that modality which is in action. Clark notes that if any such access is to 
form a part of the explanation of the phenomenal feel of a perceptual discrimination, then it 
cannot itself be accompanied or constituted by a phenomenal feel of its own (op cit. p4), at 
risk of circularity. Access to modalities on the enactive view obeys this condition, too. There 
is no necessary phenomenal feel attached to knowing which part of one's body is being used 
to explore the environment, and neither is there one attached to recognising the sensorimotor 
contingencies that are particular to a modality.     
   Clark thinks that the what-it-is-like-ness of making a visual discrimination, its phenomenal 
quality, is captured by this notion of a non-inferential access to the modality: 
 
"[I]n this case, access-awareness (of the act of detecting a difference using a 
specific modality) seems to imply that there is (or is reported to be) something it 
is like to detect the difference". (op cit, p2).  
 
   It is a case, plausibly, where Access-consciousness implies Phenomenal-consciousness5. 
But Clark concedes (p7) that the scope of the explanation may be somewhat limited. The 
argument shows, if successful, that it must feel like something to make a perceptual 
discrimination when the requisite patterns of access to modality are in place, but it hasn't yet 
been shown that such an episode must possess the particular phenomenal feel that it does. 
For example, it shows that it must feel like something for an agent who has direct non-
inferential access to his visual modality when making a discrimination between a red and a 
green stimulus, but not why the perception of the particular stimuli has the phenomenal feel 
that it does - its redness or green-ness.  
   This concession, it seems to me, falls out of the intuition that Clark's argument has only 
attempted to explain what it feels like to make a visual discrimination (say) rather than a 
tactile one (say), and that it hasn't explained what it feels like to make one visual 
discrimination rather than another visual discrimination. We can accept that the creature 
who has non-inferential access to his sensory modalities could necessarily never be a Zombie 
without accepting that his phenomenal consciousness is constrained to any particular 
character. In this sense, the case is still vulnerable to an Inverted-Spectrum style argument 
(see, for example, Block, 1990) - nothing has yet been said about why an agent's colour 
experience has just this phenomenal feel rather than its inverse, for instance.  
   Clark's argument, then, goes some way towards an explanation of phenomenal 
consciousness but not far enough to settle the matter, and certainly not far enough to resolve 
the issue in a manner that satisfies the qualiaphile. It is my goal in the remainder of the 
project to develop an account of conscious experience that employs a similar move to that 
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described above, but where self-prompting is performed by way of the perceiver's access to 
the space of actions that is enabled by his perceptual sensitivity to the world6. This route, as 
we shall see in the following chapters, avoids certain difficulties that face Clark and 
O’Regan & Noë’s proposals.  
 
   The problem with making use of the Access-implies-Qualia proposal in either of the ways 
suggested so far is that it is unclear that this type of access is in fact in place, especially if 
there is a requirement that the product of the access be used for the purposes of planning and 
reasoning, and unclear whether access of any sort to patterns of subpersonal activity is 
sufficient for phenomenal consciousness. 
   For the superblindsight case to be inconceivable - for it to be impossible that such a 
creature could exist and still be a Zombie - the agent must have a very rich access to the 
output of his sensorimotor processing mechanisms, to an extent that renders him 
indistinguishable from normal perceivers. His ability to make perceptual discriminations is 
as finely-grained as our own, and thus he must have access to many and varied sensorimotor 
contingencies. Version 1 of the enactive account has argued that knowledge or mastery of 
sensorimotor contingencies is a subpersonal matter: it is either the case that there are 
mechanisms that are capable of recognising a given changing pattern of activation and 
producing a 'result', for example to recognise a pattern of input as being characteristic of 
round objects and producing an output with the content 'round', or it is the case that there is 
nothing more to perception than undergoing certain patterns of input even if they are not 
recognised as belonging to a particular external property. If the former is true, then access to 
sensorimotor contingencies is access to the output state and its content, with the use of this 
content for planning and reasoning. If the latter is true, then access to sensorimotor 
contingencies is just the ability to make use of certain expectancies concerning patterns of 
input for the purposes of planning and reasoning.   
 
   In both cases it is difficult to see that the right kind of access is in place. It is just not true, 
one might argue, that human perceivers have this access to the activity or output of their 
subpersonal mechanisms. Visual sensorimotor contingencies, for example, involve the 
activity of patterns of the retina or the early visual system, and it is implausible to propose 
that this activity is available for the purposes of reasoning, report, action-guidance and so on. 
But it is this activity which carries the information about the world on which perceptual 
discriminations are made, and it is access to this information that must be possessed by the 
superblindsighter if he is to avoid Zombification. To make finely-grained discriminations, 
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furthermore, the agent's access must be tuned to a wide range of potentially very similar 
patterns of activity.  
   If sensorimotor knowledge is construed as the personal-level ability to anticipate and make 
sense of the changing patterns of subpersonal stimuli that come in response to movements, 
then it can be sensibly denied that there is any such ability on the basis of the denial that 
there is any such access. In fact, O&N  concede in section 6.6 that many 'low-level' 
sensorimotor contingencies like the patterns of stimuli on the retina are inaccessible to the 
agent, and this appears to contradict their requirement that contingencies must be integrated 
with reasoning and planning if they are to produce conscious awareness. The examples they 
give of contingencies that are available for access - like looking at a plate and seeing its 
elliptical profile - clearly involve a perceptual relation to the appearance of the plate (and so 
a Version-2 story), in contrast to the tracking-subpersonal-stimuli account of the rest of their 
paper.  
   If sensorimotor knowledge is construed as the recognitional capacity of a subpersonal 
mechanism, with an output specifying the invariant external property that is the causal basis 
of a changing pattern of stimulus, then it can be denied that the person has any access to the 
(content-bearing) product of such a mechanism. For example, if seeing a surface as being red 
is a matter of anticipating the ways in which it will impinge on one's visual system when 
suitably illuminated, it can be denied that any such anticipation is manifested in human 
perceivers. If, on the other hand, seeing the surface as red is a matter of one's subpersonal 
visual mechanisms producing an output with the content 'red' as a result of a recognitional 
process - say, a neural network - then it can be denied that persons have any access to such 
content, or denied that subpersonal states can truly have content proper in the first place.  
   The construal on which sensorimotor mastery is embodied in a subpersonal mechanism 
seems further from the spirit of O&N’s original proposal anyway, in light of the stress which 
that model placed on the role of the active perceiver rather than the recognitional capacities 
of parts of his brain. So it looks as though O&N’s theory requires quite a robust access on 
the part of the perceiver to the activity of his subpersonal states. Perceiving an invariant 
property of an object, on this view, just is taking that property to ground a certain pattern of 
subpersonal activity.   
 
   So the main worry facing this version of the enactive approach is that it is not clear that the 
kind of access to underlying processing that is required for the implication of phenomenal 
consciousness - that is, for the rejection of superblindsight - is in fact in place in normal 
perceivers. In light of this, it is not at all clear that the Version-1 model can be offered as a 
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solution to the Explanatory Gap. Even though a reinterpretation of the physical facts 
involved in perception that accommodates the activity of the whole animal rather than his 
brain alone might be enough to 'imply' a qualitative feel in some cases (most plausibly the 
bottle-in-hands example), the requirement that sensorimotor knowledge be integrated into 
planning and reasoning capabilities renders this version of the account unsuccessful in its 
stated aims.   
   
3.2. Version 2: 
 
   The second interpretation of the enactive approach takes the relationship between perceiver 
and appearance to be a perceptual one, with appearances being construed as external, 
relational properties that hold between agent and object. Sensorimotor skill involves keeping 
track of the changes that take place within the experience of appearances in response to 
movements, in such a way that the agent is able to perceive the invariant properties of 
objects that underlie those changes. Perceivers see both the ways things appear to be - their 
perspectival or apparent properties - and the way things really are. In this section I challenge 
the adequacy of this construal of the enactive proposal on the grounds that this perceptual 
relation, if it were in place at all, would lead to experiences with a different content and 
character from our own.  
 
   As before, there are several ways of cashing-out what it is that is being understood or 
mastered in a body of sensorimotor skill, and of interpreting the nature of the perceptual 
content that is acquired through its exercise. First of all, there is an ambiguity over whether 
what I have called the 'second level' of content - that which is fixed by bringing to bear 
sensorimotor skill - does in fact constitute a further and independent level of content, content 
that specifies something over-and-above the changes in apparent properties that enter into 
the first level of content. On one reading, the perceptual content of an experience is 
conjunctive - agents see both the object's apparent properties and its real properties, and it 
makes sense to say that both of these contents really enter into the experience and that the 
person can use each content independently of the other. 
   On a second reading, though, it is not the case that perceivers see apparent properties and 
real properties, but rather that they see real properties in the changing patterns of 
appearances. There is nothing more, that is, to seeing an object as round (say) than seeing it 
as presenting an apparent shape that changes or would change in response to a bodily 
movement, and so the object's real shape cannot be reasoned about and so on (the content 
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cannot be used by the person) independently of this understanding.  We can again note that 
this questions maps onto the conceptual / nonconceptual content debate in the following 
sense: if there is a second level of content that specifies the real properties of objects, then 
the conceptualist will insist that a perceiver whose experience possesses this content must 
possess the concept(s) that specify those properties. If, on the other hand, there is no further 
level of content independent of the changing apparent-properties level, then there would be 
no such conceptualist requirement concerning the real properties of perceived objects. 
Instead, the agent's understanding of these properties is, as Noë puts, quasi-conceptual - it is 
an understanding that involves knowing how apparent properties change in response to 
movements, rather than a full-blown intellectual-conceptual understanding.  
 
   Both of these interpretations, however, rely on the same assumption: that apparent 
properties form part of the content of an experience. We shall see below that this can be 
sensibly denied and that there is an alternative phenomenology available to us. First, though, 
there is a final way of construing this version of the enactive account that must be re-
introduced. When I set up Version 2 of the sensorimotor story in the previous chapter, I 
noted the parallel between the apparent properties favoured by Noë and the sensational 
properties favoured by (Noë's reading of) Peacocke. Peacocke's cases propose, for example, 
that in the perception of two trees, one further away than the other, the image of the nearer 
tree (its 'size in the visual field') is larger than that of the further tree. This is a non-
representational property of the experience, rather than a difference in content. The two trees 
are represented as being the same size, but their sensational properties are not identical. We 
can make similar remarks for the sensational properties of colour and shape-in-the-visual 
field; these are the properties that we would ascribe to sense-data if we thought such items 
were interposed between agent and object.  
   Noë rejects the idea of sensational properties of experience while maintaining the proposal 
that there are differences between the experience of the two trees. Apparent properties 
should be ascribed not to a hypothetical visual field but to appearances - relational properties 
that are non-mental, non-sensational. The two trees, then, present different apparent-sizes to 
a relevantly-placed observer and the nature of these properties is fixed by his spatial relation 
to each tree.  
 
   It is possible, though, to construct an enactive story on which what is kept track of when 
sensorimotor skill is brought to bear is not changes in the content of an experience but 
changes in its non-representational properties. On an account like Peacocke's, the sensational 
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properties of an experience change in regular ways in response to movements - the size-in-
the-visual-field of the further tree increases in a predictable way as a perceiver moves 
towards it, for example. So it is open to the enactive theorist to argue that sensorimotor skill 
is based upon knowledge of the contingencies that hold between the agent's movements and 
the sensational properties of his experience. This is a different proposal from the other 
Version 2 models, but it shares with them the condition that sensorimotor skill is concerned 
with the changes that occur to properties of an experience, rather than to those that occur to 
subpersonal patterns of stimulation. The difference is that here it is non-representational 
properties of experience that are being tracked and understood.  
   Such an account relies, of course, on a theory of perception that endorses the notion of 
non-representational, sensational properties, and that these properties are capable of being 
tracked by the perceiver. If, furthermore, the enactive proposal is that all of the content of an 
experience is fixed by bringing to bear one's sensorimotor skills on patterns of changing 
sensational properties then that pattern must in some sense be bare of all content before the 
knowledge is exercised7.   
 
   Although I think that Noë favours an account on which sensorimotor skill tracks 
contingencies that hold between movements and perceptual content that specifies apparent 
properties, his use of experimental data concerning TVSS suggests an underlying 
commitment to something closer to the tracking-sensational-properties version, or perhaps a 
mixed account where both representational and non-representational properties are 
understood. As mentioned in the previous chapter, TVSS apparatus are capable of inducing a 
vision-like perceptual experience by way of providing the agent with a pattern of tactile 
stimuli that varies with his movements. The agent moves a camera that is linked to an array 
of stimuli that is arranged, typically, on his back or tongue. The tactile sensations produced 
by this array change in regular ways in response to the perceiver's movements, and they 
change in ways that are characteristic of visual perception. They change in response to 
movements of parts of the body that are associated with vision, and the changes embody 
constancies that correspond to properties that are typically visually-accessible, like shape and 
location.  
   Following a period of familiarisation, users of TVSS systems tend to report that their 
experience is vision-like, or that it is more visual than tactile (see, for example, Bach-y-Rita, 
1969). The sensorimotor theory can interpret these results as showing that the agent has 
mastered certain visual sensorimotor-contingencies, and that the experience gets its vision-
like character - and its fairly limited perceptual content - from this mastery. This is a mastery 
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of the ways in which sensational properties change with movements, and not that of the ways 
in which perceptual content changes with movements. On an account like this, there is only 
one level of content, that which specifies real object properties. Apparent properties may 
show up in the non-representational component of an experience, but not necessarily. For 
instance, the tactile sensation on the tongue of a TVSS-user that is the product of the 
camera's image of a circular object may be localised on an elliptical region - an elliptical 
region which would change in a way that is characteristic of round objects in response to the 
camera's movement - but this needn't be the case. What is important for the business of 
perceiving the roundness of the object is that the sensations change in law-like ways, not that 
they share any of the properties of the object's appearance.  
 
   Similarly, Noë discusses another example in which it is 'sensations' which are being 
understood in a sensorimotor way. This is a case from Poincaré in which the experience of a 
rotating sphere as it changes colour is qualitatively identical to that of a colour transition due 
to a chemical reaction in a spherical container, but in which one is capable of distinguishing 
the two situations, he endorses Poincaré's claim that our experience "cannot be understood 
just in terms of sensations, but rather [in terms of sensorimotor contingencies]" (2004, 
chapter 6, p38; my emphasis). The use of this case and the focus on TVSS results hints at 
Noë's possible commitment to this interpretation of the enactive view, although elsewhere 
his language is more firmly rooted in perceptual content, perceptual 'seemings' and 'looks' 
and so on. The implications of these two views, and we have seen and will see, are different, 
and it is worth keeping clearly in mind which version of the sensorimotor scheme is being 
employed at every juncture.   
 
   I have grouped these two interpretations of the enactive approach together as 'Version 2' 
theories because they both require that the perceiver keeps track of changes in the properties 
of his experience, be they representational or sensational. As a result, the sensorimotor part 
of both interpretations is more limited in its ambition than was the earlier version which 
aimed to dissolve the explanatory gap and account for conscious experience in terms of 
access to subpersonal stimulation. What the Version 2 models need in addition to their 
sensorimotor component are, respectively, an explanation of how an experience comes to 
have its first level of content (that which specifies apparent properties) or an explanation of 
how an experience comes to have non-representational properties like the sensations on the 
tongue of the TVSS-user8.  
   An attempt to dissolve the explanatory gap with respect to sensational properties along the 
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lines of the superblindsight arguments of the previous section is a possible line of enquiry. In 
the TVSS case, a superblindsighter would be an agent capable of making visual 
discriminations using sensory-substitution equipment, but who nonetheless reports no 
conscious awareness of the basis of that discrimination.  Recall that the superblindsighter 
would have to have a degree of access to the activity of his subpersonal systems9, and that he 
can use such information for the purposes of planning and reasoning. This access is what 
differentiates him from an ordinary blindsighter who has no knowledge of the basis of his 
guesses. In the current case, a form of access to the products of the subpersonal mechanisms 
responsible for the registration of the tactile input from the TVSS system is needed, because 
this is where the phenomenal component of the experience is located. On Clark's version of 
the story, a form of access to the sensory modality that is in use is a further necessity. Then, 
the argument proposes that it is impossible to conceive of a creature who possesses this 
access - at least in a rich and finely-grained sense - in the absence of phenomenal 
consciousness; that access implies qualia.  
   The current case is complicated by the fact that the sensational component of the 
experience is tactile while the representational component is visual (and, in fact, that it may 
make sense to talk of a qualitative feel that is visual in addition to the tactile sensations). The 
qualitative character of the experience - the what-it-is-like-ness - is in one sense visual in 
nature but in another sense tactile. So for the enactive theories to recruit Clark's proposed 
form of access, the agent must be able to monitor not only the activity of the tactile input but 
also the sensorimotor contingencies that are embodied in changes to that input that come 
with movement. The latter is a consequence of the enactive view's claim that the qualitative 
feel of an experience is constituted by mastery of sensorimotor contingencies. The 
phenomenal feel that is implied by access to the tactile stimuli just is what is tracked during 
the bringing to bear of sensorimotor knowledge according to the current proposal, given its 
commitment to the tracking of non-representational properties. For the TVSS 
superblindsighter to be inconceivable, then, he must have access to the tactile stimuli and in 
addition be able to monitor that access itself. The first type of access implies the phenomenal 
feel of the tactile sensations while the second type implies the feel of the visual aspect of the 
experience. This degree of cognitive access appears to be incompatible with observed cases 
of TVSS use, where subjects who adapt to the apparatus come to undergo the visual 
phenomenology whilst ignoring the tactile. This is not what we would expect if the former is 
grounded in sensorimotor understanding of the latter, and the latter requires integration into 
cognitive capacities.   
   Even if this kind of dual-access is intelligible it is still not clear that it is present in human 
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perceivers, especially if the link to higher-level capacities of reasoning and planning is a 
requirement. As before, it is not obvious that perceivers have any such access to their 
subpersonal processing, and it is not clear that Clark's argument explains why experiences 
feel like they do but only that they must feel like something.  
 
   A more general difficulty with any enactive account that relies on the understanding of 
changes in non-representational properties is the task of distinguishing these properties, if 
any exist, from the representational contents of experience and showing that it is the 
contribution of sensorimotor skill that makes the difference. In the TVSS case this is easily 
done by drawing the distinction between tactile sensations and vision-like content, with 
sensorimotor mastery constituting only the latter. The perceiver himself, in fact, can typically 
attend to one or the other. During normal episodes of perception, though, the division 
between representational and non-representational properties is much less clear. If such a 
division is to be made sharply then we must be able to identify properties of an experience 
that bear no content, and this is often difficult. So-called 'visual field properties', for instance, 
typically have an extension in two dimensions: the image of each tree in Peacocke's example 
takes up a certain size and shape. Does this spatial character contribute to the content of the 
experience, prior to the bringing to bear of sensorimotor mastery? If it does, then it is not the 
case that enactive skill is what fixes all of an experience's content, in contrast to the initial 
proposal of this interpretation of the theory. If it does not, their apparently spatial character is 
somewhat mysterious, indicating the existence of a 2-dimensional visual field.   
 
   This issue is one that carries over to the original Version 2 account that was introduced 
earlier. Here, it is changes in the representational content of an experience that are tracked 
during the exercise of sensorimotor skill. The content that is understood is 'low-level' content 
specifying the apparent properties that an object presents to a suitably located observer. 
Noë's idea, to reiterate, is that we perceive both apparent properties and real properties; 
plates look elliptical and round, for example. The central challenge for this proposal, raised 
in the discussion of Version 3 of the theory in the previous chapter, is that it can be argued 
that this content is in fact no part of ordinary perceptual experience. It can be sensibly 
proposed that plates and the like do not look elliptical at all, still less elliptical and round, but 
that they simply look round (or round and arranged at a particular spatial orientation). This is 
a possibility that is considered and rejected by Noë in chapter 3 of 'Action in Perception': 
 
"[A plate] looks elliptical to you, even though you can see that it is round... 
Some philosophers will not scruple to acknowledge commonplaces such as this. 
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It is just not true that the plate looks elliptical, they will say. But how can we 
take this seriously? Certainly it is not the case that we wouldn't be likely to 
judge the plate to be elliptical, on the basis of how it looks. Nor is it likely that 
we would say that it looks elliptical. But surely it does look elliptical from 
here!"  (Noë, 2004; p7 of chapter 3).   
 
   We should take seriously, though, the concessions made in the penultimate two sentences 
of this statement. It really is not the case that, in veridical perception at least, there is any 
tendency to report that apparent properties form part of the content of an experience. To this 
we can add that there is no tendency to act upon objects as though they possessed their 
putative apparent properties. There is no tendency, for example, to reach out to pick up a 
plate using a hand-grip that is tuned to elliptical rather than round objects. These are, of 
course, not conclusive arguments against the presence of apparent-property content. Milner 
and Goodale's work on the visual dual-streams hypothesis has shown that the control of 
action is likely to be guided by a separate processing stream from that responsible for 
conscious experience (Milner & Goodale, 1995). So tendencies to act on objects in certain 
ways may not be a reliable guide to the content that is present in experience. Actions such as 
reaching and grasping may be tuned to the real rather than apparent properties of objects 
independently of how those properties are perceived; they may even involve a further grasp 
of sensorimotor contingencies embodied in the processing of the dorsal stream.     
   On the other hand, we would need a good reason to agree with Noë that apparent 
properties form a genuine part of the content of experience, rather than playing some other 
role, in light of the lack of any tendency to judge and act upon the presence of such content. 
We can allow, after all, that perceivers may have some other kind of grasp or understanding 
of apparent properties, such as the knowledge of the image one would have to draw on a flat 
screen if one were aiming to make a lifelike representation of the object. This is the kind of 
knowledge at which visual artists excel, and which can be trained. But there is no 
requirement to conclude from this that perceivers with this knowledge have an additional 
level of content in their experiences, or that it is an understanding of how this content 
changes with movements that yields the rest of their perceptual content.  
 
   There is a more pressing difficulty facing this version of the theory, though, that is similar 
to the problem of distinguishing representational and non-representational properties that I 
noted in the tracking-sensational-properties version. The worry is as follows: the 
sensorimotor-mastery component of the theory states that enactive skills make a contribution 
to the perceptual content of an experience, they add a level of content that is not present in 
the perception of appearances. So any content that is acquired by way of (or constituted by) 
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sensorimotor skill is not present in the first level of content that specifies apparent properties, 
but that first level is still part of the experience. If we agree with Noë's phenomenology, this 
works okay for the elliptical-and-round plate case. The plate looks elliptical, but 
sensorimotor skill can be brought to bear in such a way that the perceiver takes the object to 
be circular. An agent with no enactive ability would see only the elliptical apparent shape; 
the circular shape is not available to him.  
   However, Noë's account aims to explain more than the perception of real shapes in 
sensorimotor terms. It aims, for example, to explain the perception of spatial properties too. 
The locations of the two trees in the Peacocke-style case, or at least their relative distances 
from the observer, are said to be perceived in virtue of understanding the ways in which their 
apparent sizes change in response to movements.  
   This content is not present to an observer who lacks the relevant sensorimotor mastery. So 
the first level of content - that which specifies the apparent sizes of the trees and which is 
available to the sensorimotor-ignorant perceiver - does not specify the spatial location (or 
relative distance) of the trees. The apparent properties presented by the trees must be 
perceived in this level as being arranged on a 2-D surface located somewhere in front of the 
perceiver. Similarly, not only must the plate look elliptical prior to the exercise of 
sensorimotor skill, it must look to be located on a 2-D plane perpendicular to the line of 
sight. It looks, according to Noë, elliptical and round; but it must also look to be located on 
this 2-D screen and out there in the world, if sensorimotor skill makes the contribution to 
spatial content. While the elliptical part of Noë's phenomenology is not too hard to swallow 
(if we disregard the concerns about the lack of any tendency to judge and act appropriately to 
this content), this located-on-a-flat-screen requirement is more obviously 
phenomenologically inappropriate.  
   If spatial properties are perceivable only by agents with sensorimotor mastery, this version 
of the theory must accept that the visual perception of appearances involves seeing them as 
located on a flat plane with no depth. There is no way to include 'apparent depth' or 'apparent 
location' as relational properties in the first level of content without eliminating apparent 
shapes: there will always be scope to ask the theorist who says that plates look elliptical 
where that elliptical appearance looks to be10. 
 
   If, on the other hand, perceivers can see the apparent location of an object without recourse 
to sensorimotor skill, there is no obvious reason why they cannot see their real shapes and 
orientation (as my Version 3 of the approach suggests). For example, if a perceiver can see 
the apparent location of a plate, then he will be able to see that one edge of the plate is 
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further away than the other, and thus see that it is a circle on its side11. The choice must be 
made between accepting that the first level of content has no spatial component or accepting 
that it does, which constitutes a rejection of Version 2 in favour of Version 3.   
 
   The problems that are particular to Version 2 of the enactive model, then, relate largely to 
the phenomenology that its account of perception entails. Either it is the case that there are 
non-representational properties of experience whose changes are tracked when sensorimotor 
mastery is brought to bear, and which are non-content-bearing, or there is perceptual content 
that specifies apparent properties, where these are not arranged in spatial depth. Both of 
these detract, at least, from the radically enactive nature of the proposal. Perceptual states 
with non-representational, qualitative properties are precisely the sorts of thing that the 
enactive approach aims to eliminate; the aim is to do more than simply add a sensorimotor 
component to an existing sense-data style approach. Secondly, if the theory aims to give a 
sensorimotor story on which contingencies hold between movements and perceptual contents 
that specify external appearance-properties, we end up with a phenomenologically-unnatural 
account.  
 
3.3. Version 3:   
 
   The primary difference between versions 2 and 3 is that the latter builds more content in to 
the first level of an experience, at the expense of the contribution of sensorimotor skill. 
Version 3 proposes that there is no enactive role played in the perception of the facing sides 
of objects (in the visual case), but only in providing for perceptual content that specifies their 
3-D shape and continuity - what Noë calls the perceptual presence of parts of objects that 
extend beyond what is immediately in view. This brings the visual case in line with the 
tactile case, which is nicely susceptible to this sort of enactive explanation. When holding an 
object, for instance, one has a perceptual sense of the presence of the whole object that goes 
beyond those parts of it that are in contact with one's hands. One feels the whole object in 
spite of having immediate contact only with a hand-shaped part of its surface, say. On this 
version of the sensorimotor story, then, visual perceivers see those faces of objects that are 
unobscured by occluders and that are suitably illuminated and within an appropriate viewing 
distance and so on. There is spatial content prior to (or independent of) the bringing to bear 
of sensorimotor skill in that objects are seen as bearing a certain spatial relationship to the 
observer. A plate is seen as being round, on its side, and located some distance away. The 
pre-sensorimotor content thus includes both a specification of observer-independent 
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properties (real shape) and of perspectival properties (relative distance and orientation).  
   The problem with this account is that it has so far failed to provide an explanation, in non-
sensorimotor terms or otherwise, of this first level of content. It is further still from the 
dissolution of the Explanatory Gap proposed by the first theory than was Version 2 above. In 
particular, it will need to provide an explanation of how visual perception comes to have 
spatial content, given the insistence on its non-sensorimotor nature that I made at the end of 
the previous section. The way that Version 3 has been set up makes it look as though it is 
only content that specifies primary qualities that is acquired through sensorimotor means 
(since I have stressed that it gives the perceptual presence of 3-D shape, extension, solidity). 
But spatial properties are primary qualities too and Version 3 will need a reason for why the 
experience of this quality is not mediated by sensorimotor skill while the others are.  
   In addition, it may be suspected that any successful explanation of how perceivers come to 
experience the facing parts of objects may be perfectly capable of accounting for the 
phenomenon of perceptual presence without recourse to sensorimotor talk. That is, that any 
account we give of the content that this version does not give a sensorimotor role to may be 
able to account for the sensorimotor part too. What this account will need, if it is to hold onto 
any sensorimotor contribution, is an explanation of the first level of content that goes just far 
enough, that doesn't also explain the 'second level' too. A representationalist approach, for 
instance, may see no problem in explaining the perception of the facing side of a tomato and 
the perception of the tomato as a solid and extended object in exactly the same way - in 
terms of the agent's construction of an internal representation of both of the relevant sets of 
properties as delivered by some perceptual mechanism.  
   The lesson to be learned from Version 3 of the enactive approach, I think, is simply that we 
can marry a sensorimotor contribution that assists in fixing content that specifies solidity, 3-
dimensional extension and so on to any of a number of competing accounts of perception 
that are already on the market. Some versions of representationalism, for example, may 
allow that content that specifies these properties is constituted by the exercise of 
sensorimotor skills, and likewise some direct-realist accounts. As we shall see, the theory 
that I defend in the rest of the project, although it rejects the strong role of sensorimotor 
factors proposed by Noë and others, accepts that they may contribute to some limited 
perceptual contents.  
   For now we can consider any problems that threaten Version 3 of the enactive thesis. As in 
the previous interpretations, there is a question as to whether the understanding of 
sensorimotor contingencies - here, the ways in which new parts of objects are perceptually 
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revealed in response to movements - is the only understanding that perceivers have of real 
object properties, or whether this mastery is used to recognise features of which the agent 
has a further, perhaps conceptual, understanding12. In the case of the visual perception of a 
sphere, for example, the options are as follows: either the agent just sees the object as being 
one whose parts (sides, surfaces) are revealed and look a certain way as he moves around it, 
or he uses this knowledge to recognise the object as being a sphere, the concept of which he 
possesses. We can call these the 'purely-sensorimotor' and 'conceptualist' interpretations 
respectively. The former kind of understanding involves only a grasp of the content of 
experiences of an object from different perspectives, and/or how these contents change with 
movement. It is not an intellectual grasp of the property of being spherical, but is based 
instead on how the property looks: the understanding is that objects of this type present a 
half-spherical part of themselves to a visual observer located anywhere outside its surface. It 
is not the case that perceiver need to have a conceptual grasp of what it is to be 'half-
spherical' in order to have this understanding, either, but only some grasp of how half-
spheres look from a certain perspective. But the phenomenology of Version 3 demands that 
the half-sphere looks half-spherical to the agent and not, say, flat-and-circular (or any other 
'apparent shape').  
   As such, this interpretation avoids at least some of the difficulties that face the 
conceptualist requirement that perceivers can only perceive that for which they possess 
concepts, for instance how to construe the nature of the experience of non-concept-users 
such as infants and animals. The purely-sensorimotor construal of Version 3 represents an 
advance on the correlative interpretation of Version 2 as well. In Version 3 what is 
understood is the way in which new parts of the physical object are revealed with 
movements, so only properties that are possessed by the object are perceived, both before 
and after the bringing-to-bear of sensorimotor skill (before: the facing side of the tomato; 
after: the presence of the whole tomato). There is no mention of apparent or relational 
properties. In the purely-sensorimotor construal of Version 2, however, what is understood is 
the ways in which apparent properties change, and perceiving real features just is perceiving 
them to have certain changing appearances (there is, by hypothesis, no additional conceptual 
understanding). Apparent properties are not properties that are intrinsic to physical objects, 
though, but depend upon the relations that hold between them and locations from which 
observation occurs. So the only possible perceptual content on Version 2 specifies properties 
that are not intrinsic to physical objects.  
   Version 3 need not attempt to dissolve the Explanatory Gap - the sensorimotor component 
of this version works over sophisticated perceptual content rather than patterns of 
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subpersonal activity. The qualitative character of experience is going to be constituted by 
more than what it feels like to perform a certain action and get a certain response, and there 
are options open for spelling out what that 'more than' is. As the least ambitious of the 
sensorimotor proposals, Version 3 leaves more work for that part of the theory that is not 
enactive in nature.      
 
3.4: General Objections to the Sensorimotor Approach: 
 
   In addition to the individual worries that face the three interpretations that I have set out, 
there are a number of possible responses to the general thrust of the enactive approach to 
perception. The objections question whether the physical makeup of the human brain is apt 
for the manifestation of sensorimotor skill, whether sensorimotor skills reflect the actual 
character of our perceptual experiences, and whether there are alternative types of 
knowledge that could be brought to bear and play the role so far attributed to sensorimotor 
mastery.   
 
3.4.1: Dual Visual-Streams Objection: 
 
   Milner and Goodale (1995) have developed an account of visual processing which divides 
conscious perception from the visual control of action in such a way that presents a prima 
facie problem for the sensorimotor theory, and although Noë briefly discusses and rebuts 
such a challenge in a way that I take to be successful (Noë, 2004, p.24) it will be illuminating 
to examine it here.  
   Milner & Goodale's dual-streams hypothesis13 claims that there are two channels of visual 
processing that are physically and functionally distinct. The first channel passes through the 
ventral regions of the brain and is dedicated to conscious experience, while the second 
stream is located in the dorsal regions and is geared towards the visual control of action. The 
two channels carry different information: the emphasis of the action stream is on those 
properties of objects that are important to the rapid online guidance of bodily actions, 
whereas the experience stream is concerned with the stable and unchanging features of the 
world. The former processes the spatial arrangement of the world relative to the agent's own 
location - so that the possibilities for action upon these items are immediately present - while 
the latter has a more abstract, non-agent-centred spatial system more suited to reasoning and 
planning (analogous to the difference, say, between knowing that there is a rock within one's 
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reach and knowing where the rock is in relation to the rest of the environment for future use).  
   The data discussed by Milner & Goodale are compelling14 and demonstrate that the 
functioning of the two streams, though typically in mutual agreement, can come apart in 
certain situations - for example in blindsight patients whose experience stream is damaged 
yet who maintain a (partially) intact action-guidance stream, or in cases of visual illusions to 
which only the experience stream is susceptible.  
 
   In light of this proposal, it may seem that the sensorimotor account of experience draws too 
close a link between perception and action in claiming that mastery of sensorimotor 
contingencies - that are action-involving - is necessary for experience. The anatomical and 
functional division between the two streams suggests, according to this objection, that their 
relationship is not as tightly coupled as the enactive approach claims. However, and as Noë 
himself anticipates, this is to misconstrue the nature of the sensorimotor approach: the theory 
does not suggest that experience is for action or the guidance of action; it is not the case that 
the processing of perceptual and action-guiding input would have to be performed together 
in a model of this sort. Input to the stream responsible for conscious experience changes in 
response to movements - which may or may not be guided by the dorsal stream - and if these 
changes are understood by the agent then he perceives the world.  
   We can construct a version of the sensorimotor account in the case of the action-guidance 
stream as well, since it too is sensitive to the real properties of objects rather than to apparent 
properties. Given that action-guidance is independent of conscious perception, such an 
account will most closely resemble Version 1 - it will be an unconscious tracking of 
subpersonal stimuli, not of a perceptual relation. As before, we can view this as a process of 
disambiguation - any given pattern of input does not uniquely specify the nature of the object 
causing the stimulus (an elliptical object and a round object may cause the same elliptical 
pattern, say). Bringing to bear an implicit understanding of changes in patterns of 
subpersonal activity, though, would be a possible mechanism for embodying sensitivity to 
real object properties. This is one possibility among many as far as the processing of the 
dorsal stream goes, and is hostage to empirical fortune, but if the sensorimotor approach is 
on the right track it is a genuine candidate. If each of the two streams proposed by Milner 
and Goodale involves sensorimotor mastery then understanding the relations that hold 
between the two (and further questions about why only one stream generates conscious 
experience if the underlying mechanisms of both are similar) remains a further project for 
the enactive theorist.  
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   While I take the general thrust of Noë's response to this objection to be accurate, there is a 
more significant worry for the enactive view that also comes from this direction. Andy Clark 
and Naomi Eilan (2006), following Milner & Goodale's treatment of the ventral stream, have 
emphasised that the contents of conscious perception appear to be systematically insensitive 
to fine-grained sensorimotor details. This suggests that, contrary to Noë's view, what gets 
into perceptual awareness is not determined by an understanding of finely-executed enactive 
skills. The alternative, they state, and as the rest of the project will argue, maintains that 
perceptual content is geared towards providing quite coarsely-grained descriptions of 
external features for the purposes of planning and rational action-choice. Clark and Eilan's 
comments stem from remarks made by Clark and Toribio (2001), in which they label this 
problem for the strong enactive story sensorimotor chauvinism.  
 
3.4.2: Sensorimotor Chauvinism: 
 
   The worry emerges from the enactive theorists’ insistence that characteristically motor 
systems are those that matter in the fixing of experiential content. Andy Clark and Josefa 
Toribio (Clark, 2002; Clark & Toribio, 2001) have argued that this insistence on the 
relevance of the details of sensorimotor contingency skill for the nature of conscious 
experience ties perceptual content too closely to action at the expense of higher-level 
cognitive systems such as memory, reasoning and planning. The thought here is that the link 
between a creature's perceptual and cognitive apparatus and the character of his experience 
that is required by the enactive theory is too restrictive: in a model of this sort "[my] 
conscious visual experience depends very very sensitively upon my implicit knowledge of a 
very specific set of sensorimotor contingencies" (Clark, 2002; p21). Because perceptual 
ability just is implicit mastery of sensorimotor contingencies, and these contingencies 
depend in turn on the nature of a creature's sensory physiology, any structural difference in a 
creature's sensory systems will result in a difference in what is experienced.  
 
   Clark offers two examples that serve to undermine this strict dependency: firstly the 
hypothetical case in which his own eyes perform their saccades slightly more rapidly than 
those of normal individuals, resulting in a different set of sensorimotor contingencies, and 
secondly the case in which a robotic table-tennis player is constructed with a rudimentary 
sensorimotor knowledge base. He argues that it should be up to empirical investigation to 
determine whether such cases would result in experiences of a different nature to our own - 
or even in any experience at all - rather than this being an a priori consequence of a 
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particular theoretical position. The implication of Noë's position is that the increased saccade 
rapidity does yield a qualitative experiential difference, and that the robot has an experience 
'of a very different nature' to our own.  
   The problem is posed by Clark as a dilemma, one horn of which must be embraced by the 
skill theorist: "O'Regan & Noë must either accept that every difference makes a difference, or 
they owe us an account of which ones matter and why." (2002, p21, emphasis in original). 
Noë (2004) appears to accept the first alternative. In his discussion of sensory substitution 
(cases where a man-made apparatus is used to stand in for a damaged or absent sensory 
system), he claims that the degree to which the experience achieved through the substitute 
system differs from that of the original system corresponds to the degree to which the 
sensorimotor contingencies afforded by the former differ from those of the latter. A 
substitute system whose contingencies are very similar to those of the normal visual system, 
for example, will result in an experience that matches normal vision closely15.  
 
   There is a deadlock, then, between Clark's intuition that not all differences in sensorimotor 
mastery should yield a difference in the way the world is experienced, and Noë's claim that 
only creatures with identical sets of sensorimotor knowledge can share identical experiential 
character. Clark's acknowledgement of the many roles that experience plays in a creature's 
life - including those of memory, planning and intentional action - strengthens his position, 
though. He argues that the world is presented in experience in such a way as to facilitate 
these activities - it is presented as populated by objects that can be acted upon, as offering 
opportunities for long-term goals and actions, and as stable and regular in a way that allows 
for the reidentification of remembered items and scenarios. It is factors such as these that are 
important to the way that a creature experiences the world, and thus the emphasis of O'Regan 
& Noë’s position on action in perception is too limited. Extremely sensitive dependence on 
very small sensorimotor differences (like the slightly-more-rapid-saccade case) is, according 
to Clark, unlikely to matter to the more high-level features of memory, planning and action - 
"What matters for visual consciousness is thus (I suggest) at best a select subset of the 
information O'Regan and Noë highlight. What will matter are whatever (perhaps quite high-
level) aspects of those sensorimotor contingencies prove most useful for reason, recognition 
and planning." (Clark, 2002; p32)16. 
 
   It is not absolutely clear what Noë's motivation for upholding the every-difference-makes-
a-difference (EDMAD) claim is, and it is not obvious that it is a necessary requirement of the 
sensorimotor approach. Its virtue is that it would make the account simple and unitary - all 
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perceptual content is fixed by enaction mediated by sensorimotor skill. Noë himself 
concedes that there may be other layers of content that are constrained by the concepts 
possessed by a perceiver - an agent cannot see that the ballerina has fallen over unless he has 
the concept of 'ballerina', for example - but his description of this implies that concepts are 
brought to bear on a base level of content that is dependent upon sensorimotor mastery and 
nothing else. The base level is what provides the experience with its qualitative character, 
and it is this to which the EDMAD claim is relevant. For Noë then, an agent with no 
concepts could have an experience of the ballerina with the same qualitative character as that 
of a concept-user only if their sensorimotor skills matched one another. 
   We can compare the current discussion to that of the Porsche-driving example considered 
earlier. O'Regan & Noë’s claim, remember, was that driving a Porsche has a certain 
qualitative character, and that this is constituted by what it is like to perform certain skilful 
actions on the car and receive certain responses - for the car to accelerate, corner etc in a 
particular way. Similarly, the qualitative character of a perceptual engagement is said to be 
generated by the interaction between body and world; the phenomenal feel of an experience 
just is what it is like to interact in a certain way with an object and its appearances. Just as a 
Porsche and a Ford, say, will yield different sets of responses, so too will the exploratory 
probings of the world that are made by two creatures with different bodies. In both cases the 
sensorimotor contingencies are different, and so (by hypothesis) the qualitative character of 
the episodes are different - but dependent upon the details of the creatures' physiology. So 
the EDMAD claim with respect to the qualitative character of experience is a consequence of 
the way in which phenomenal feel has been set up in this account. 
   The distinction between the qualitative character of an experience and its content has not 
been sharply upheld in this discussion - either in Clark's objection to O'Regan & Noë or in 
their response (perhaps because they think that such a distinction cannot be upheld). Clark 
quotes O&N as follows: 
 
"[C]reatures with radically different kinds of physical makeup can enjoy 
experience which is, to an important degree, the same in content and quality. 
But it also allows for the possibility (indeed the necessity) that where there are 
physical differences, there are also qualitative differences." (O&N, 2001; p4. 
Reproduced with emphasis added in Clark, 2002; p22). 
 
   If it is tenable to uphold a distinction between content and qualitative character, and to 
endorse the possibility that the two may come apart, then we can allow that two 
physiologically different creatures may have experiences that are the same in content but 
different in phenomenal character. This would be to accept the final sentence of the quote 
 66
above, but to maintain that sameness of sensory apparatus is not required for sameness of 
perceptual content. After all, if appearances are relational properties that hold between 
objects and locations of observation - and are independent of the sensory apparatus that may 
be used to detect them - then their exploration with one type of sensory system will be 
mediated by one set of contingencies but this does not rule out the possibility that a creature 
whose exploration of the object involves a different set of contingencies can have a 
perceptual access to the same property. For example, consider Clark and his swift-eyed twin 
in a case in which both encounter a circular plate. As they both explore the plate by moving 
around it, the elliptical appearances that each encounters will be the same (since they are not 
dependent upon sensory apparatus but only on perspective), but they will change in different 
ways - they will change at relatively different speeds. But if both Clark and his twin are 
capable of understanding these changes - as they are required by the sensorimotor view to 
do, if they are to perceive at all - then both will have an experience as of a round plate. The 
patterns of appearances that each perceiver encounters embody the same constancies - those 
that are characteristic of circularity - and perceiving is coming to be aware of those 
constancies. This we can allow even if the experiences have a different qualitative character. 
In addition, if the only physiological difference between Clark and his twin is that of 
saccade-speed, we should expect the content of their pre-sensorimotor-knowledge 
experiences (that is, their experience of appearances) to be identical.    
   If Clark's claim that what matters for visual consciousness is the interests and requirements 
of higher-level capacities like reasoning and planning is to hold not only for content but for 
phenomenal feel too (or perhaps better: that they go hand in hand in an inseparable fashion), 
then this constitutes a rejection of O&N’s claim that qualitative feel comes from 
sensorimotor interaction. It is to argue that the Porsche analogy as it stands does not do 
justice to the phenomenal feel that comes with conscious perception. The demands of 
reasoning and planning in this case would be such to edit or emphasise some aspects of the 
way in which the car responds during driving; to select a subset of the sensorimotor 
contingencies. The qualitative feel - and not just the content - of the activity would be in 
some sense constrained by these demands rather than being sensitive to the minutiae of 
action-and-response patterns. In conscious perception, the 'sensorimotor chauvinism' charge 
can be levelled at both content and qualitative character, and if the latter holds up this points 
to a failure in the original model - that of tying phenomenal feel too closely to the details of 
action.   
    
   There are two points in the sensorimotor theory at which there is potential for an influence 
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of some sort by higher-level capacities such as reasoning and planning at the expense of 
purely sensorimotor activity. These correspond to the two possible ways of spelling-out the 
enactive proposal that I observed in section 3.3. above, where I noted that it is either the case 
that sensorimotor understanding allows a perceiver to recognise a property for which he has 
some further, perhaps conceptual, understanding; or that his understanding of a property - 
and his perception of that property - is limited to how it looks or would look when an 
exploratory movement is made. In the former interpretation, we can say that there is an extra 
level of content added to the experience, and that this is constrained by the understanding 
that the perceiver has of the property. For example he might be able to see that a ball is a 
sphere, and to use this content to reason about the object in a way that is impossible for a 
perceiver who lacks the concept 'sphere'. On the latter interpretation the ball is seen as an 
object whose appearance changes in regular ways in response to movements, and there is no 
further conceptual understanding.  
   If there is a second level of content that is fixed by the concepts that the perceiver 
possesses, then this is a space for the types of capacities that Clark suggests to enter into the 
picture. The desires, interests, familiarity and so on that the perceiver has concerning the 
perceived object may affect the content of the perception by affecting the ways in which the 
agent thinks about it.  
 
   On the other hand, if the contribution that sensorimotor mastery makes to an experience is 
not in allowing a perceiver to recognise a property for which he possesses a concept, then the 
putative role of higher-level capacities in the fixation of content will have to be exercised at 
the level of the 'looks' of objects and their properties. That is, if properties are only 
understood in sensorimotor terms, then it is within the sensorimotor component that higher-
level capacities must be effective. There is space for this once we have realised that the 
relationship that holds between perceiver and appearance is a perceptual one (as I have 
stipulated in Versions 2 and 3 of the enactive approach). Agents perceive changing apparent 
properties and perceive real properties in those changing appearances. Depending on the 
account of perception that we employ to explain the agent's experience of apparent 
properties, there may be room for this content to be influenced by his higher-level capacities. 
A perceiver's visual experience of a pyramid, say, might not reflect its true apparent shape 
but only an edited or emphasised version of it that depends on his interests and plans as far 
as they concern the object. Then the perception of its real shape, which is possible only for 
agents who have mastered its sensorimotor contingencies, will be based in this edited or 
emphasised content too.  
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   To clarify: once we describe sensorimotor knowledge as knowledge of how an object or 
property would look from a changing perspective, there is room to build in a higher-level 
influence on how the object or property looks from any given perspective - an influence that 
is determined by what the perceiver's goals and plans are, and how the object fits into these. 
The sensorimotor understanding of contingencies of this sort - including expectancies of how 
the property would look were a predicted movement to be made - is thus sensitive to the 
edited or emphasised version of how the property looks.  
 
   If this is accurate then Clark's objection could be successfully accommodated within a 
broadly sensorimotor framework. On the amended account, we can allow that sensorimotor 
skills work over content that is itself sensitive to higher-level capacities. This, however, 
would make it true that the content of perceptual experiences is not solely dependent upon 
the fine details of sensorimotor interactions - the editing and exaggeration, however it might 
be manifested, would have a source that is independent of sensorimotor considerations.    
 
3.4.3: Ideal Appearances and the Redundancy of Sensorimotor Skill: 
 
   The previous two issues facing the enactive account have suggested that sensorimotor 
knowledge is not enough to explain the content of perceptual experience. The Dual-Streams 
Objection proposed that the visual system is not set up in the right way to behave in the 
manner suggested by the sensorimotor theorist while the Chauvinism Objection stressed that 
the real character of human perceptual experience does not reflect the close tie to action that 
the enactive theory demands.  
   The proposal to be examined here (discussed in detail in Kelly, 1999, although not 
endorsed there) can be taken to suggest that sensorimotor interaction with the environment is 
not a necessary component of perception. It proposes that there is a kind of content-
constraining understanding that lies somewhere between full concept-possession and the 
purely perceptual grasp that exists on the enactive view, and that doesn't rely on motor skill 
for its acquisition or exercise. The theory, which Kelly attributes to Russell and Hering 
independently, is that what I have been calling the 'second level' of content - that which on 
the enactive view is fixed by the perceiver's sensorimotor skills - is grounded instead in a 
perceiver's understanding or memory of how the property in question tends to look under 
ideal or familiar conditions. So rather than needing to master the ways in which the 
appearance of an object or property changes in response to movements, the agent need only 
know one appearance, which we can call the 'ideal appearance'. 
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   The conditions under which the ideal appearance is presented depend on the type of 
property in question - for colour properties the relevant conditions are those of illumination 
and ideal conditions are even, white light; for shape properties the relevant conditions are 
spatial, and ideal conditions are being located straight in front of the object, at a distance that 
is suitable for easy apprehension of its geometry. Alternatively, there may be a perspective 
on the object with which the perceiver is most familiar, and from which the object presents 
an appearance which he can easily remember.  
   This proposal, like versions 2 and 3 of the enactive account, involves two levels of 
perceptual content: one that specifies the object's apparent properties - or how they are 
perceived to be from the current perspective - and one that specifies its real properties. The 
disagreement between these two views is over the way in which real properties are 
understood by the perceiver, as this (we are assuming) is what constrains how they are 
perceived. Take the case of shape - on the purely sensorimotor view the real shape of an 
object is 'seen in' the pattern of changing apparent shapes; there is nothing more to seeing the 
roundness of a plate than knowing how its apparent elliptical shape changes with movement. 
Crucially for the present discussion, there is no 'privileged' appearance that fixes how the 
roundness is perceived - it is not the case, for example, that the apparent shape that the plate 
presents to an observer located straight in front of it (that is, a circle) makes more of a 
contribution to the agent's experience than any other individual appearance. The ideal-
appearances view, on the other hand, makes just this claim. What is brought to bear in 
perceiving an object's real shape is knowledge of how it looks when viewed straight-on, i.e. 
under ideal conditions. Similarly for colour: the enactive view allows that knowledge of 
changes in apparent colour that come in response to changes in conditions of illumination 
may play a part in the perceiver's sensorimotor mastery (that is, that more than just purely 
motor-induced changes are relevant; I'll say more about this later), but it is again changes in 
appearance that are the key to his perceiving the real colour of a surface. There is nothing 
more to seeing an object as red than knowing how its apparent colour changes in response to 
changes in conditions of observation. Again, there is no privileged apparent colour - it is not 
that how the colour looks under even white light plays a special part in the perceiver's 
understanding. The ideal-appearances view, in contrast, states that the two levels of content 
specify, respectively: 1) the apparent colour of the surface, or how it looks under the current 
conditions, and 2) the colour that the surface appears to have under ideal conditions.   
 
   Recall that the enactive view must permit that agents can have perceptual experiences 
without moving. In these cases, a predictive understanding of the ways in which appearances 
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would change in response to movements is exercised. The bringing-to-bear of this 
knowledge constitutes the perception of the real properties of the scene. For instance, a 
perceiver can see that an object is a cube without having to move around it and encounter its 
changing aspect so long as he understands the ways in which that aspect would change were 
he to do so. It is a similar form of predictive understanding that is putatively exercised on the 
ideal-appearance view. Perceivers bring to bear their knowledge of how the properties that 
they are now encountering under non-ideal conditions would look under ideal conditions.   
   In both cases, this understanding is said to account for the phenomenon of perceptual 
constancy - the fact that certain properties of objects are perceived to remain the same even 
though conditions of observation change. On the ideal-appearances model, the constant 
property that is perceived across changing conditions is that which the object is perceived to 
have under ideal conditions - grass is seen to be the same colour at dawn and at noon 
because in both cases it is seen to have the colour it would seem to have under even white 
light. On the sensorimotor account, the constant property that is perceived across changing 
conditions is that which is responsible for the ways in which the object's apparent properties 
change in response to a change in conditions. There are constancies that underlie the 
characteristic ways in which the apparent shape of an object, for example, changes as the 
observer moves around it. Grass is seen to have the same colour at dawn and at noon because 
in both cases the viewer understands that the underlying colour property that produces this 
apparent colour under these conditions would produce that apparent colour under those 
conditions.  
      
   Kelly criticises the ideal-appearances position (which he calls the 'empiricist' position) for 
failing to account for the phenomenology of perceptual constancy appropriately. On his 
interpretation of Russell and Hering's view, what is perceived on any given occasion is only 
the ideal-appearance. Grass, for instance, looks the same colour at noon and at dawn because 
perceivers substitute the way its colour looks under the present conditions for the way it 
looks under ideal conditions. It is not that properties are perceived to be constant in spite of 
appearing different under different conditions, it is that they don't appear different at all. This 
is to construe the ideal-appearances view as being disanalogous to the enactive account - 
rather than there being two levels of content, one which specifies how things appear from 
here and the other how things really are, there is only one: how things appear under ideal 
conditions.  
   We can, though, interpret the ideal-appearances model in the way that I have done above, 
as being at bottom a similar kind of proposal to the sensorimotor view but involving the 
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bringing-to-bear of a different kind of understanding. This would be to claim, contra Kelly's 
objection, that agents perceive both properties-in-context and properties-as-they-really-are, 
where the latter is understood as properties-as-they-appear-under-ideal-conditions. If Kelly is 
right, of course, this is not a faithful interpretation of Russell and Hering's position, but it is 
one that fits nicely with the discussion so far.  
 
   The existence of this possibility, if it can be sustained in the right way, threatens the 
requirement that it is changes to the way things look that come in response to movements 
that are important to the business of perception. Once we've accepted that the exercise of an 
agent's understanding, suitably construed, can play a role in constraining the contents of his 
experiences, that is, it is an open question as to what that understanding pertains to. 
Interpreting such understanding as a grasp of the ideal appearance of an object or property, 
rather than of its profile of sensorimotor contingencies, provides us with an alternative 
account of perceptual constancy phenomena, and there may be others.     
 
3.5: Summary and Conclusions: 
 
   The differing explanatory goals of the three possible construals of the enactive story have 
resulted in their being open to challenges from different directions. A Version 1 account 
aims not only to secure a sensorimotor explanation of perceptual content, but also of 
phenomenal character. Once we see that phenomenal facts supervene on physical facts 
concerning the exercise of sensorimotor skills and their integration into a perceiver's higher-
level cognitive capacities, this story goes, we can provide a non-question-begging closure of 
the Explanatory Gap. The appeal to higher-level integration, I noted, is a move that is shared 
by Tye's (1995) representationalist approach and Clark's (2000) access-implies-qualia 
strategy, and is employed to ensure that the account can distinguish between uses of 
sensorimotor skills that are not consciousness-implying (for example, in the guidance of 
action) from those that are. My particular concern for this version of the account is that, 
given the way that sensorimotor contingencies have been set up as dependencies that hold 
between movements and patterns of subpersonal sensory stimulation, the requisite kind of 
integration with higher-level capacities for reasoning and planning cannot be in place. Even 
if we can make sense of there being a personal-level understanding of contingencies of this 
kind, and I'm not sure that we can, the further condition that this makes a difference to an 
agent's thinking, planning, goal-selection and so on is an unrealistic one.     
   On Version 2, in contrast, sensorimotor dependencies hold between the perceiver's 
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movements and her perceptual relation to externally-located appearance properties. This 
account not only leaves that perceptual relation unexplained, but also results in a two-level 
view of perceptual content that has unacceptable consequences. The exercise of sensorimotor 
understanding, on this approach, brings about a second level of content, specifying an 
object's invariant properties, from an initial level specifying its apparent properties. The 
second level is uniquely determined by profiles of movement-inspired change within the first 
level - apparent shapes, for example, transform in ways that are characteristic of the real 
shapes that underpin them. The problem with this, I argued, is that it is far from clear that 
perceptual content has this two-level structure in general. Although it may be a sustainable 
description of the visual perception of shape17, where we can talk of the surface of a square 
table, say, as having a diamond-shaped appearance from here, talk of a two-level spatial 
content, for example, is very unnatural. For a visual experience of the real distance to an 
object to be brought about by a perceiver's grasp of movement-induced changes to its 
apparent distance, as this view would imply, there would have to be a commitment to 
apparent-distance content in experience, and this is obscure. To put the point in a different 
way, if part of what is experienced in vision is the apparent shape that an object would 
project onto a 2-dimensional screen perpendicular to the line of sight, it seems that the view 
is similarly committed to the apparent location of that screen forming a part of the spatial 
content of the experience. We shall see in the next chapter that the explanatory plausibility of 
the second version of the enactive view varies across the sensory modalities.        
 
   Version 3 of the enactive view is in a sense the weakest, in that it leaves the distinctively 
sensorimotor component with little to do. It notes simply that there is a possible sensorimotor 
contribution to perception - that which determines or constitutes the experience of objects as 
solid and extended in 3-dimensional space - that could supplement the resources of a range 
of existing perceptual theories. For example, it may be that a representationalist can appeal 
to an agent's sensorimotor skills in explaining how he comes to experience objects as solid 
and extended but retain standard representational vocabulary in explaining all other contents. 
Likewise, a direct realist may state that the perceiver is in immediate contact with only the 
facing sides of objects but can nonetheless have a fuller experience of the whole object as 
perceptually present in virtue of bringing to bear sensorimotor knowledge. I find this version 
a plausible one, and as we shall see it is consistent with the treatment I develop in the rest of 
the project, but a possible concern is that the sensorimotor factor it introduces will be made 
redundant by the explanatory apparatus employed by particular theories of perception. A 
representationalist account, for example, that appeals to a causal chain between object and 
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perceiver in explaining the contents of perceptual states may have built-in resources to 
accommodate the content that version 3 attributes to sensorimotor factors.  
    
   Three more general concerns were introduced. Firstly it was noted that empirical results 
support Milner & Goodale's division between two separate visual processing streams, one 
devoted to conscious perception and the other to finely-grained motor control, and that this 
presents a prima facie difficulty for any theory that takes action and perception to be co-
constituted. While I accepted Noë's response that the enactive view is not in fact committed 
to any consequences that are directly in conflict with the dual-streams results, a further 
upshot of Milner & Goodale's position is that the contents of the conscious stream appear to 
be systematically insensitive to fine sensorimotor details. From this issue emerged the 
second strand of my critical analysis - the objection of sensorimotor chauvinism (Clark & 
Toribio, 2001). The contents of experiences, this view suggests, present the world as an 
arena for rational action and response; for ready discrimination, comparison and segregation 
in ways that capture what is important about the environment for the perceiver's ongoing 
interests and goals. The delivery of this content and the implications of this view will be 
focused upon in the rest of this project, but for now it suffices to note that any considerations 
that count in favour of the view that perceptual content is of this form, and as such may 
involve rough-and-ready editing and exaggeration (where this enables fast and fluent 
interaction) at the expense of fine sensorimotor tuning, count against the strong enactive 
model.    
   Thirdly, I offered one alternative construal of the kind of understanding that might 
constrain perceptual content and which deals with perceptual constancy phenomena as 
successfully as the sensorimotor project. On this picture, an agent may be capable of 
bringing to bear knowledge of a property's ideal appearance rather than of its full 
sensorimotor profile; to grasp, for example, that the surface of a table that has a diamond-
shaped appearance from here would present a square appearance from face-on. The second 
level of content is again the invariant property albeit specified, this time, in terms of how that 
property looks or would look under ideal conditions. This alternative introduces the 
possibility that there are viable alternatives to the sensorimotor construal of perceptual 
understanding.  
 
   These considerations undermine the enactive project, especially in its more ambitious 
variants. It is unclear that we can develop a sustainable account of perception that depends 
upon an appeal to skilfully-mediated sensorimotor understanding that is neither question-
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begging nor empirically unjustified. The challenge has been to the left-hand-side of 
purported sensorimotor contingencies - if the patterns that change with movements are taken 
to be subpersonal it is problematic to locate their role in personal-level perceptual 
phenomena; if they are taken to be perceptual we lose the truly enactive flavour of the 
approach and end up with a phenomenologically-implausible description of the content of 
experience. 
   In the next chapter I investigate some features of non-visual perception from an enactive 
perspective, as these modalities have received little attention in the literature, before turning 
my attention to how the sensorimotor approach must deal with cases of misperception. In 
doing so I highlight some further worries for those who intend for the enactive model to be a 
fully general theory of perception.  
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Chapter 3 Notes.  
 
Footnote 1: I doubt that Noë & O'Regan themselves take this particular example to 
demonstrate a successful Explanatory Gap solution, given that such a solution is not the 
primary focus of their paper.  
 
Footnote 2: One possibility is to endorse a kind of disjunctivism here, where the division is 
between cases of perception in which an exploratory movement is made and feedback is 
received, and cases that involve only the bringing-to-bear of predictive knowledge of how 
inputs would change with movements. The task then would be to explain how the latter 
could be qualitatively identical to the former. The case of misperception is a separate issue 
that will be examined in chapter 4.   
 
Footnote 3: This condition has a precedent in certain representationalist accounts of 
perceptual consciousness, e.g. Tye (1995), where the aim is to distinguish those kinds of 
content-use that are sufficient for consciousness - higher-level transactions of some sort - 
from those that are purely unconscious.  
 
Footnote 4: Of course, enthusiasts of qualia will deny precisely this claim and argue that it 
forms a question-begging construal of phenomenal consciousness. From the point of view of 
those who endorse the access-implies-qualia move, though, the reverse is true: it is question-
begging to hold that there are intrinsically phenomenal properties. I shall examine these 
competing views in detail in chapter 6.  
 
Footnote 5: The possibility that such access implies that phenomenal consciousness is 
(merely) reported by the creature is one whose assessment I defer until chapters 6 & 8; I take 
it that this significantly different proposal is not the interpretation that O'Regan & Noë 
employ in their argument, and is closer to what has been called a phenomenal concept 
strategy (Stoljar, 2005).  
 
Footnote 6: This option is gestured at by Clark as a possible means of access to modality, in 
keeping with the thrust of his proposal, but left undeveloped in his paper.  
 
Footnote 7: This interpretation of the theory is close to that described by A.D. Smith (2002).  
 
Footnote 8: It may be that an explanation of the content of perception would suffice as an 
explanation of its character, of course, so these shouldn’t be taken to be necessarily 
separable.  
 
Footnote 9: A kind of access, recall, that I have argued is not capable of being in place, and 
which is possibly conceptually confused.  
 
Footnote 10: The treatment that Noë gives of the patient of a cataract operation, on page 5 of 
Real Presence, on which "Large objects far away looked to this post-operative patient like 
small holes nearby", is the closest he gets to acknowledging this two-level spatial content 
requirement.   
 
Footnote 11: This response constitutes a rejection of the personal-level diagnosis of 
perceptual constancy phenomena. Rather than there being a problem of how it is that objects 
can be perceived as having observer-independent properties when all the agent has access to 
is perspectival properties (where this is solved, on the enactive view, by employing 
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sensorimotor expertise), both kinds of content are ‘already there’ in perception by the same 
(representational, say) means. 
 
Footnote 12: Or, indeed, some other practical / nonconceptual understanding that is not 
sensorimotor in character.   
 
Footnote 13): Milner & Goodale's treatment presents a different functional division to the 
earlier, influential proposal of Ungerleider & Mishkin (1982), on which the relevant 
separation is between 'what' and 'where' streams.  
    
Footnote 14: Although the strict and complete separation of the two streams as I have 
presented it is probably an overstatement, as important cross-connectivity exists. I take it that 
the broad division of functional labour into action and perception streams is correct, 
however.  
 
Footnote 15: Although more recently Noë has denied that his view entails the EDMAD 
claim (Noë, in conversation). If this is right, then the argument I present in this section can 
be taken as further motivation for this denial.  
 
Footnote 16: We can run an identical objection with respect to the non-motor factors that are 
said to feature in a perceiver’s sensorimotor understanding, such as a grasp of changes to 
apparent colour that are the result of alterations in conditions of illumination. Is it the case, 
such a challenge would go, that every minute detail of changes to reflectance, intensity, hue 
and so on must get into perceptual content?  
 
Footnote 17): On my own view, even apparent-shape properties don't come into visual 
content - plates don't look both elliptical and circular. It is my experience, however, that 
intuitions genuinely vary on this matter. For a review of philosophers who also deny the two-
level view see Noë, forthcoming, section 1.   
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Chapter 4: Non-Visual Perception and Perceptual Error. 
 
   So far my discussion has largely been concerned with visual perception, its content and the 
means by which this content might be fixed. This reflects the focus of the sensorimotor 
approach literature - Noë, for instance, has said little about non-visual experience - and of the 
philosophy of perception literature more widely, where there is a trend to accept vision as the 
paradigm of a sensory modality and to assume that conclusions about its nature can be 
extrapolated to non-visual cases. A unitary account of the senses - that is, one that explains 
in similar terms how each modality gets its content and phenomenal properties - is a 
desirable philosophical goal, and the least that we should hope for are explanations of 
individual modalities that are compatible with one another and that do not require radically 
different conceptual apparatus. As a result, if we are to sustain a sensorimotor model of 
visual perception (if a proposal like Noë's survives the kinds of issues I have raised up to 
now) then we should expect our explanation of non-visual perception to rely upon similar 
considerations; we should be able to speak in terms of the active exploration of appearances, 
of multiple levels of content being fixed by the exercise of sensorimotor skills and so on, in 
auditory, tactile, gustatory and olfactory perception.  
   The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the extent to which the central features of the 
enactive approach can be carried over to non-visual sensory modalities, and to argue that the 
contribution of sensorimotor understanding to these cases is rather limited. While an agent's 
grasp of the sensory consequences of her movements may present her with some of the 
spatial properties of the entities she detects non-visually, the rich range of experiences of 
sounds, smells, tastes and the like are not adequately accounted for on this model. Non-
visual experiences, and especially those achieved by olfactory or gustatory means, have, I 
argue, a somewhat different structure to those of vision. It is more difficult in these cases to 
separate the properties of the objects of experience from the properties that they appear to 
have from the perceiver's current perspective, and it is not clear that non-visual perception 
has an active-exploratory character. As a result, my view maintains that sensorimotor 
considerations influence non-visual perception in ways that are partially distinct from those 
that bear upon the visual case.    
   
   Although it may tread on some philosophers' toes, I will assume for simplicity that the 
sensory modalities are discrete and countable - limiting my discussion to sight, hearing, 
touch, taste and smell - and that it is possible to determine the content that experiences from 
each modality bear.    
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4.1: Non-visual Perception on the Enactive Approach. 
 
   The sensorimotor approach, as has been described in detail in the previous two chapters, is 
characterised by its active construal of the business of perceiving: rather than being a passive 
reception of information, perception is constituted by the skilful exploration of the world, as 
mediated by 'sensorimotor contingencies', ways in which patterns of stimulation change in 
response to one's movements. In chapter 2, I identified an important division in the ways in 
which this proposal can be interpreted; it is either the case that what an enactive perceiver 
keeps track of as she moves is the changing patterns of subpersonal stimulation - inputs to 
her retinae, for example - or it is something at the conscious level, either a primitive level of 
experiential content, or non-representational properties with intrinsic phenomenality. Many 
of the considerations of this chapter, however, apply equally to each of these interpretations 
and the individual ways of chopping up the general approach will be noted only where they 
make a real difference.  
 
   Visual perception, according to the enactive theory, involves moving one's eyes, head and 
body in order to alter one's perspective on the environment. By drawing on one's knowledge 
of the ways in which how things look from here change in response to one's movements, one 
perceives the constancies that exist within these changes - apparent shapes, for example, 
change in regular ways that reveal the real physical shapes that underlie them; apparent 
colours alter in comprehensible ways, furthermore, in response to alterations in the 
conditions of illumination. On Noë's view, only a creature who is capable of exercising a 
particular set of bodily skills (and of understanding the resulting changes in input) can 
undergo visual perception; he needs to have mastered the contingencies that hold between 
appearances and changes in the conditions of observation.   
   Noë claims, furthermore, that both the content and the phenomenal character of experience 
is explicable in sensorimotor terms; there is no real separation of the two. The qualitative 
properties of an experience of redness, for instance, are tied to the sensorimotor 
contingencies that apply to red surfaces - for an object to look red just is for it to look as 
though its apparent colour will change in ways that are characteristic of redness. This is in 
opposition to theories of colour experience that endorse colour qualia (see, for example, 
chapter 4 of Noë, 2004), and more generally to any account of perception that ascribes a 
significant causal or constitutive role in the determination of phenomenal character to 
activity of the brain rather than to that of the whole creature. The enactive view, that is, 
hopes to eliminate the need for an explanation of how the brain generates content and 
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qualitative character by showing that these can be explained in terms of the exercise of skills 
by the active perceiver.   
 
   The problem with extending this account to non-visual experience is that it is not clear that 
such bodily exploration typically takes place in these cases, or that there are relevantly 
similar and trackable conditions of observation here. A pre-theoretical survey of some cases 
of non-visual experience reveals this. When you hear birdsong, for example, it is not obvious 
that you explore the real nature of the sound by keeping track of its apparent nature; in fact, 
it is hard to make sense of what could correspond to these categories. It is even less clear that 
there is exploration involved in experiencing the taste of a cup of coffee, say, or what such 
exploration could possibly involve. Neither of these episodes of perception appear to require 
movement of any sort for their content or phenomenal character. Unlike in vision, where we 
have a perspective upon the world as it is laid out before us and we are capable of shifting 
this perspective, the other senses are - at least at first pass - more amenable to the passive 
rather than active construal. When we smell the scent of a flower, say, the notion of having 
an olfactory perspective on the property in the sense in which we have a visual perspective 
on a coloured surface, for example, is not a natural one. In light of this, any account that 
makes it a requirement that perceivers skilfully alter their perspective seems to run into 
difficulties when it comes to these cases. Initially, then, it appears that a passive rather than 
active account of non-visual perception will be required, one on which the content and 
character of the experiences is grounded in the nature of the input - the activity on the 
tongue, say, or on the skin - rather than in changes to that input.  
 
   The enactive model, we have seen, does not demand that a movement is performed on 
every given perceptual occasion. What is important, instead, is that a body of sensorimotor 
knowledge is brought to bear. A changing pattern of input (or of low-level content, or 
phenomenal properties) is not needed; all that is required is that the perceiver brings to bear 
his understanding of how the current input would change were a particular movement to take 
place. I have called this the predictive or anticipatory version of the enactive view. Is this 
available as a response to the apparent lack of a movement component in the non-visual 
cases? Is it always the case that some body of sensorimotor skill is brought to bear here even 
when an exploratory action is not performed?  
 
   No. For at least some aspects of the contents of non-visual experiences, changes that come 
with movement are simply irrelevant. There are, we can concede, some alterations to the 
 80
input to non-visual modalities that are the results of bodily actions, and so it is not the case 
that these modalities are totally passive. The strength or intensity of an odour, for instance, 
recedes as the olfactory perceiver moves himself away from its source (or moves the source 
away from himself). Similarly, the taste of an object in one's mouth may increase in response 
to a movement of one's tongue, and diminish as the object is removed or swallowed. But 
these are not, I contend, examples of the exploration of such properties in the relevant sense, 
and being able to anticipate the ways in which such changes would occur were such a 
movement to be performed does little or nothing to fix the content or character of this kind of 
experience. Knowing that the smell of a rose, say, will increase in intensity as one brings 
one's nose up to it does nothing to determine the distinctive floral scent that is experienced. 
In perception by gustatory or olfactory means, the changes that come with motion apply only 
to the intensity, or perhaps the salience, of the experience. In contrast, we can identify 
(following Noë) all sorts of properties that appear to alter during visual exploration - 
apparent colours, shapes, sizes and so on - where these changes are the result of either a 
change in the observer's spatial perspective or in other conditions of observation. In the next 
section I give a more detailed treatment of the sensorimotor element of non-visual perceptual 
content.  
    
   A quick note about how this issue applies to the two competing interpretations of the 
enactive account: (1) if we take sensorimotor skills to operate at the level of subpersonal 
stimulation (as in the original O’Regan & Noë account), then perceiving the real properties 
of the environment is a matter of understanding the constancies that are embodied in a given 
changing pattern of activity. What is important (O&N, 2001; section 2.2; and my chapter 2) 
is not the nature of any particular pattern of input - for instance, any particular retinal image - 
but that the patterns change in regular ways that correspond to external properties. A 
particular retinal image may not itself be square, but when it changes in ways that are 
characteristically indicative of the presence of a square surface when the agent moves his 
eyes, the perceiver is in a position to track this constancy. Both the content and the 
qualitative properties of the experience come from the agent's bringing to bear his knowledge 
of the sensorimotor profile of squareness, and not - to repeat - from the nature of any 
individual pattern of subpersonal activity.   
   If what I have said about non-visual perception is right, though, there is no such changing 
pattern of subpersonal activity that is capable of embodying constancies like this. The pattern 
of activity on the tongue will not change in a law-like way when coffee, say, is explored 
because no exploration necessarily occurs during a taste experience. Again, the only changes 
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to input that take place in response to movements of the tongue and so on are those to the 
intensity of the activation, and it is unclear why these should contribute to content or 
phenomenal character. It is unclear, anyway, why these changes should be better candidates 
for this role than the patterns of stimulation themselves: what seems to be doing the work is 
the fact that coffee stimulates the taste-buds in a different way from orange juice, for 
example, rather than that this stimulation changes in a characteristic way for each property 
when the agent moves. If this is right, then the emphasis seems to be on the processing done 
by an agent's brain rather than on her skills as an embodied actor.   
(2) The second interpretation of the enactive account, on the other hand, states that there are 
two levels to perceptual content, and that the latter is constituted by the exercise of one's 
sensorimotor grasp of the former. The first level specifies apparent properties - the ways 
things appear to be from one's current perspective - and the second specifies real properties; 
only by keeping track of the former does one perceive the latter. Perceiving the real square 
shape of the table involves keeping track of the changing apparent diamond-shapes as you 
move relative to it, for instance.  
   This account has some appeal in the visual case, where we can make sense of the idea of 
apparent colours and shapes and so on (even though, as I have argued in chapter 3, we end 
up with an explanation that does not do proper justice to the phenomenology). In non-visual 
perception, though, the problems identified so far can be re-cast in this language: it isn't clear 
what it means for something to smell or taste a certain way from here, or for this to change 
as we move our bodies. It isn't clear what an 'apparent taste', rather than a 'real taste', could 
be (or an observer-dependent versus observer-independent taste). Again, it can't be changes 
in how things appear that determines the content of the experience because no such changes 
occur, and so a passive model on which the brain does the work is appealing.    
 
   One way in which Noë construes the perception of the first level of content in the visual 
case is as follows: 
 
"To experience something as elliptical from here is to experience it as 
occupying a certain place in your sensorimotor space, e.g. as being such as to be 
blocked from view by this sort of an occluder, or as being something whose 
outline could be traced by such and such a movement et cetera." (2004, chapter 
4; p1; emphasis in original).  
 
   As before, this is not an account that can be carried over without difficulty to the 
explanation of non-visual modalities. The content of non-visual experiences tends not to 
specify spatial features of external objects that can be tied to one's own capacities of 
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movement (or 'tracing') like the example of apparent shape. Nor do there appear to be any 
correlates of the grasp of 'occluders' outside of the realm of visual perception.  
 
4.2: Is Any Non-Visual Content Explicable in Sensorimotor Terms? 
 
   I mentioned above that one way that non-visual features change in response to a perceiver's 
movements is along the dimension of intensity or salience. Smells, for example, are stronger 
and more easily identified the closer one's proximity to their source, while sounds are louder 
and clearer. This is the one sense in which it is appropriate to talk of there being non-visual 
perspectival or apparent properties, and an understanding on behalf of the agent of the ways 
in which they change with her movements may be a contributory factor to some non-visual 
perceptual contents.  
 
   Although it is hard to sustain the claim that all of the content and character of non-visual 
perception is grounded in sensorimotor skill - largely, as I have suggested above, because of 
the paucity of candidate movements in these cases - there are some components of these 
modalities to which enaction does appear to make a contribution. The enactive account 
carries more weight in the cases of auditory and tactile perception than in gustatory and 
olfactory perception, but in fact we can identify plausible aspects even of the content of 
smell and taste experiences for which sensorimotor considerations may play a part.      
 
   We have seen already that tactile perception is amenable to enactive explanation; indeed, 
Noë argues that we should take this to be our paradigm of a sensory modality, rather than 
vision. In some cases at least, it makes sense to describe the content of a tactile experience as 
exceeding what is immediately given to the part of the body involved in the perception. In 
our familiar case, an agent feels the whole three-dimensional shape and solidity of a bottle 
that is held in his hands, in spite of the fact that only his fingertips are in contact with the 
object's surface. On the enactive view, of course, this is possible because the agent brings to 
bear his knowledge of how the rest of the bottle would feel were he to move his hands over 
its surface; he experiences the bottle as accessible by means of sensorimotor skills.  
   This kind of account works pretty well, I think, for the general case of shape and size 
content in tactile perception. When the object is large, the perceiver understands the ways in 
which he can move his hands, say, over its surface; when the object is small the changes will 
come with movements of the fingers, or movements of the object itself. Texture, too, is a 
plausible candidate for this kind of explanation - perceiving a surface as smooth appears to 
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require an understanding of the way that how it feels would change as one moves one's body 
over it.  
   For those contents that are explained by the enactive proposal, it should be impossible to 
conceive of a creature who lacks the relevant sensorimotor understanding but who 
nonetheless is capable of experiencing the property. Barring, perhaps, the case of a creature 
capable of entirely enveloping external objects - and who might be able to perceive the 
whole 3D shape of an object 'in one go', as it were - it is difficult to imagine the possibility of 
fully perceiving by tactile means in the absence of bodily exploration and the understanding 
that goes with it. In contrast, the more passive nature of taste and smell renders them easily 
ascribable to even the most inert of creatures.  
   The sensorimotor basis of tactile perception, however, extends only to its spatial 
components - size, shape, relative location, texture - and not to temperature. This is an issue 
where disambiguating and counting the senses may be problematic - the perception of 
temperature may be separated from the modality of touch, or it may not be. If it is a genuine 
facet of tactile perception (as strikes me as the intuitive categorisation), then this is tactile 
content for which the enactive view is inappropriate. If it is better described as a separate 
modality in its own right, of course, then it will be a further case that appears to resist 
enactive explanation. The only temperature-relevant changes that come with movement, like 
in the gustatory and olfactory cases, are those of intensity: we may understand that the 
warmth of the fire recedes as we move away from it, but this 'sensorimotor skill' does 
nothing to explain the content and phenomenal quality of the experience. It isn’t clear that 
there is anything analogous to perceptual constancy in the case of temperature. Recall that in 
the case of colour, for instance, we can talk of two regions of a surface that bears the same 
observer-independent colour (say, red) as presenting different apparent colours (say, shades 
of pink), and that enactive skill resolves this discrepancy for the perceiver – he sees the real 
colour by exercising his knowledge of how the apparent colours change in response to 
alterations in conditions of observation. When it comes to the experience of heat and cold, 
though, there appears to be no such two-level composition; two parts of the same object that 
feel different with respect to temperature (say, two parts of a car that has been left out in the 
sun) are not also felt to be the same temperature through sensorimotor interaction.     
 
   Auditory experience fits to some degree with the enactive proposal, to the extent that it 
bears spatial content. Locating a sound in experience, on this story, involves knowing how 
its intensity or apparent volume changes as one moves through space. A sound from one's 
left changes in a different way from a sound from one's right as one moves left, for example. 
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This case, in fact, accords most closely with Noë's overall conception, and appears to resist 
the objections I have made so far to the sensorimotor model. I argued in the last chapter that 
the dual-content account failed to adequately describe the phenomenology of visual 
experience; that, for example, round plates do not look apparently-elliptical and circular at 
the same time, as Noë claims. In auditory experience, though, the division between apparent 
and real properties is quite a natural one to draw, albeit only where apparent properties are 
carefully restricted.   
   Consider the case in which you hear a far-off siren, at the same time as listening to a 
programme on a nearby radio. There is a sense in which you may hear the two sounds to be 
the same volume (or even that the siren is quieter than the radio), but another sense in which 
the siren sounds louder than the radio - after all, the siren is louder than the radio, and the 
experience is not illusory. The enactive view can explain this phenomenon by appealing to 
the claim that you perceive the real volumes in virtue of understanding how their apparent 
volumes would change were you to move relative to their sources. You hear the siren as 
being louder than the radio because you know that its apparent volume would increase - to a 
threshold far higher than that of the apparent volume of the radio - as you approach its 
source. This explains, too, why it is possible to mistake a sound that is in fact of low volume 
and close proximity for one of higher volume and greater distance: you simply bring to bear 
the wrong profile of sensorimotor contingencies1.     
   I claimed that in the visual case, a property like Noë's putative 'apparent size' - on which 
model a distant object has a smaller apparent size than a nearby object - could be rejected in 
favour of the more phenomenologically-apt 'looks further-away' interpretation. On my view, 
distant objects don't have a dual-content with respect to size; when one's visual experience is 
veridical, they look to have their real sizes and to be far away. In the auditory case above, 
though, my intuition is reversed: I find it more acceptable to say that the siren sounds 
apparently-quieter than the radio, and - by bringing to bear sensorimotor knowledge - that it 
sounds to be louder. I concede, though, that this is a case where intuitions about 
phenomenology are not clear-cut, and where they consequently don't hold much rhetorical 
weight. On Noë's view, the visual case matches this one - nearby objects are apparently-
large(r) in the same way that sounds whose source is nearby are loud(er). To reiterate, I am 
committed to the latter but not the former.   
   My proposal regarding the case of auditory perception, then, is tentative: that content 
relating to the spatial location and arrangement of a sound-source is plausibly explained in 
sensorimotor terms and, although less clearly, that content specifying the volume of a sound 
may be similarly explained.  
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   The case of smell is, I propose, similar with respect to enaction to that of hearing: we can 
locate smells in perception, and this ability (this content of the experience) can be put down 
to the ability to keep track of the ways in which the intensity of the smell changes as we 
move - we experience an odour as coming from over there because it gets stronger as we go 
in that direction. Again, there are competing descriptions of what is being specified by this 
content here: it is either the location of the smell, or it is the source of the smell. Each of 
these may be more or less appropriate in individual cases (I think it's more natural to speak 
of, say, a pervading scent of air-freshener as being located in a room, but of the smell of 
baking bread as coming from the oven), but both are amenable to this sensorimotor 
explanation. As with the other modalities, it is hard to dissociate spatial content in the 
experience from action; unclear, that is, how a wholly inert perceiver could locate smells or 
their sources in perception.     
   Again, my view is that the olfactory case differs from the visual one in that it is appropriate 
to speak of an odour's apparent intensity (or its intensity from here) in a way that I rejected 
for visual properties.  
   Taste is the most spatially-impoverished of the senses. Not only is it inappropriate to 
propose a perspective from which one enjoys gustatory experiences, in the way that one has 
a visual perspective on the world, it is also the case that perceptual content that picks out the 
source of a taste does so, in a sense, in non-spatial terms. Rather than specifying a location 
from which a taste is 'coming from', the experience picks out the object to which the taste 
property is ascribed, on some suitable construal of 'object' that includes liquids, vapours, 
gases etc. One tastes the orange, for example, and not the location of the orange. 
   Sensorimotor understanding, however, can be seen to apply in this case too. Through 
knowing that the taste will recede as the orange is removed from one's mouth, and that the 
very same flavour will come back when the orange is replaced, one experiences the taste as 
an enduring property of the orange itself. Here, enactive skill does not contribute to the 
character of the experience - it does not fix the orangey-ness of the experienced flavour - but 
it does, I contend, fix its intentionality per se. That is, it allows the agent to experience the 
taste property as a property of the external world; a property that endures and that can be 
detected by bringing oneself into contact with appropriate objects2.  
   The same is true for the other examples I have provided in which sensorimotor 
understanding is not what accounts for the content and qualitative feel of an experience: this 
understanding does provide the agent with an awareness of the world-directedness of his 
experiences. The warmth of a cup, for instance, is attributed to (experienced as being a 
property of) the physical object in virtue of the knowledge that the warm sensation would 
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recede were the cup to be taken away.  
 
   In non-visual perception the exercise of sensorimotor skills contributes only to the 
specification of spatial content, which in turn may ground a perceiver's sense of self versus 
other; the explanatory task of accounting for the remainder of non-visual content and 
phenomenal character has been left untouched by the enactive model. The pitch and timbre 
of sounds; the sweetness, sourness and bitterness of tastes; the particular qualities of smells 
and so on have not been adequately addresses by enactive considerations.   
 
4.3: Conditions of Observation in Non-Visual Perception.  
 
   So far I have claimed that enactive skills are irrelevant when it comes to what are 
traditionally described as secondary qualities in perception: they contribute nothing to the 
perception of smells, tastes, warmth and cold and so on. The visual perception of colour, 
however, is said by Noë to draw upon a sensorimotor understanding not only of the ways in 
which apparent colours alter in response to the perceiver's movements, but also of the ways 
in which they change as further conditions of observation change. These extra conditions are 
those of illumination - for colour perception the agent needs to understand how the apparent 
colour of an object will change as the object is moved into, for example, brighter light or 
light of a different hue. To experience grass as green, say, the agent must understand that it 
will look green under uniform white light, but will take on a dark brown apparent colour 
under red light and so on. There are motor-related changes, too - this bright patch here will 
change its location on the object as the object is moved in relation to the light source, for 
instance. Both types of change can contribute to the understanding possessed by the agent, 
and therefore to the content of his experiences.  
   The requirement that the visual perceiver must bring to bear sensorimotor skill in order to 
perceive even colour properties entails that any agent who is capable of undergoing colour-
sensations, but who lacks the relevant body of sensorimotor skill, is not enjoying a true 
colour experience. The perceiver whose perceptual contents only specify the first level of 
Noë's proposed dual-level account - that is, only the apparent colours of objects, or how they 
look with respect to colour from here - is not enjoying a true colour experience. The bringing 
to bear of sensorimotor skill is necessary in order to disambiguate possible colour contents: a 
red sensation (appearance) may be the result of a white wall that is illuminated by red light, 
or of a red wall lit by white light, or of a pink wall lit by red-ish light and so on. The red 
sensation/appearance alone is therefore not sufficient for a contentful experience.      
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   If the same were true of the non-visual modalities, then this would be a possible response 
on behalf of the enactive theorist to the charge that changes that are the result of movement 
are irrelevant to content. By extending the scope of 'sensorimotor knowledge' to include a 
grasp of non-motor influences, the enactive theorist could argue that this is the kind of 
mastery whose exercise is necessary for non-visual perception (I know of no philosopher 
who has made this move, but there is logical space for it).  
   This strategy, I suggest, is not available as a viable explanation of the non-visual cases 
because there are no correlative non-motor conditions of observation here whose changes 
must be mastered. There is no possible disambiguation between apparent properties that are 
the possible results of multiple real properties.  
   Superficially, there are non-visual cases in which the perceived property changes as a 
result of non-motor influences that could, potentially, be understood in the same quasi-
sensorimotor way as those of illumination condition. Orange juice, for example, tastes 
different before and after brushing one's teeth; an E played on the piano sounds different 
when accompanied by a C or an A; a rose smells different when accompanied by the scent of 
air-freshener or in its absence. Differences to what we could call background conditions 
result in differences to how properties are experienced.    
   These situations do not match the case of colour perception, though, because there is no 
bringing to bear of sensorimotor knowledge in order to disambiguate possible contents in 
these examples; the sensation - or appearance - is enough to settle the content of the 
experience. When tasting the orange juice prior to brushing one's teeth, for example, how it 
tastes then is enough for the juice to be experienced as having an orange flavour - it is 
peculiar to imagine that one has to bring to bear one's knowledge of how it would taste when 
accompanied by the flavour of toothpaste, or any of an open-ended range of flavours, in 
order to have this content.   
    We can put this point another way: Noë introduces the non-motor-changes understanding 
to account for the phenomenon of perceptual constancy in the colour case. Perceivers see the 
real colours of objects in spite of their apparent colours changing across conditions of 
illumination, and it is the bringing to bear of knowledge about the nature of these changes 
that constitutes this constancy according to the enactive view. The ambiguity inherent in any 
individual apparent colour (red-wall, white-light versus white-wall, red-light, for example) is 
resolved by the exercise of sensorimotor skill. In non-visual perception, though, it is not 
clear that such constancy exists, or that non-visual experiences involve the resolution of 
ambiguity by sensorimotor skill. For constancy to be present, it would have to be the case 
that, for example, the 'real' taste of the orange juice is experienced in addition to its 'apparent' 
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taste following tooth-brushing; that the real sound of the E is experienced in addition to its 
apparent sound when played with each other note; that the real smell of the rose is 
experienced in addition to its apparent smell when accompanied by air-freshener.  
    I take these to be phenomenologically inaccurate descriptions of the content of non-visual 
experiences. Only the new property is experienced in these cases, and that any constancy that 
may be involved is not at the level of experience. There is simply a new taste that is 
experienced when orange juice and toothpaste combine, a new composite sound when notes 
are played together and a new scent when more than one smell mixes in the air. As noted 
above, it makes little sense to talk of real and apparent properties in the non-visual 
modalities; there is no dual-level content here3.      
 
   The 'grasp of changing conditions of observation' component was introduced by Noë to 
show that in visual perception it is never enough to undergo a particular colour sensation (in 
his terms: to perceive a particular colour appearance) - for genuine colour experience the 
perceiver must exercise his mastery of the ways in which the sensation would change in 
response to changes in illumination. In non-visual perception, though, this route is not 
available and the consequence is that any particular sensation is fit to fix the content of 
experience in the absence of any extra 'grasp of changing conditions of observation' 
condition. What we need, of course, is an explanation of how particular sensations come 
about, but this will not be achieved in enactive terms.  
 
4.4: Illusion And Hallucination.   
 
   By examining cases of illusion and hallucination in visual and non-visual perception, we 
can further demonstrate that the enactive account does not have the resources to explain all 
perceptual phenomena. Where it falls down, as in the cases investigated above, is in 
accounting for the perception of apparent or sensational properties. Although there are 
certain features of visual illusions, for example, that can be accounted for fairly naturally 
under the enactive framework, there is no satisfactory general account of misperception in 
sensorimotor terms.  
 
4.4.1: Illusion.  
 
   For the sensorimotor model to be successful, it would have to describe illusory and 
hallucinatory perception on its own terms - that is, cases in which an experience is non-
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veridical would have to be explained as failures on the part of the agent to successfully enact 
the right content or to bring to bear the right body of sensorimotor skill. There are cases of 
illusion in both visual and non-visual perception for which this type of explanation is 
appropriate, but this is possible only for misperception involving the limited component of 
content that can be attributed to a sensorimotor source. 
   Visual cases first: when, for instance, a perceiver sees a far-off tower as being round when 
in fact it is square, this can be put down to his bringing to bear an inappropriate body of 
sensorimotor knowledge. To see the tower as round, on the enactive view, is to anticipate 
that its apparent shape will change in ways that are characteristic of round objects. For the 
illusion to occur, the perceiver's experience of the appearance of the tower - which may be 
indistinct from her distant location - must result in her bringing to bear a body of 
sensorimotor knowledge that is inappropriate to that appearance. Perception goes right when 
the anticipatory component of the agent's understanding of sensorimotor dynamics matches 
what would in fact happen were she to move in certain ways; it goes wrong when these come 
apart.  
   Similarly, the visual perceiver may be perceptually mistaken about the colour of a surface 
as a result of failing to resolve its apparent colour correctly. According to Noë's account, the 
red wall lit with white light and the white wall lit with red light may present the same 
apparent colour to the agent, but the apparent colour will change in different ways in 
response to changes of illumination depending on which real colour is present. When the 
wall is really red but the agent mistakenly brings to bear his sensorimotor knowledge of how 
the appearance of white walls change, he will undergo a colour illusion. His expectations, 
which determine the content of his experience on the enactive view, concern sensory 
changes that are characteristic of white rather than red.   
    To the extent that sensorimotor considerations apply in contributing to the contents of 
non-visual experiences, a similar story can be told about illusions in these cases too. An 
auditory or olfactory perceiver may be mistaken about the spatial location (or source) of the 
properties he experiences if and when he fails to correctly anticipate what will happen to the 
intensity of the sound or smell as he moves. If he expects a sound to increase in volume as he 
moves to the left, for example, with this expectation suitably construed as implicit and 
skilful, then he will experience its source as being to his left (for that is what having an 
experience with this content consists in). There may be further illusory cases that involve the 
perceiver moving, correctly keeping track of the resulting changes to his sensory input, but 
unsuccessfully keeping track of his movement (that is, getting the right-hand-side of the 
sensorimotor contingencies wrong). The possibility of such cases will depend on the extent 
 90
to which perceivers must understand their own movements on the enactive story.  
   Some tactile spatial illusions, too, seem amenable to sensorimotor explanation, either 
where the agent has failed to keep track of his own movements, or where he mistakenly 
anticipates that a certain movement will yield a certain change in input. An agent who holds 
what he thinks is a glass bottle in his hands will experience the object as solid and bottle-
shaped by bringing to bear his knowledge of how its tactile appearance will change in a 
certain profile of ways, but these expectations may go awry if the object is in fact differently 
shaped in all but the regions with which his hands are in contact.    
                
   While failing to bring to bear the right body of sensorimotor knowledge can result in 
perceptual content that is illusory, this description is appropriate only in those cases where it 
makes sense to talk of both real and apparent properties. Illusions, after all, are by definition 
those perceptual situations in which what is experienced does not match the way things 
really are. In the cases mentioned, though, the perception of apparent properties (which, 
recall, have been defined as objective, relational properties) is veridical - it is only the 
content that specifies invariant properties, constituted by the exercise of sensorimotor skill, 
that is not accurate. If all cases of illusion could be described in this way - as failures to bring 
to bear the right body of sensorimotor knowledge on veridically-perceived appearances - 
then the enactive account would be on firm ground.  
   For Noë, though4, apparent properties are capable of being perceived and the first level of 
his dual-content story specifies these (we are said, for example, to see both the real and 
apparent shape of the plate). The question arises, then, as to whether it is possible to 
misperceive the apparent properties themselves and if not, why not?  
   In the visual example above, the apparent colour of a red wall lit by white light matches 
that of the white wall lit by red light - they both have a reddish hue. This apparent colour is a 
real, non-mental property that is determined by the physical properties of the wall, the 
character of illumination and the location of the observer. Noë thinks that you perceive this 
apparent shade and the real colour that underlies it; the latter of which through the exercise 
of sensorimotor skill. But we haven't been given an explanation of what it is to perceive the 
apparent colour: is it possible to misperceive the apparent colour? If so, how? If not, why is 
the first level of perceptual content immune to error?  
 
   Some familiar visual illusions do seem to be cases in which apparent properties are 
misperceived, and so resist explanation in sensorimotor terms. The Mueller-Lyer illusion, for 
instance, cannot be described as a failure to resolve the apparent properties of the figure 
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correctly by sensorimotor means. For an enactive explanation to be given appropriately here, 
the two lines would have to present different apparent lengths and the perceiver would have 
to bring to bear an inaccurate body of sensorimotor knowledge concerning the ways in which 
objects with those lengths would change in response to movement, as in the square-tower 
case. It is not, however, clear that this is a sensible description of this scenario. The lines do, 
on Noë's account, present apparent lengths that can change as the agent's perspective moves. 
For example, when the page is perpendicular to the line of sight the apparent length of the 
lines is at a maximum, and when the page is sloping away from the viewer the lines are 
apparently shorter. But the two lines visually seem to be different lengths even when both 
are located on the same plane (on the page), even though their apparent lengths are the same 
from any location orthogonal to the page, so the difference cannot be put down to a 
difference in their respective spatial relations to the viewer.   
   If the enactive theorist is to maintain the view that the illusion is the result of the correct 
perception of appearances coupled with the incorrect exercise of sensorimotor skills, then he 
must provide us with an explanation of how contextual - and therefore extrinsic - properties 
like, in this case, the diagonal arrows on the ends of the Mueller-Lyer lines - can alter 
appearances. 
   
   The phenomenon of colour contrast, too, seems to involve the misperception of apparent 
properties - here, the apparent colours that Noë claims are specified in the first level of visual 
content. Colour contrast occurs when the colour of a surface appears to change when another 
coloured surface is placed adjacent to it. Again, an extrinsic contextual property - the 
presence of an adjacent surface or surfaces - affects the character of the experience, and the 
enactive theorist must explain with what this change is to be identified. The sensorimotor 
theorist cannot claim that it is to a mental/sensational property because such properties are 
anathema to the enactive approach, but if it is a property that can be affected by extrinsic 
changes it is not clear what kind of property it could be. Apparent colours, on the enactive 
view, are relational properties that hold between surfaces, locations and lighting conditions, 
with no mention of the influence of other surfaces and their properties.  
   In the Mueller-Lyer and colour-contrast cases, then, we have visual illusions that 
correspond to the misperception of apparent properties - of apparent length and apparent 
colour respectively. They are thus not amenable to the enactive explanation that may be 
given of the earlier cases I presented. We cannot make an appeal to the misguided 
employment of sensorimotor understanding, as we did there, for the perception of apparent 
properties hasn't been given a successful sensorimotor interpretation. While we may be able 
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to give an enactive account of how invariant colour properties are perceived within changing 
apparent colour properties, we can't give one of the perception of apparent colour properties 
themselves. As a result, illusions that involve their misperception cannot be given a 
sensorimotor treatment.  
    
4.4.2: Hallucination. 
 
   Hallucinatory experiences, even more so than illusory ones, cause trouble for the enactive 
theory in that they are situations in which there is phenomenal character and content - albeit 
perhaps only to a limited extent - in the absence of any correlative external object. 
Experiences of this kind cannot therefore be episodes of the active exploration of 
appearances as mediated by sensorimotor contingencies, because there is nothing appropriate 
to be explored. They show, then, that the active-exploratory construal of perception, with its 
focus on the exercise of whole-animal skills, is misguided.  
 
   Hallucinations occur in both the visual and non-visual modalities, although the former are 
more familiar. Visual hallucinations include coloured afterimages and drug-induced visions, 
for example, while non-visual hallucinations can be undergone by migraine-sufferers, say, 
prior to onset. In these cases, vivid olfactory and gustatory experiences are had in the 
absence of their standard external cause. Auditory hallucinations, too, can be induced by 
direct contact with the brain during surgery, while tactile hallucinations include phantom-
limb phenomena. In these situations the hallucinatory experiences appear straightforwardly 
to be the result of brain activity and not of an extended period of exploratory interaction with 
appearances.  
  
   Noë's enactive account of hallucination in 'Real Presence' (p33 and following), I will argue, 
does not fit with his earlier story of sensorimotor dependence. Throughout his development 
of the enactive theory, Noë has emphasised that appearances are non-mental, albeit 
relational, properties of objects and that perception consists of keeping track of the ways that 
they change with movement. A consistent reading of the enactive view is that it adopts a 
direct realist position as far as appearances go - it involves a relation between the perceiver 
and the appearance: perception is an active process of exploration of the world. As with any 
direct realist position, there are difficulties in accounting for cases of illusion and 
hallucination.   
   We can define hallucination as the experience of properties or objects that are not present. 
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In these cases there is - by hypothesis - nothing present that can stand in the same relation to 
the agent as in the case of veridical perception. There is no object that is there to be explored 
through skilful action. There are no changing appearances that can be understood (or, as in 
the case of illusion, misunderstood) by the perceiver.  
   Yet Noë says that "when I hallucinate yellow I act as if I were seeing yellow by drawing 
into play the sensorimotor profile of yellowness" (forthcoming; p34; emphasis in original). 
This can't be right - why should acting a certain way when not in the presence of a yellow 
appearance produce the same experience as when you are in the presence of a yellow 
appearance? Why should acting in a certain way produce any qualitative experience at all? 
Indeed, if acting a certain way is sufficient for a contentful, qualitative hallucinatory 
experience, what role does exploratory interaction with external/relational appearances play 
during veridical perception?5.  
    
   We can allow, however, that hallucinatory experiences acquire (some) perceptual content 
only in virtue of the exercise of sensorimotor skill, while maintaining that non-sensorimotor 
considerations are responsible for the remainder. The spatial contents that I have argued are 
the realm of sensorimotor skills are candidates here: while the phenomenal character of a 
migraine-induced smell is not fixed by the exercise of enactive skills, its apparent external 
location (if it is experienced as having one) may be the result of anticipating the ways in 
which its intensity would change in response to movements. This may be true even if the 
performance of said movements would not in fact reveal said changes; what is important is 
the expectation on behalf of the perceiver. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that such content 
could be undergone in the absence of these kinds of expectations.   
 
   We should be careful not to suggest that the division between the content and the 
phenomenal character of an experience can be mapped easily onto the contribution of 
sensorimotor and non-sensorimotor mechanisms respectively; that the brain is responsible 
for the latter and the whole animal for the former. Part of the phenomenal feel of a 
perceptual episode, as Noë has argued, is grounded in the expectations of the perceiver in 
such a way that his current sensations are not enough - in the absence of these expectations - 
to account for the full qualitative component of the experience. The sensations at one's 
fingertips when holding onto a football, say, are not all that we must appeal to in explaining 
the qualitative feel of holding the ball - there is a perceptual sense of the presence of the 
whole ball that is grounded in one's expectations of the way it would feel were one to move 
one's hands around its surface.   
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   In contrast to this case there is gustatory experience where, I have claimed, expectations 
about changes that are the result of movements do not make any contribution to perceptual 
content. The phenomenal character of such an experience - say, the fruitiness of the taste of 
orange juice - is not determined by the perceiver's expectations, and the content of the 
experience just is, it seems, this qualitative character.  
   
   The considerations investigated above demonstrate, I believe, that the enactive claim that it 
is the skilful exercise of sensorimotor knowledge that determines the content and character 
of experience is in error, and that the activity of the brain alone is an important contributory 
factor. One way of filling out this contribution - one version of which I develop in the 
remainder of the project - is to argue that the brain supports representation in experience. 
Other traditional treatments of perception are consistent with this brain basis, too, and the 
burden of explanation is on the enactive theorist to show why we ought to extend the 
supervenience base of experience to body and world.   
  
4.5: Summary and Conclusions: 
 
   Non-visual, non-tactile experiences and cases of perceptual error are problematic from the 
point of view of the enactive approach. The possible contribution to perception of dynamic 
sensorimotor exploration and understanding differs across the sensory modalities, given the 
different structures and contents of their respective experiences. It is not at all clear, though, 
that each modality shares the essentially exploratory nature that is emphasised by the 
sensorimotor view, nor that we can tell the same two-level-content story or deal with 
perceptual constancy phenomena in these cases.    
   On a personal-level construal of sensorimotor skill, where what is understood is how 
appearances alter in response to movements, we saw that visual perception involves 
resolving observer-independent properties such as shapes and colours out of perspectival 
properties. This is said to account for how perceivers can experience constant features of 
objects in spite of always observing them from a particular location and under particular 
conditions. I have suggested that while this account may work well for some aspects of 
perceptual content across sensory modalities – most notably in regard to spatial content – it 
is not helpful when it comes to others. 
 
   Sounds, I take it, may have an apparent volume (a volume from the point of view of an 
auditory observer) and a real volume, while smells may have an apparent intensity and a real 
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intensity. A consistent sensorimotor story may be told according to which the spatial content 
of these senses is determined (perhaps constituted) by the exercise of the perceiver's implicit, 
practical grasp of how these apparent properties change or would change in response to her 
movements6. Similarly, the spatial content of tactile perception, exemplified in the familiar 
bottle-in-hands example, is amenable to sensorimotor explication.    
   The non-visual content that is enacted, though, is limited to this spatial component. If the 
view is right, then perceivers are presented with certain properties as spatially located or 
extended, or as moving, when they bring to bear their understanding of how the appearance 
of these properties alters in response to their movements. This story says nothing, on the 
other hand, about the distinctive qualities of non-visual experiences, whether these ought to 
be ascribed to the objects of such perception or to experiences themselves. It says nothing 
about what it takes for a scent to be experienced as floral, for a sound to be high-pitched, for 
a surface to be hot to the touch.  
   Most problematic is taste perception, where (at least in certain cases) exploratory world-
engagement is absent and any distinction between apparent and real properties is hard to 
sustain. Sensorimotor expectations may allow the agent to perceptually ascribe a taste to an 
object, and so provide world-directedness in experience, but even this may be lacking when, 
for instance, one has a taste that is simply in one’s mouth. If the enactive approach is 
intended to accommodate perceptual experiences from each and every modality then these 
represent challenging cases7.  
    
   Some features of misperception can be dealt with on sensorimotor terms, while others 
resist this form of explanation. Those limited perceptual contents that depend upon the 
exercise of sensorimotor skill can form part of an illusory experience when the skills are 
employed inappropriately - for instance, when expectations concerning sensorimotor 
dynamics that are characteristic of one shape are triggered by the presence of a different 
shape. Some illusions, on the other hand, and I made reference to the Mueller-Lyer as an 
exemplar, seem to be cases in which it is apparent properties themselves - defined as 
external, relational in nature - that are misperceived. Apparent shapes and colours and so on 
are capable of being misperceived, and the enactive view has not (yet) provided the 
resources to explain how this might occur.  
   Similarly, hallucinations are experiences that take place in the absence of external objects 
that can be explored, and so the enactive theorist must provide an account of how states that 
may be qualitatively indistinguishable from those involved in genuinely perceptual episodes 
can come about. If the response is to say that sensorimotor understanding can be brought to 
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bear even without object-involving exploration, then we deserve a full treatment of this 
(obscure) notion.   
 
   I take it that these considerations, and the problems facing the enactive approach as a 
whole that I highlighted in the previous chapter, put pressure on sensorimotor views in their 
role as explanatory projects with ambitions to accommodate all perceptual phenomena. 
While active exploration and sensorimotor understanding may be required for an agent to 
undergo experiences with spatial content – where this may be the hallmark of world-
directedness in perception – it isn’t clear how or whether this can be extended to perceptual 








Chapter 4 Notes.  
 
Footnote 1: This is another phenomenon, however, that could be explained by the 'ideal-
appearances' view: rather than bringing to bear one's knowledge of the full profile of 
sensorimotor dynamics, that is, it may be that the same result could be obtained by appealing 
to knowledge of what the volume of the sound(s) would be from an ideal perspective.  
 
Footnote 2: At least some cases, though, resist even this limited sensorimotor explanation. 
For example, medication that is taken intravenously can sometimes cause a taste in one’s 
mouth in a way that seems entirely free from sensorimotor interaction.   
 
Footnote 3: Again, even if we were to accept a dual-content view here an ideal-appearances 
version appears to me to be more compelling than a sensorimotor one. If the real taste of the 
orange-juice is experienced in addition to its apparent, adulterated taste it is because the 
perceiver brings to bear her knowledge of how orange juice tastes with a clean palette (that 
is, under ideal tasting conditions), and not how its taste changes over a full range of 
conditions.  
 
Footnote 4: On, at the very least, some readings of Action in Perception. This, in my 
terminology, is a Version 2 enactive account.  
 
Footnote 5: One way to go on this, to which Noë appears to be sympathetic (in discussion, 
Edinburgh Perception & Action workshop; March 2007), is to endorse a form a 
disjunctivism. Non-hallucinatory cases of perception are, on this view, given one treatment - 
a sensorimotor, direct-realist one - while hallucinations are taken to be introspectively-
indistinguishable states of a different kind. The challenge for the enactive theorist is then to 
explain why acting in a particular way in the absence of an external object should result in 
(or constitute) a state that is indistinguishable from an episode of genuine sensorimotor 
exploration of an object. This is no easy task.    
 
Footnote 6: I offer this only as a consistent treatment, not as a true one. A representationalist 
account, for instance, may do equal justice to the phenomena. The aim here was to explore 
how an as-yet-undeveloped enactive account of non-visual perception might go, not to 
defend it.   
 
Footnote 7: Non-perceptual experiences, too, are difficult to explicate in sensorimotor terms. 
It is unclear, for instance, how pains, itches and orgasms involve active exploration mediated 
by knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies. It may, however, be that the enactive view is 




Chapter 5: Introducing the Action-Space Account. 
 
   I have argued that the very deep and direct relationship between action and perception that 
is proposed by the enactive approach is not a satisfactory one. Except perhaps in limited 
cases, neither the content nor the qualitative character of perceptual experience are 
adequately explained by appeal to the exercise of finely-tuned sensorimotor understanding. 
Yet action and perception are obviously importantly interconnected; at the very least, there is 
an instrumental relation between an animal's perceptual and motor abilities. Perceptual 
sensitivities guide world-directed actions while movements allow agents to alter their 
observational perspective on the environment. In this chapter I introduce my positive account 
of the relation between action and perception, which goes significantly further than a thesis 
of mere instrumental dependence. While the sensorimotor theory emphasises the influence 
that actions have on perception, the account I develop takes the opposite view and stresses 
the role that perception has in presenting agents with opportunities for world-engaging 
action. Thus we are able to retain a focus on perceivers as embodied, active agents without 
committing ourselves to the strong enactive approach.  
   On the view that I will develop, spaces of action are specified by perceptual contents. 
When an agent with suitable perceptual sensitivities encounters an environment, she is 
empowered to perform certain suites of possible action that are constrained both by that 
environment’s properties and constituents, and by features of the perceiver’s body and skill-
set. Particular objects, for example, can be acted upon in characteristic profiles of ways by 
embodied agents, while cognitive or epistemic action-types such as comparing, tracking and 
recognising are afforded by surface or geometric properties. Conscious perception is 
constituted, on my view, by the representation of these spaces of action in a format that is apt 
for integration into the perceiver’s ongoing planning and rational action choice. My starting 
points are the models proposed by Philip Pettit (2003) and Andy Clark (2000a), and I 
acknowledge the precedents set by these accounts before developing the central features of 
the ‘action-space’ approach, as I shall call it, in the remainder of the project.  
 
   In chapter three, I examined a cluster of proposals that aimed to show that certain patterns 
of access consciousness entail the presence of phenomenal consciousness. As will be 
developed below, the action-space approach makes use of this strategy, too, as its aim is to 
motivate the claim that phenomenally conscious experiences are constituted by a particular 
form of access to spaces of perceptually-enabled action. Access consciousness is in the 
business of poising the contents of mental states for use in planning, reasoning and the 
 99
guidance or targeting of intentional action; questions about its functioning are said to be the 
'easy' problems of consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness, on the other hand, concerns 
the 'what it is like-ness' of experience, and the 'hard' problem of consciousness involves 
explaining how such a phenomenon could be embodied in or caused by a physical system. 
The proposals I investigated all claim that if an agent is capable of bringing to bear a 
particular form of access consciousness - that is, bringing to bear access consciousness on a 
particular form of target - then he will necessarily undergo a phenomenal experience; there 
will be something it is like to be him. Such an explanatory move, if successful, would 
constitute a reduction of the phenomenal to physical/functional facts about the agent as an 
integrated system capable of interaction with the world. 
 
   The accounts that emphasise this access-implies-qualia move are similar in that all 
acknowledge the fact that perceivers exist in environments whose constituents have 
characteristic effects on agents' sensory systems when both are located appropriately, effects 
which typically enable the perceiver to navigate through that environment and to act upon 
and within it. It is the integration of these effects into the agent's higher-level capacities of 
planning and reasoning that entails phenomenal consciousness - on these accounts, 
perception just is a matter of this integration. Where the theories to be considered differ is 
over which stage of this causal chain - from sensory input from the outside world to the suite 
of effects that are enabled in the perceiver as a whole - is appropriately described as the 
'target' of access-consciousness, the target of integration with higher-level functioning.      
   In section 5.1, I reiterate the existing options for the relevant target of access-
consciousness: patterns of sensorimotor dependence; features of sensory processing that are 
characteristic of one modality rather than another; spaces of actions enabled by perceptual 
sensitivities. I argue that the most plausible candidate target of access-consciousness is the 
latter of these. 
   Section 5.2 introduces Philip Pettit's looks as powers account (Pettit, 2003) as an exemplar 
of the view that the important direction of influence between action and perception is one 
where the stress is on what perception can do for action, rather than the reverse. This account 
is then compared in section 5.3 to the sensorimotor model endorsed by Hurley & Noë 
(2005), and I argue that Pettit's model offers a more satisfying treatment of what it is that 
constitutes perceptual awareness. Section 5.4 and the majority of the following chapter are 
devoted to defending the claim that proper examination of access-consciousness and the 
kinds of capacities it can support provides genuine explanatory headway when it comes to 
phenomenal consciousness.      
 100
5.1: Three Alternative Access-Based Accounts:  
    
   O'Regan and Noë’s account, at least on one plausible interpretation, required that the 
agent's access be to patterns of changing stimulus activity - for example, on a simplified 
reading, to images on his retina in the case of visual experience. Only when sensorimotor 
contingencies - ways in which these patterns change in response to the agent's movements - 
are integrated with his higher-level capacities of planning and reasoning will the agent be 
phenomenally aware of the world that underpins those contingencies. This integration can be 
described as the agent's having access-consciousness whose target is sensorimotor activity.  
   My objection to this was that it is not clear that any such access is really in place, and that 
it is not even obvious what it would mean for it to be so, given that access is a personal-level 
phenomenon while patterns of input are subpersonal. O'Regan and Noë’s theory is what I 
have called a Version-1 sensorimotor approach: it is (explicitly) the changes to the agent's 
sensory input activity that come with his movements that matter to perception, in contrast to 
its being changes to perceptual content or changes to phenomenal properties (as other 
versions of the enactive account propose1). According to O'Regan and Noë, then, the effects 
on the perceiver that are caused by his engagement with the world and which must be 
integrated into his goals and reasons during perception are those that concern his sensory 
systems, rather than the agent himself or his skills and capacities. I take such integration to 
be impossible, given the way that access has been set up so far, as modelled on Block's 
original distinction. It is not the case that perceivers are capable of keeping track, for the 
purposes of planning and reasoning, of their own subpersonal states or changes within them. 
As I read Noë's recent work, furthermore, he too rejects this account for these reasons, and 
adopts an approach that is no longer amenable to the access-implies-qualia strategy.  
  
   Andy Clark's account can be divided into two alternatives and it is the latter of these, on 
which access is to a suite of enabled actions, that I will develop2. Clark's overall claim is that 
if the agent has a form of direct, non-inferential access to the sensory modality with which 
he makes a discrimination, there will be something it is like for him to make that 
discrimination (i.e. phenomenal awareness). So the effects that the perceiver's environment 
has upon him, and which must be integrated with higher-level capacities in perception, are 
those concerning the channel or mode of input from external world to agent.    
   The first way in which such access could be in place is for the agent to be in touch with the 
vehicles that subserve a discrimination - the brain states themselves that underlie the sensory 
modality - and to understand non-inferentially that particular vehicles correspond to one 
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modality rather than another3. Leaving aside the question of whether this would genuinely 
constitute non-inferential access, this account, I suggested, was subject to the same kind of 
objection as that to which O'Regan and Noë’s model was vulnerable. As before, the presence 
of access to subpersonal states - vehicles - is implausible or, perhaps, nonsensical. Agents are 
not able to integrate facts about the brain states that are active when a particular sensory 
modality is in operation into their ongoing plans and reasoning. Clark notes that he does not 
favour this reading himself.  
 
   The second way in which access to sensory modality could be in place is for each modality 
to empower the agent in characteristic ways and for the agent to have access to these ways. 
That is, for the different modalities to poise the agent to act out a characteristic skill-set. 
There could be, for example, distinctive ways in which visually-acquired information 
empowers particular actions and interventions; distinctive auditory or tactile action-spaces 
and so on. Access to sensory modality, then, would be in place if access to the signature 
action-space was. The effects that the agent's environment has upon him, and which must be 
integrated with his higher-level capacities in perception, are those that enable him - qua 
skilful actor - to perform certain actions on and within that environment.  
 
   A central proposal of the action-space view is that access to a suite of enabled actions 
suffices for phenomenal consciousness. We can begin to understand this claim by noting that 
a creature who has this access in place is, as before, in the position of a superblindsighter. 
Not only can he make perceptual discriminations and act in ways appropriate to stimuli, he 
knows that he can when he can. He doesn't need to be prompted into carrying out his 
perceptual skills, because those skills are directly available to him. Crucially, the target of 
access-consciousness is, on this proposal, a personal-level phenomenon - the space of 
enabled actions is the suite of responses and interventions that the agent himself can 
perform; there need be no contact with subpersonal vehicles or states.   
   If it is right, as O'Regan and Noë argued, to hold that superblindsighters are conceptually 
impossible - that once we establish a rich enough set of self-prompted perceptual responses it 
is inconceivable that an agent with these abilities lacks qualitative awareness - we begin to 
make plausible the claim that certain patterns of access consciousness may constitute 
phenomenal consciousness. It is difficult to see what more could have to be added to creature 
capable of self-prompting any of a suite of perceptual skills in order for her to be conscious, 
if that alone is not sufficient. Note, too, that there are other ways in which the information 
that enables the space of actions to be performed can be put to use that do not entail 
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consciousness, as in the absent-minded car driver case. What is important to the appeal to 
access-consciousness, and that will be developed in the remainder of the project, is its being 
bound-up with (perhaps constituted by) the integration of contents into the agent's reasoning, 
planning and rational action-choice. The aim is to separate kinds of information- or content-
use that are sufficient for phenomenal consciousness from those that are not.     
 
   This type of account aims to show not only that there is something that it is like to be an 
agent with the requisite pattern of access consciousness, but also that it entails particular 
phenomenal feels. Clark's concession was that, were access only to facts about which 
modality is in operation, all that would be entailed would be that it feels like something 
rather than nothing to be an agent with that access. Once we replace this with the notion that 
perceivers access a whole action-space, though, we can see that there are resources available 
for an explanation of particular phenomenal properties. Spaces of action, including those that 
are of a cognitive or epistemic nature, are sufficiently finely-grained to make this suggestion 
plausible. The distinctive kinds of phenomenal feels that are attached to particular sensory 
modalities, too, can be dealt with in action-space terms. A perceptual episode has a 
peculiarly visual phenomenology, for example, when it involves the empowerment of suites 
of actions (comparings, trackings, and sortings) that are characteristic of vision – the ability, 
say, to discriminate objects and surfaces at a distance when they lie on an unobstructed, 
straight path from the viewer. Tactile phenomenology, likewise, comes with certain patterns 
of empowered bodily skills, typically those involving the part(s) of the body that are in 
contact with the perceived object or surface, and a similar story can be told for the other 
modalities.     
 
5.2: Looks as Powers.  
 
   The action-space account, I noted, interprets the relation between action and perception as 
having a direction that is in a sense the reverse of that proposed by radically enactive views. 
We must consider not the perceptual effects of action, but the action-oriented nature of 
perception. This is in accordance with the account set out by Philip Pettit in his 'Looks as 
Powers', which we can see as a precursor to the action-space model.    
   Pettit offers an explanation of colour looks as manifest powers. An item looks red, for 
example, if it looks as though it can be sifted, sorted and tracked in a particular profile of 
ways; a profile that is characteristic of red objects. Only objects with a red look cause this 
suite of effects in the observer, and looking red just is manifestly empowering the effects. 
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This is, importantly, in direct opposition to qualia theories of colour looks, which state that 
there is an intrinsic property of red objects that is in principle separable from its effects on 
the observer (that is, separable from the ways in which he can sift and sort it, etc); namely 
the qualitative property of redness. On the qualia account, the space of perceptually-enabled 
actions (at least as far as sifting and tracking and so on go) is grounded in or based upon the 
presence of qualitative properties - red objects are sorted together (say) because they share a 
similar phenomenal property. On the powers account, on the other hand, there is no such 
causal dependence of powers on phenomenal properties - for an object to look red just is for 
it to present an action-space that specifies the ways in which it can be sifted with and sorted 
from other objects that can be visually discriminated. The action-space must have an 
unconscious basis - there must be a brain-level sensitivity to the intrinsic properties of red 
objects (say, to their surface spectral reflectances) that enables the agent to sift, sort and track 
them. These sensitivities show up in the behaviour of blindsighted subjects, and so their 
employment is not alone a sufficient condition for consciousness. This is a theme to which I 
shall return during the following chapters.     
    
   An agent’s being access-conscious of the set of skills that a particular property enables 
(that is, for those skills to be manifestly enabled) does not require her to possess any 
understanding of or access to the brain processing that subserves it. I can distinguish, for 
example, a square drawn with red ink from its white background, but I can't distinguish a 
square drawn with infra-red ink from the same background. This is because my eyes and 
visual system are sensitive to the light reflected from the former, but not the latter. While I 
may be access-conscious to the skills that the red square enables, I need have no 
understanding of the causal chain that subserves them - the reflection of light of a particular 
wavelength, the excitation of my retinae and so on.  
 
   One condition that needs to be satisfied by the manifest powers account is that each 
manifest skill-set that is to be identified with a particular colour-look must be sufficiently 
finely-grained to be a plausible substitute for a quale of redness. That is, it must be 
impossible for an object to manifestly empower in ways that are characteristic of the 
property of redness without looking red: 
 
"[The powers account] must point us towards a range of colour effects rich 
enough to make it plausible that anything which has those effects is going to 
look red; it should become difficult to imagine the effects attending something 
that had a different look or to imagine the look having different effects." (Pettit, 
2003; p12). 
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   In order to satisfy this richness constraint, the set of powers that a particular colour 
property manifestly enables must be extended beyond the set that can be performed now, in 
the sense that it must be manifestly the case that the object can be sifted, sorted and tracked 
across conditions other than those that are currently in place. The set of things that the agent 
can do with an object on the basis of its colour (where this is to be construed as whatever 
physical property the object possesses that the agent's colour-vision system evolved to 
detect) at a particular moment is very limited - perhaps he can judge it to be more or less 
similar than some other object(s) in the scene, to visually discriminate it from its background 
and so on. This restricted set of powers is not rich enough to secure the kind of account that 
Pettit is after (as he acknowledges), and so we must include a fuller set, extrapolating to the 
skills that would be enabled in contexts other than the present one. The agent therefore has 
manifest expectancies about the skills that he would be able to perform in those contexts. 
Just as the sensorimotor account emphasised the need to appeal to expectancies concerning 
the sensory consequences of possible movements or changes to conditions of observation, so 
the powers account must make reference to expected skills.   
   For an object to look red, for instance, is for it to look not only as though it can be 
distinguished from the current context (the present background, say), and sorted from the 
other objects in the present scene, but also that it looks as though it can be tracked across 
different backgrounds, sorted with similar objects that aren't here now and so on. Without 
this extended account of the powers that a property enables, the set of skills that is attached 
to the colour look is too impoverished to secure the plausible elimination of the 
corresponding quale. After all, a green-looking object could be distinguished from the 
current context, and sifted from the other constituents of the present scene just as the red-
looking object can, so this constrained skill-set can't be enough to determine the look of the 
object. It can't even legislate between red and green, let alone particular shades of red; a 
spectrum inversion could occur and the same current skill-set would remain in place. 
 
   A red object, on the other hand, can be sifted, sorted and tracked across a different - and 
uniquely different - profile of counterfactual scenarios from that of green objects. Red 
objects stand out in certain contexts more saliently than green objects, say, and should be 
sorted more closely with and sifted more obviously from some objects than others.  
   Pettit's claim is that once (and only when) this counterfactual set of skills is made manifest, 
which is to say that the perceiver anticipates which skills would be empowered in contexts 
other than the present one, the set of manifest powers will be rich enough to make it 
implausible for the right look not to be present when the effects are. I shall call the grasp of 
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the ways in which the object/property would be distinguished, sifted, sorted etc in contexts 
other than the present one the anticipatory component of the look. The anticipatory 
component is what rules out the possibility of spectrum inversion.  
 
   We need to take care, though, not to give an account of this anticipation of counterfactual 
skills that relies on a question-begging construal of the perceiver's grasp of the counterfactual 
situations (the set of different backgrounds, for example, or the set of possible object with 
which the current object would be sorted/sortable) in which those skills would be employed. 
It seems to me that the agent would have to have some kind of understanding of, or access 
to, the counterfactual contexts themselves, in order to have a grasp of the ways in which a 
property that is present now would have the particular suite of effects on the agent in those 
contexts. But we need to be careful to provide an acceptable interpretation of what this grasp 
or understanding is; one that does not itself rely on 'looks' that require some other form of 
explanation.  
  
   We can't say that it is simply the case, for instance, that for an item to look red is for it to 
look as though it should be sorted with objects that look orange and sifted from objects that 
look green (etc), because this, at least without modification, is no explanation at all. 
Likewise, it can't be that for the object to look red is for it to look as though it can be easily 
tracked across backgrounds that look green, and less easily across backgrounds that look 
orange, say. Explanations of this sort would themselves have to be filled-out by providing an 
account of what a 'look' is, either in terms of qualia or in terms of some other intrinsic 
property, or in terms of manifest powers. The first two of these construals seem problematic. 
Consider, for example, the sifting aspect of the anticipatory component of the look, the 
agent's grasp of the kinds of objects from which the current object would be sifted were they 
encountered together. It can't be, say, that the agent grasps that red objects would be easily 
sifted from objects that possess green qualia, and less easily from those that have orange 
qualia: the account at which we are aiming is one that hopes to eliminate qualia altogether.  
   Furthermore, it can't be the case that the agent's grasp of those objects from which the 
current item could/should be sifted is grounded in any understanding of their intrinsic 
properties, because he need have no such grasp. He need have no understanding, for 
instance, of their surface spectral reflectance properties (which, remember, are the properties 
to which his visual system is sensitive - the sensitivity that enables his perceptual skills in the 
first place). So it can't be that he anticipates that the current object would be siftable from 
objects with such-and-such surface spectral reflectance properties, because he has no 
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understanding of those properties. Remember, access to the skill-set that a property enables 
is supposed to be a personal-level phenomenon; we are considering access-consciousness in 
Block's sense of the term, as the availability for the agent's report, reasoning, planning and so 
on. It certainly isn't the case that the agent can reason, plan, report the ways in which 
particular surfaces reflect particular frequencies of light at different ratios. 
  
   The third option, however, is more successful: it is to claim that the agent's predictions 
concern the ways in which the current object would show up in conditions where other 
powers are manifestly enabled; that is, where the counterfactual backgrounds, counterfactual 
sets of objects that afford sifting and sorting and so on, are themselves understood as 
manifestly enabling in certain ways. This results in a holistic interpretation of looks as 
powers, where to experience the sifting, sorting and tracking responses that one property 
enables requires locating that set of skills within a wider and interconnected body of skills. 
For an object to look red, say, is for it to manifestly inhabit a particular location in the space 
of similarities and differences that hold among visually-discriminable objects.   
   On this account, the agent would predict that the current object could be sifted from a set 
of objects that are themselves siftable and sortable in particular ways, and sorted with a 
different set of objects that are themselves siftable and sortable in other ways. The looks that 
come into the anticipatory component of the look of the current object are set up in manifest 
powers terms: for an object to look as though it would be easily distinguishable from a red 
background is for it to look as though it would show up against a background that manifestly 
enables the set of skills characteristic of red objects.  
   The holistic nature of his account thus becomes more clear: the manifest set of skills that 
constitutes the predicted look of the counterfactual situation must itself include a predictive 
component; it must itself satisfy the richness constraint. The account would involve 
something like the following as far as sifting goes: for the current object to look red, it must 
(inter alia) be manifestly easily siftable from objects that look green, were they to be 
encountered together, where for an object to look green is for it to be (inter alia) easily 
siftable from objects that look red, were they to be encountered together, where...etc. We end 
up with a regress of looks mutually dependent on other looks, but not a vicious regress. This 
is a holism, I think, which bears out the intuition that any agent who had no grasp of the 
similarities and differences that hold among colours would fail to really be a colour-
perceiver. The current proposal holds that there is nothing more to colour perception over 
and above the manifest grasp of ways in which objects can be visually sorted and sifted and 
so on.  
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5.3: The Sensorimotor Account versus the Looks as Powers Account: 
 
   The proponents both of the sensorimotor account and of the manifest-powers account, 
respectively, state that the two theories are fundamentally similar in approach (Hurley & 
Noë, 2005). Both require that perceivers are skilful agents and that experience involves 
drawing upon a body of skills or knowledge; both support their claims using similar kinds of 
empirical evidence; both have similar implications for the metaphysics of perception.  
   It would be a mistake, however, to draw the parallels between these two theories too 
closely. Although both employ the argument for the entailment of phenomenal 
consciousness by access consciousness, we have seen that the target of access on each model 
is different: on the enactive account the target is changing patterns of input while on the 
powers account the target is the enabled skill-set.  Although, as Hurley & Noë note, both 
theories "view perception and action as tightly interconnected" (p1), we have seen that the 
connection proposed by each is not of the same nature. An example mentioned both by Pettit 
and by Hurley & Noë, the case of a ball's looking to be going fast, demonstrates the 
alternative descriptions of the action-perception link that their accounts provide. For Pettit, a 
ball looks to be going fast insofar as it looks as though it empowers certain responses of 
judgement and action in the perceiver: 
 
"[T]he ball has a look that is essentially tied to the effect of inducing in you the 
judgement 'It's going fast!' and, no doubt more primitively, certain reaching and 
ducking responses." (Pettit, 2003; p8).  
 
   As is characteristic of Pettit's approach, the claim is that there is no effect-independent 
'fastish' look (as he puts it) that is separable from the responses that the ball manifestly 
enables in the perceiver - all there is for the ball to look fast is for it to look as though these 
responses are appropriate.  
   Hurley & Noë, on the other hand, describe the case in the following way while stating that 
their treatment is consistent with, and supportive of, Pettit's account:   
  
"Seeing the ball enables ducking to avoid it, and does so manifestly. But it looks 
as if the ball can be avoided by ducking because it looks as though ducking 
would make the situation look different in certain ways." (H&N, 2005; p5; 
emphasis in original). 
 
   As is characteristic of this approach, what is important is that the agent understands the 
ways in which the appearance of the scene would change in response to his movements, and 
 108
not the ways that the scene empowers him per se. He has access to the set of actions that a 
particular scenario affords because he has access to the sensory consequences of performing 
those actions.   
   Hurley & Noë want this grasp of sensory consequences to be what grounds the manifest 
empowerment of skills that Pettit's account emphasises, and it will be instructive to examine 
how plausible this claim is. First, we should note that their proposal is not that the agent has 
expectancies about the sensory consequences of ducking (and, similarly, for the other actions 
that the moving ball affords) and then infers that those actions are possible given the 
circumstances, although this is one way of reading the view. Instead, the set of possible 
actions is seen in the set of dependencies between movements and changes in appearances 
(that is, the body of sensorimotor contingencies) that is experienced according to the 
enactive account. The enactive perceiver has a set of expectancies about the sensory 
consequences of his movements which are brought to bear in his experience - as I examined 
in chapters 2 and 3 - and this constitutes his access to the action-space.  
   On Hurley & Noë’s story, furthermore, the action-space is manifestly enabled for the agent 
because he experiences it in the expectancies that he has for the sensory consequences of his 
movements: 
 
"In seeing the ball coming, the perceiver also knows what the sensory 
consequences of doing this or that will be, and hence knows how to respond for 
certain purposes." (op cit. p6). 
 
   The manifestness of the perceiver's access to the action-space is here explained in sensory 
terms - the set of possible actions is experienced in bringing to bear sensorimotor 
contingency knowledge, which is itself perceptual in nature. On the enactive view, 
perceiving just is bringing to bear one's sensorimotor knowledge: for an object to look 
square, for example, is for it to look as though there will be a characteristic pattern of 
sensory consequences to one's movements relative to the object; and this is for it to look as 
though it enables those actions, according to Hurley & Noë.  
   In addition, knowing how to respond "for certain purposes" - that is, presumably, for the 
fulfilment of his goals and plans, for the avoidance of harm and so on - follows the agent's 
grasp of the ways in which his actions result in sensory consequences, too, and is grounded 
in that grasp on this account: the agent knows that he must duck in order to avoid the ball 
because he knows that the situation will look different if he ducks. He comes to know what it 
is appropriate for him to do through knowing what the sensory consequences of the set of 
possible actions are.  
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   This suggestion, it seems to me, gets things the wrong way around and (a charge we have 
seen levelled at the enactive account before) puts too much stress on the changes that come 
to sensory inputs in response to movements. This time, the stress on sensorimotor 
contingencies is at the expense of the non-sensory effects of acting that matter to the agent. It 
matters more to the agent, I propose, that ducking the ball avoids pain and damage than that 
it changes the appearance of the scene. Perceivers come to know what it is appropriate for 
them to do through knowing what the non-sensory consequences of the set of possible 
actions are. I shall discuss this more fully in the next section.  
   Hurley & Noë’s claim that the manifest action-space is grounded in sensorimotor 
contingencies suffers from the objections raised to the enactive account more generally in 
chapter 3. I will recap these only briefly here. The crux of the problem is that it remains 
unclear how we ought to interpret the 'sensory consequences' of a perceiver's movements, 
and what kind of role a grasp, understanding or prediction of these consequences is to play in 
our account of perception. If 'sensory consequences' are construed as patterns of subpersonal 
activity (as O'Regan and Noë’s original account proposed), then it is not obvious that they 
can be integrated with the personal-level capacities that conscious experience is said to 
require. In the current example, it is not obvious that the agent confronted with a moving ball 
has any interest (or should have any interest) in the ways in which the images on his retinae 
will alter if he ducks the incoming projectile; what matters is rather that it does not strike 
him. More basically, it is not obvious that he sees the possibility of ducking in seeing the 
ways in which ducking would change his subpersonal activity.  
   If, on the other hand, 'sensory consequences' are themselves perceptual in nature then it 
isn't clear what role the grasp of an action-space could have as far as perception goes. For 
instance if the perceiver's knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies is to extend to the 
anticipation of how the ball will look when he ducks, or perhaps how the ball and his own 
body and the rest of the scene will look, then this is going to require a full-blown account of 
what 'looks' are, to start with. If Hurley & Noë provide us with an explanation of what it is 
for the ball, perceiver and scene to appear a particular way (which they have failed to do so 
far), it won't be obvious that the action-space is what is doing the work when it comes to 
explaining looks, and so it won't be clear that this is a proposal that is in the spirit of the 
other accounts on offer here. For Pettit, 'looks' are explained in terms of manifest powers - 
for an object to look red, for example, is for it to manifestly empower in ways that are 
characteristic of red - so we don't want to have to appeal to more looks in order to explain 
manifestness. Hurley & Noë’s reliance on 'sensory consequences', then, jeopardises what is 
distinctive about the manifest-powers account - that phenomenal consciousness is to be 
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reduced to patterns of access-consciousness.   
   In the case of colour, as we have seen above, the kind of account endorsed by Pettit 
involves the agent's being manifestly confronted with a set of sifting, sorting and tracking 
skills that is characteristic of a particular hue. If Hurley & Noë mean for their account to be 
of the same nature, their proposal must be that this action-space is made manifest to the 
agent when he brings to bear his knowledge of how each of these actions changes the 
appearance of the colour - the sensory consequences of each of the actions. However, the 
sifting, sorting and tracking skills of the action-space account simply don't have sensory-
consequences of the kind that Hurley & Noë are looking for. Sifting red objects together, 
say, doesn't change their look. In light of this, it cannot be that a perceiver is manifestly 
enabled in ways characteristic of red because he brings to bear his knowledge of the sensory 
consequences of those ways, because no such sensory consequences exist. If Hurley & Noë 
have in mind some other set of actions or skills - other than those set out in Pettit's account, 
and which do have sensory consequences that can be anticipated - then they owe us a 
description of these.   
 
   Pettit's account is thus preferable to Hurley & Noë’s alternative. The range of enabled 
actions to which a Pettit-style account can appeal go beyond those that have sensory 
consequences, and so it has richer resources to deal with the variety of possible perceptual 
contents. In addition, the powers model avoids the potential circularity attached to offering 
an explanation of looks in terms of a grasp of how looks change, and allows us to include in 
perceptual content what is important to an agent's ongoing goals, reasoning and planning, 
rather than restricting it to sensorimotor details.  
    
5.4: The Manifestness Condition: 
 
   There is a certain amount of confusion in the literature over what it is for a particular suite 
of actions to be manifestly enabled in perception. This is obviously a key notion in accounts 
of the sort I have been discussing, and so one that deserves an accurate characterisation. We 
have seen that if the action-space is to explain the phenomenal look of a perceptual episode it 
is not enough for it to be merely enabled - that is, for a creature to be sensitive to the 
possibilities of action that are afforded by an object or property - because in blindsighters 
and Zombies we have agents who have this sensitivity but lack phenomenal awareness. Thus 
the action-space must be manifestly enabled in the perceiver: the agent's grasp of the action-
space must be such that it entails that he is not a Zombie. Of course, in giving an explanation 
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of manifestness we cannot appeal to phenomenal awareness – that is, the direct and non-
inferential access to which we make reference cannot be access-by-way-of-phenomenality – 
on pain of circularity.  
   This section compares two possible construals of the manifestness condition the first of 
which was introduced above, in the discussion of Hurley & Noë’s account, while the second 
emerges from a careful consideration of the access-implies-qualia claim. I take the latter, 
which is the best understanding of the brief treatment provided by Pettit, to be the more 
successful.  
 
   The sensorimotor story, as proposed by Hurley & Noë, claims that there is a perceptual 
element to the agent's grasp of the action-space that takes place when he encounters a 
particular object or property. In the visual case, he must see the possibilities for action that 
the scene affords, and this is what it is for the action-space to manifestly empower him. 
Pettit, too, slips into this way of talking in a manner that, I will argue, does not square with 
the rest of his account.  
 
"That a seen object manifestly enables me to do such things means that I see it, 
rightly or wrongly, as enabling me in that way. The contrast is with the 
imagined case where I find or think that I have such capacities but have no 
immediate sense of where they come from... [I] will not see it enabling me - see 
it as enabling me - to do them." (Pettit, 2003; p8).  
 
   Here, the object only manifestly enables the agent when he is able to see the action-space 
that it affords, although there are other ways in which he can come to know that it is present 
(for example through inference, as in the case of the blindsighter who comes to learn that he 
has certain discriminatory abilities with practice). For Hurley & Noë too, as noted in the 
previous section, the action-space is seen in the set of sensory consequences that each 
possible action would have; the perceiver's sensorimotor-contingency expectancies. An 
object looks to afford some action because it looks as though that action would have a 
particular sensory consequence.  
   It may be that the use of 'see' in these descriptions is misleading, and that these 
philosophers have a different interpretation in mind (perhaps the second construal that I will 
develop below), but any account that requires the seeing of the action-space to itself be 
perceptual in nature has done little to defuse the problems of perception. If the space of 
possible actions that can be performed on an object or property is something that can be 
seen, we are owed an explanation of how such seeing occurs. If the manifestness condition 
of the manifest-powers account requires as much philosophical analysis as perception itself, 
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that is, the account loses its shine as a genuine explanation of consciousness.  
 
   This first interpretation of manifestness, furthermore, loses sight of the attempt that this 
kind of account makes to explain phenomenal consciousness in terms of patterns of access 
consciousness, the issue from which I started this chapter. Once we focus on this claim, I 
suggest, we can develop a more suitable notion of manifestness.  
   The central claim of the original sensorimotor approach is that perceiving is a matter of 
bringing to bear one's knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies - a body of skills and 
expectancies concerning the sensory consequences of one's actions. Once these 
contingencies are integrated with one's higher-level capacities of reasoning and action-
planning, argued O'Regan & Noë, phenomenal awareness will be entailed. This is thus a 
version of the access-implies-qualia claim, with the access being constituted by the bringing 
to bear of sensorimotor understanding. Crucially, this story does not involve its being the 
case that the agent must see sensorimotor contingencies; indeed it is unclear what such a 
proposal would mean. Rather, the agent's grasp of sensorimotor contingencies is his 
integration of stored (learned, according to Noë) knowledge into his planning and reasoning.  
   If we accept Hurley & Noë’s proposal that the agent's manifest grasp of the action-space is 
grounded in his sensorimotor knowledge, then, we must tell a story along similar lines to 
these. The agent does not see the action-space in seeing the sensorimotor contingencies 
because the latter are not the type of thing that can be seen. Instead, knowledge of the action-
space must be brought to bear in bringing to bear one's knowledge of the sensory 
consequences of the actions. The agent's grasp of the action-space is a matter of the 
integration of knowledge about possible actions into higher functioning, rather than a matter 
of becoming perceptually aware of them in a way that requires an independent explanation.    
   So the claim that manifestness comes from the seeing of the action-space is not quite right; 
what we need here is an account of what it is for knowledge of this kind to be 'brought to 
bear' in perception, and of what kind of 'knowledge' this is in the first place. This is the same 
as enquiring into the nature of the 'access' that is said to imply phenomenal consciousness. 
The condition that the action-space must be manifestly enabled, then, will rest on the account 
we provide of this access, and not on some perceptual relation that agents have to possible 
actions.       
 
   On this interpretation of Hurley & Noë the perceiver's grasp of the action-space remains 
grounded in his sensorimotor knowledge - the agent's knowledge of the possible space of 
actions afforded by an object is a part of  his knowledge of the sensory consequences of 
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those actions and so is not independent of it. Pettit's account, though, makes no reference to 
the sensory consequences (and I have suggested that an appeal to these is philosophically 
problematic anyway) of performing the actions in the action-space, so if his account of 
manifest access involves bringing knowledge to bear, then it will be a body of knowledge 
that is independent of expectancies concerning changes in appearance. On a Pettit-style 
account, in fact, the knowledge that is brought to bear in perception can simply be about the 
space of actions that can be performed on an object or property and, perhaps, some of the 
non-sensory effects of performing those actions that matter to the agent. I noted in the 
previous section, for example, that it matters more to the agent that ducking to avoid a ball 
will avoid pain or damage than that the ball will have a different appearance once ducked. If 
the two accounts under investigation here are right to claim that perception involves bringing 
to bear a body of relevant knowledge, we should favour the alternative that ascribes to the 
agent knowledge of consequences that matter to his interests. Furthermore, the only set of 
actions to which the agent can have access according to Hurley & Noë are those that have 
sensory consequences, since knowledge of the former is bound up in and dependent upon 
knowledge of the latter. Pettit's account, meanwhile, allows that the agent can be manifestly 
confronted with a wider range of possible actions - actions that have no sensory 
consequences at all, or no relevant ones, but that have other consequences that matter to the 
agent's interests.  
   By rejecting the claim that action-understanding is a part of sensory-consequences 
understanding, this reading of Pettit's view circumvents the problem of having to explain 
what these sensory consequences are. Having to make an appeal to sensory consequences in 
one's explanation of perception, I have maintained, is an undesirable commitment that this 
view succeeds in avoiding. 
 
   I have been taking 'bringing knowledge to bear', 'integration with higher-level capacities' 
and 'access' to be identical, and they tend to be used interchangeably in the literature. Clark's 
'direct, non-inferential access', for example, should be read simply as the agent's ability to 
use the components of the action-space to influence his cognition and behaviour, rather than 
as a separate faculty or processing stream from which higher-level capacities draw. The 
accounts presented by Hurley & Noë, Pettit and Clark are making essentially the same claim 
- that perception is about keeping track of the effects that the outside world has on you, in 
such a way that allows you to navigate and use its constituents for your ends. Accessing the 
action-space, then, just is bringing to bear one's knowledge of the possibilities for action that 
the scene affords in such a way that can guide one's choice of action and intervention. If this 
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knowledge is brought to bear whenever its object is present - that is, if it is forced upon the 
agent - and if this knowledge tells the agent how he can act now, then the action-space will 
be manifestly enabled. Manifest access on this second interpretation, then, is not about 
perceiving the action-space - at least not where this requires a further account of how such 
perception occurs - but of the possibilities for action becoming available to influence the 
agent's action-choice and behaviour whenever the possibilities are present.   
 
   Consider the case of the moving ball again. The first interpretation of manifestness states 
that seeing the ball to be going fast is constituted by seeing that it enables certain responses 
(of ducking and so on). Seeing the responses is what makes them manifestly enabled. But 
this isn't a satisfying explanation if 'seeing the ball to enable certain responses' is itself a 
perceptual matter; in this case, we are merely shifting the burden of explanation rather than 
reducing it.  
   The second interpretation, on the other hand, states that the ball manifestly empowers the 
agent just when the space of responses and interventions that he can make at a time is made 
available for him at that time for the purposes of informing his ongoing decisions about how 
to act. If, as I have suggested, we reject the enactive theorists' proposal that the agent's 
knowledge of how he can act on the ball is grounded in his grasp of how the ball would look 
were he to act in particular ways, we can allow that part of what he understands (part of what 
he uses to guide his behaviour) is the set of non-sensory consequences that acting will afford; 
for instance, we can allow that he knows that ducking will avoid the ball. Perceiving is thus 
bringing to bear one's knowledge of how one now can and should act on and within the 
world.  
   In the case of colour perception, too, we can tell an analogous story: coloured objects do 
not look to empower in characteristic ways; they do not look to be siftable, sortable and 
trackable. They manifestly empower the agent in that he has access to these skills when they 
are enabled in him, for the purposes of planning and cognition. The agent's knowledge of the 
sifting, sorting and tracking skills that are enabled by a particular object locates them in a 
holistic body of such abilities; he understands that this object can be picked out against 
backgrounds that themselves manifestly enable him along certain dimensions.     
 
   This way of filling out perceptual consciousness, I suggest, bears out an intuition that we 
have about which kinds of creatures are conscious and which aren't. For instance, we can 
imagine a primitive creature who responds automatically to the presence of a stimulus by, 
say, swimming towards it. Whenever the stimulus appears the action is carried out. The 
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action may even be the appropriate response to the stimulus in terms of the fulfilment of the 
agent's goals if, for instance, the stimulus corresponds to the presence of food or oxygen, in 
which case there is a sense in which the agent should swim towards the stimulus. However, 
because this agent doesn't confront a space of possible actions, and has no choice about how 
to behave, the manifest-powers account dictates that he is not perceptually aware of the 
stimulus. This is a conclusion that we are inclined - I think - to draw about this case pre-
theoretically. Even an amateur roboticist could build a device capable of behaving as this 
creature does, and we would have little temptation to ascribe to the device conscious 
awareness.  
   Consider, on the other hand, a more sophisticated creature who is capable of controlling 
his behavioural response to the presence of the stimulus, even if the extent of his control is 
only the ability to act or refrain from acting; to swim or to remain stationary. The manifest-
powers account states that if the creature is able to integrate the possibilities for action that 
the stimulus affords into his plans and goals (etc), then he will be perceptually aware of it. If 
he can choose to act, say, when he is hungry and to refrain from acting when he isn't - when 
he knows that the choice exists whenever it does so - there will be a way that the stimulus 
looks to him. Our intuitions are less clear in this case, I suspect, but we are more inclined to 
accept that a creature of this sort has conscious awareness; indeed our inclination to accept 
this increases as the richness and sophistication of the creature's sensitivity to the space of 
possible actions does. That is, the extent to which the agent has control over the actions that 
he is capable of performing given the situation in which he finds himself.  
 
5.5: Summary and conclusions:  
 
   We have the beginning of an account, drawing upon insights made by Pettit, on which 
perceptual awareness of an environment is constituted by being made manifestly able to 
perform a space of possible actions on and within that environment, where such actions 
include those of a cognitive or epistemic nature. Manifest access to, or knowledge of, an 
action-space provides the agent with self-prompting skill - it allows him to not only be 
perceptually sensitive to the world but to know that he is (when he is) and to know what the 
'results' of these sensitivities are, namely that they present him with his environment's 
possibilities for action and cognition. The perceiver takes his environment to present these 
possibilities in that they are integrated into his ongoing planning and reasoning, and this is 
what conscious perception is. It is the ongoing integration of the perceiver's knowledge of 
the action-space that makes this knowledge distinctively perceptual. In confronting the 
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action-space, the perceiver has a grasp of what he can do here and now, and is thus poised to 
perform in those ways; he knows that he can track and discriminate these objects right here, 
and is ready to reach them, grasp them, avoid them and so on, according to his needs and 
goals. This is all there is for him to being aware of his surroundings. These central claims of 
the account will be developed in full in the following chapters.  
 
   The action-space model offers advantages over the sensorimotor theory and extends the 
explanatory impetus of the looks as powers story. It maintains an action-oriented focus 
without restricting perceptual contents to those entailed by the enactive approach, where 
detailed sensory consequences of exploratory actions are key. While Pettit's emphasis is on 
colour looks, the action-space account suggests that perceptual contents in general can be 
given an action-oriented interpretation, again where actions may be either bodily or 
epistemic in nature. Solid, shaped objects that are located at a certain orientation and location 
in space, for example, empower an embodied agent in characteristic suites of ways provided 
that she is suitably perceptually sensitive to their properties. They constitute obstacles to her 
progress and opportunities for climbing, ducking, lifting, pushing and so on, but are also 
items that offer means to the satisfaction of her ends, and that she can categorise, 
discriminate and track over space and time.   
   My proposal is that manifest empowerment should be construed as empowerment to which 
the perceiver has direct, non-inferential access, and so that the account recruits Clark's 
access-implies-qualia tactic. This way of filling out manifestness differs, apparently, from 
Pettit's own treatment which takes a suite of actions to be manifestly (visually) enabled when 
it is seen as being enabled. My account rejects this perceptual relation in a way that accords 
with the 'bringing knowledge to bear' interpretation endorsed by the sensorimotor theory, 
although the knowledge that is exercised4 concerns possibilities for goal-satisfying, world-
directed action rather than the sensory consequences of movements. In putting the account in 
this way, we avoid limiting the space of possible manifestly empowered actions to those that 
have sensory consequences.  
   I noted that Pettit's explanation of colour looks must be amended to accommodate a kind of 
holistic interdependence of the sifting, sorting and tracking skills to which he appeals. In 
order for a surface to look red to a perceiver, it must manifestly empower her to discriminate, 
compare and contrast it with respect to other colour-looks that are themselves understood in 
sifting, sorting and tracking terms. A perceiver needs to have a grasp of a whole space of 
colour powers in order to have a grasp of any. This amendment is consistent with what Pettit 
states, but clarifies the interrelated nature of spaces of perceptually enabled action.  
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   I begin to develop the action-space account in the next chapter by providing reasons to 
accept the claim that particular patterns of access-consciousness, those that constitute 
manifest empowerment of a space of enabled actions, may entail phenomenal consciousness. 
I proceed by undermining the principal competitor to this view - an approach that endorses 
intrinsically qualitative properties of experience. The action-space theory aims to do more 
than simply explain why perceptual experiences feel like something to their subjects, it aims 
to provide a satisfying account of why particular perceptual encounters have their 






Chapter 5 Notes.  
 
 
Footnote 1: These other versions of the enactive theory, recall, cannot accommodate the 
current strategy of attempting to explain phenomenal-consciousness in terms of access-
consciousness of sensorimotor contingencies, for the sensorimotor dependencies they 
propose involve the effects of movements on features that are already phenomenally-
conscious.  
 
Footnote 2: This view is only gestured towards in Clark's access implies qualia paper, but the 
proposal is one that he now endorses (see, e.g., Ward, Roberts & Clark, in progress).  
 
Footnote 3: As Clark notes, this follows a suggestion made in Güzeldere, 1997.  
 
Footnote 4: Where 'knowledge' is too strong, but is a suitable place-holder for now. The 
correct construal will be explored in chapter 7.  
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Chapter 6: Conscious Experience.  
 
   We saw in the last chapter that the action-space account involves an extension of Clark's 
'access consciousness entails phenomenal consciousness' proposal, upon which the 
qualitative feel attached to a perceptual experience is explained but not explained-away. 
Setting phenomenal consciousness in terms of access consciousness, that is, is not to deny 
that experiences have a genuinely qualitative component. It is to deny, however, that 
phenomenal properties are mysterious, intrinsic or irreducible features of the agent's mental 
life. The strategy in this chapter is to undermine the plausibility of the ascription of 
phenomenal properties construed this way to experiences. On the action-space model 
experiences are temporally-extended encounters with the world during which the perceiver 
takes his environment to afford certain possibilities for action and cognition, and this is all 
there is for it to look (sound, taste, feel etc) a particular way to him. There are no further 
qualitative properties attached to such episodes.   
   One source of resistance to theories of perception, like this one, that eliminate intrinsic 
phenomenal properties is the intuition that they leave something out in their description of 
what it is to enjoy a conscious experience; that they haven't explained the difference between 
being consciously aware and its being 'all dark inside'. The current proposal, however, states 
that once we explain what it is for the world to look (sound, feel, and so on) a certain way to 
a perceiver this is all that needs to be accounted for. Any perceiver for whom the world 
appears this way is not all dark inside.     
 
   The entailment or implication of phenomenal consciousness by access consciousness is 
thus not to be read as a causal relation but rather as a constitutive one. It is not that the 
phenomenal feel of a perceptual episode is the result or end-product of some access activity - 
instead, the subjective look of a particular property is constituted by the perceiver's non-
inferential integration of the property's possibilities for action into his higher-level capacities 
for planning, reasoning and the control of action. The claim is that for any agent who is 
confronted by his environment's characteristic action-space - where confrontation with an 
action-space is for it to be manifestly afforded - there will be something it is like to be that 
agent at that time. As outlined in the previous chapter, it is this 'confrontation' that is to be set 
in terms of access or (which is to say the same thing) in terms of 'bringing knowledge to 
bear'. If such an account can be sustained, there will no longer be a conceptual division 
between access- and phenomenal-consciousness; the latter can be viewed as a species of the 
former.    
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6.1: Locating the Action-Space Account.  
        
   The task now is to defend this conception against those who might charge it with 
behaviourist leanings, and more generally those who think that it leaves something important 
out of its explanation of conscious perception. Why, such a critic might ask, should such 
patterns of access result in any qualitative feel at all? Doesn't the action-space story involve 
only types of behaviour and dispositions to behave?  
   I believe that my discussion in Chapters 3 and 5 has mitigated the force of such a response 
already, where I commented that it is hard to imagine what more could have to be added to a 
creature who could self-prompt his perceptual discriminations in order for him to be 
phenomenally conscious (where self-prompting is achieved through non-inferential access to 
the space of possible actions). There, I noted that one feature that distinguishes blindsighted 
patients from their visually conscious counterparts is their inability to carry out 
discriminations (etc) unless prompted by an experimenter (at least until they learn that their 
perceptually-grounded guesses tend to be reliable). The first step towards the action-space 
account was to suggest that one way to secure self-prompting - the ability of the agent to no 
longer have to rely on the experimenter's input for guidance on when to make a particular 
discrimination, judgement etc - would be for the agent to have direct, unmediated access to 
the suite of actions and interventions that the stimulus affords, including the ways in which it 
can be sifted and sorted and so on. A putative Zombie would have to be a self-prompter in 
order to fit the criteria - as legend dictates - of behaving exactly as we conscious perceivers 
do. If the action-space account is right, a creature whose self-prompting is grounded in a 
direct and non-inferential access to the skills that are enabled in him by the presence of a 
particular stimulus will have phenomenal consciousness, and therefore necessarily not be a 
Zombie.  
 
   There is a way of reading this strategy, though, and particularly of reading Clark's proposal 
in 'A Case Where Access Implies Qualia?', which confuses the structure of the action-space 
account and is misleading over its components. Such a confusion can be identified in Pete 
Mandik's commentary on Clark's paper (Mandik, forthcoming), and there are hints of it in 
Clark's paper too. The problem lies in ascribing too much to the perceiver pre-access, as it 
were: in interpreting the direct, non-inferential access that we need for the action-space 
account to work as something that can be simply bolted-on to some other set of 
discriminatory capacities that the agent already possesses. The higher-level access proposed 
by the action-space account should not be seen as being an extra addition to a system that 
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can already make perceptual discriminations, it should be seen as partially constituting the 
agent's ability to make such discriminations. Similarly, such access is not something that is 
attached to a system that is already capable of acting; it is partially constitutive of the ability 
to act intentionally.  
   The problematic interpretation emerges from the first proposal made in Clark's paper - that 
the access that is supposed to secure qualia has as its target the mode of discrimination (that 
is, the sensory modality) employed by a perceiver. Clark's suggestion at this stage, as is 
illustrated by the way he sets up the case in which he is interested, is that we should consider 
a creature who is able to make perceptual discriminations and then add to the creature a 
higher level of access-consciousness whose target is the modality by which these 
discriminations are made. Such access, the argument goes, is sufficient to secure phenomenal 
consciousness.  
   Once we interpret the action-space model more clearly, however, we can see that it ought 
not to involve this two-part structure, at least not in the way that Clark's original set-up 
assumes. First, the action-space account is interested in sensory modalities only insofar as 
they enable different sets of actions for the agent, so the higher-level access that we ought to 
be considering is targeted at action-spaces rather than (directly) at modalities. Second, prior 
to the addition of this access the creature is unable to self-prompt, so it is unreasonable to 
describe him as capable of making discriminations - at best he has perceptual sensitivities. 
This distinction matters, as we shall see, given certain liberal views on when qualia are 
present. Mandik's argument is, I suspect, typical of the kind of response that many will be 
tempted to give to the action-space story, and examining it will allow us to see the competing 
interpretations of qualia more effectively and to determine the resources that are available to 
those who think that phenomenal consciousness is conceptually distinct from access 
consciousness. 
     
   Mandik states that Clark's position (the first proposal made in his paper, that direct, 
unmediated access involves discriminating sensory modalities) occupies an unstable mid-
point between two competing accounts of qualia, the liberal position and the conservative 
position. 
The qualia liberal, first of all, has an undemanding view of when qualia are present, and in 
particular holds the following: 
 
"[T]he mere fact that a system is able to make perceptual judgements about 
features of its environment entails the existence of phenomenal consciousness... 
in order to have qualia, the creatures need not access information about which 
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modality they employed, they need only employ the modality." (Mandik, 
forthcoming; page 4).  
 
  Clark's argument is based upon consideration of a scenario in which there exists a creature 
who is capable of making such perceptual judgements, and we are invited to consider the 
position that the creature will be in if he is capable of directly accessing the sensory modality 
that subserves such judgements - that is, if a higher-level of access is added to a system that 
is already capable of making discriminations. Clark's claim is that the 'extra' access implies 
the existence of phenomenal consciousness. But this is redundant, according to the qualia 
liberal, because qualia are already there given the ability to make discriminatory 
judgements. Clark is thus accused by the liberal of smuggling qualia into his scenario instead 
of reducing or explaining them. His argument will work, then, only if there is a suitable way 
of filling-out those abilities that are possessed by the creature prior to the addition of access 
that doesn't imply qualia even on the liberal view.   
   My suggestion is that there is a confusion over what it is for the creature to "employ the 
modality" here. There are two readings of this, which parallel the abilities of the self-
prompter and the blindsighter respectively, and Mandik assumes that the first reading holds. 
Once we embrace the second reading, I propose, we can see that any further attempt by the 
liberal to maintain that qualia are 'already there' is very implausible, but that it is equally 
implausible to maintain that they are not there once the appropriately-construed second-level 
is in place. On the first reading, Clark's creature is a self-prompter capable of making 
perceptual judgements when they are appropriate - for example, when(ever) he is confronted 
with a visual stimulus - even before the higher level of access is added. He employs a 
sensory modality when he makes such judgements and discriminations on the basis of that 
modality. The liberal can then claim that such a creature already has phenomenal 
consciousness at this stage, that there is something it is like for the agent to make a 
perceptual discrimination, and indeed it is not clear what role any 'extra' access capable of 
discriminating the sensory modality could contribute. Clark's argument, if this is an 
appropriate description of it, would thus be redundant - qualia would be implied only 
because they would be present in the first place.  
   
   On the second reading of "employ the modality", though, all that the creature initially 
possesses is a sensitivity to the outside world that shows up in his prompted guesses (as with 
the blindsighter). He doesn't know when it is appropriate to make a perceptual judgement, 
and so if he is not accompanied by a prompter he will not be capable of doing so. As I 
interpret this case, it is not legitimate to say that a creature like this is really able to make 
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perceptual discriminations at all - and so this interpretation will involve something of a 
revision of the way that Clark sets up the case in his argument. The action-space story should 
say that a creature without the higher-level access that is said to imply qualia will not be able 
to make perceptual discriminations at all, but only has perceptual sensitivities. The latter are 
not sufficient by themselves to imply qualia, on anything but an implausibly radical position. 
More generally, the pre-access agent is unable to act at all in the ways that are perceptually 
enabled, because he doesn't know that he can. Access to the space of perceptually-enabled 
actions, on the other hand, allows these possibilities to be carried out intentionally.  
   The access that the action-space account proposes is what brings the agent to a position in 
which he is a self-prompter, where (at least when self-prompting is direct and non-
inferential) self-prompters are phenomenally conscious. On this second interpretation, Clark 
is actually in agreement with what the liberal says about the first way of reading "employ the 
modality": that any agent who is genuinely capable of making perceptual judgements when 
they are appropriate - and not simply of being sensitive to visual information - will undergo 
qualia. What Clark's argument (and, more fully, the action-space account) provides, though, 
is an explanation of the means by which such a self-prompting capacity comes about1.   
   To summarise - the first reading of Clark's position states that we ought to consider a case 
in which a higher level of access, capable of discriminating sensory modalities, is added to a 
creature who is capable of making perceptual discriminations. The qualia-liberal says that 
this addition will make no contribution to securing phenomenal consciousness, because 
phenomenal consciousness is already implied by the ability to make discriminations. The 
second reading of Clark, the improved action-space account, states that the creature doesn't 
truly have the ability to make perceptual discriminations prior to the addition of the higher 
level of access, but possesses only sensitivities to information. The extra level of access 
secures self-prompting, the ability to make perceptual discriminations, and phenomenal 
consciousness.  
 
   Now, either the liberal has to say that mere sensitivity to information is sufficient for the 
presence of qualia, or he must admit that the additional access that the action-space model 
proposes can make a qualia-implying contribution after all (the qualia conservative, to be 
considered below, states that neither condition is sufficient for qualia). The first of these 
options is unattractive as it would entail that, for example, a thermostat or a petrol-gauge 
have phenomenal consciousness. It is too liberal, I suggest, to state that qualia must be 
present wherever there is informational sensitivity. Clark, the qualia liberal and I all agree, as 
far as I can see, that any agent who is really capable of making perceptual discriminations 
 124
when appropriate will be phenomenally conscious, provided that this ability is grounded in a 
non-inferential understanding of when such discriminations can be made (rather than, as with 
the experienced blindsighter, by coming to know from his past performance that he tends to 
be able to discriminate stimuli). So we shouldn't see the access-implies-qualia argument as 
claiming that some extra access is needed on top of the ability to make appropriate 
discriminations, we should see it as a way of filling-out what it is to have the non-inferential 
grasp of when a discrimination can be made (and the kind of discrimination that can be 
made, and so on) that is required for the possession of this ability.  
   Contrary to Mandik's objection on behalf of the liberal, then, it is not the case that the 
current position smuggles qualia in by covertly assuming the presence of a capacity that 
already implies phenomenality. Prior to the non-inferential self-prompting capacity that the 
action-space account proposes, all that the creatures we've been considering possess is a 
perceptual sensitivity to the world that shows up in the reliability of their prompted guesses. 
If we accept the blindsighter's claim that he has no phenomenal awareness of the stimuli 
about which he can guess (and this is in line with our intuitions about the kinds of creatures 
who are conscious and unconscious), there is little scope for a radically liberal theorist to 
claim that perceptual sensitivity alone is enough for qualia. If this is right, then Clark's 
hypothetical systems to which higher-level access is added are not already phenomenally 
conscious prior to that addition.  
 
   The qualia conservative, on the other hand, has a more demanding conception of when 
and where qualia are present. Mandik thinks that the conservative, too, will not accept 
Clark's position: 
 
"[T]he conservative holds that adding all the modality specific introspective 
access in the world will be (logically, conceptually) insufficient to give rise to 
phenomenal consciousness... the phenomenal does not logically supervene on 
the physical and adding the ability to discriminate one's own sensory modalities 
is merely adding more physical stuff that does not logically entail the addition 
of qualia." (op cit. page 4).  
 
   For the conservative2, Clark is proposing the addition of a capacity that is ultimately of the 
same access-based kind as that which is already present, and neither entails the presence of 
qualia. There is discrimination of states of the world and discrimination of sensory 
modalities, and neither is the right kind of thing to account for phenomenal consciousness. 
The conservative doesn't accept the conclusion that the self-prompting blindsighter is no 
longer a blindsighter, a conclusion that, I acknowledge, has been so far defended with only 
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an appeal to intuition.  
   Again, though, we can do something to mitigate the force of this objection by developing a 
clearer treatment of the perceptual abilities that the action-space model proposes (where, 
remember, these are different from those made in Clark's first proposal). Once we do this we 
can see that the account being developed here does not merely involve one discriminatory 
power being brought to bear on another, and so that there are ways to defend the view from 
the qualia conservative. 
         
   Prior to the addition of extra, higher-level access, I suggested, the hypothetical creature 
should only be considered as being perceptually sensitive to the world. He doesn't have 
access to his environment, though, because access (on the construal I've been using 
throughout, owing to Block) requires integration with higher-level capacities of reason and 
planning and so on. So it's not the case that this scenario involves one mode of access being 
brought to bear on another. Instead, the action-space account states that the presence and 
operation of the agent's perceptual sensitivity enables - and forces - the bringing-to-bear of 
his knowledge about the space of possible actions.  
   One way of filling-out the relevant distinction here is to set 'bringing knowledge of the 
action-space to bear' in terms of transactions among representational contents. This is the 
view I will develop and defend in the next chapter. A representationalist framework will 
allow us to locate the action-space account more easily with respect to its competitors in the 
philosophy of mind. Access to an action-space can be viewed simply as representation of 
that space in a way that feeds into higher-level capacities of reasoning and action-planning 
and -selection. When content specifying a suite of possible world-engaging actions and 
interventions is capable of flexibly influencing an agent's ongoing, goal-directed activity, she 
is manifestly empowered to perform those actions.    
 
   The question, then, is whether the qualia conservative can maintain that even once the 
agent is thus manifestly poised in front of an action-space he still undergoes no phenomenal 
consciousness. The conservative must argue that a creature can be affected by his 
environment in such a way that he is capable not only of acting on it appropriately, but of 
knowing what the space of possible actions is, of integrating these possibilities with his plans 
and goals (etc), of judging and acting upon the relative similarities and differences that hold 
between parts and constituents of the world without all this carrying with it any phenomenal 
feel. The action-space account, to repeat, holds that there is nothing more to experiencing the 
world - with all the qualitative aspect that this involves - than being manifestly confronted 
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with this set of perceptual effects for the purposes of action-choice, deliberation and control: 
once these are secured phenomenal feel comes for free, as it were.  
   As Pettit notes (2003, p5 and following), the 'traditional' picture (that is, the qualia-
conservative view) has it that qualia are what underpin the perceiver's ability to sift, sort and 
track objects - he can sort red objects together, for example, because they (or perhaps the 
agent's experiences of them) all bear similar red qualia. So for the conservative qualia are 
separable from their effects, they are intrinsic properties of experience. In addition, the 
traditional picture holds that qualia are ineffable, irreducible to physical or functional states, 
directly introspectible and private. In the following sections I motivate the claim that the 
traditional picture is mistaken, and that the burden of proof is on the qualia conservative to 




   I take it that the qualia-conservative position presents the most significant challenge to the 
action-space account, and that the dispute hereabouts looks at first pass to come down to a 
clash of intuitions: the intuition had by the advocate of the action-space story that nothing 
more is required for phenomenal feel than manifest confrontation with the space of possible 
actions and interventions appropriately construed, versus the qualia-conservative's intuition 
that 'manifest confrontation' isn't even the kind of thing that can explain subjective feel and 
that effect-independent phenomenal properties are real.  
  This is, of course, the debate to which much of Daniel Dennett's work has been directed 
and, as a species of Dennett's general approach, the action-space account is entitled to tackle 
the qualia-conservative using his resources. The thrust of Dennett's argument is that it is not 
possible for anything to meet the conditions set on qualia by the conservative; that it is 
impossible to sustain a credible account of intrinsic, effect-independent qualitative properties 
even on the conservative's own terms. If this is right - and the rest of this chapter will 
consider the case for this claim - then the debate will no longer be a mere clash of intuitions. 
Instead, we will have a principled reason to reject the conservative position and alternatives 
such as the action-space model will be on firmer ground. Whatever is 'left over' once the 
unsustainable properties of qualia are rejected - that is, whatever qualitative aspect of 
experience that resists the 'intrinsic, ineffable, private' label - is the target of explanation by 
the action-space account. Like Dennett, this model does not aim to explain what it is for 
experiences to have phenomenal properties as construed by the conservative, but rather to 
explain their "nearest real-world correlate" (as Clark has put it, in conversation). What this 
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explanation amounts to, I propose, is simply an explanation of what it is for the world to look 
or appear to be a particular way to an agent.  
 
  The action-space account can provide a fuller and potentially more satisfying explanation 
of phenomenal consciousness than does Dennett's own interpretation, I suggest, although it is 
essentially an addition to his treatment rather than a competitor. Roughly, for Dennett, once 
the effects that a perceptual episode has on its subject have been accounted for nothing more 
need be said (or can be said) about how the experience felt for him. The action-space account 
spells out more richly what these effects are: they are suites of skills to which the perceiver 
has manifest access, skills that allow him to discriminate, sift, sort, track and interact with 




   The qualia-conservative holds that there are phenomenal properties of experiences that are 
intrinsic to them, in the sense of being independent of any of the effects that the experience 
has on its subject (his dispositions to react, judge and report and so on). They are 
intrinsically phenomenal in that they are irreducible to physical or functional facts about the 
state of the perceiver. They are the properties that give an experience its 'what it is like-ness'.   
   Dennett concedes, eventually (Consciousness Explained (hereafter “CE”), p461), that he is 
a verificationist when it comes to questions of qualia: given that there could be no evidence 
for their presence, independently of their effects, qualia-talk is strictly meaningless. The 
impossibility of verifying an experiencer's claims about his phenomenal properties renders 
them neither true nor false. This is a strong claim that is unlikely to convince those who 
endorse the conservative view, but it does shift the burden of explanation onto their position 
- they must provide a defence of the intrinsic-and-effect-independent interpretation rather 
than simply assuming its accuracy. The problem with the conservative construal of qualia, 
even without going as far as verificationism, is that it is unclear what kind of explanatory 
role it could play: what kinds of facts could be explained by proposing the existence of 
effect-independent qualitative properties of experience? The only possible answer is that 
there are cases in which there is something left over - some kind of subjective, private feel - 
once an experience is stripped of the effects that it causes on the perceiver; or in which the 
same suite of effects can be present in conjunction with different subjective feels. If either of 
these is a genuine possibility, the conservative will be able to show that qualia and their 
effects are separable. Two such cases are summarised below and Dennett and the action-
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space theorist agree that the conservative is in fact unable to sustain a division between an 
experience's effects and its qualitative properties (albeit while enumerating different kinds of 
effects).  
 
   The first of these (Dennett, Quining Qualia (hereafter “QQ”), section 4) features two 
coffee-tasters, Chase and Sanborn, whose opinion of a particular brand of coffee has altered 
over time: where once Maxwell House was their favourite brand now neither taster enjoys it. 
The two, however, offer different reasons for this change - Chase maintains that the taste of 
the coffee has stayed the same but his tastes (that is, his evaluative response to the taste) 
have changed, while Sanborn opines the opposite (that it is not his tastes that have changed, 
but the taste of the coffee itself that has altered). For the qualia conservative there is a real 
distinction here - both of these situations are possible given the separability of qualia (taste) 
from effect (evaluation). Both Chase and Sanborn can be correct in their judgement of what 
has changed, and if both are right then they are each in a different position experientially 
from the other; their qualia are different.  
   For the verificationist, on the other hand, there could be no evidence to decide whether 
either Chase or Sanborn are correct in their assertions, and so their statements are 
meaningless. No evidence could be adduced to support Chase's claim that his qualia have 
stayed the same while his tastes have changed - nothing, that is, that could favour this 
interpretation over its converse - and the same is of course true for Sanborn. The qualia-
conservative's insistence on the intrinsic, private, effect-independent nature of qualia secures 
this. There is nothing available to the third-person observer that could allow him to 
adjudicate over whether it is taste or tastes that have changed in either case. Furthermore, as 
Dennett notes, there is nothing available for Chase and Sanborn themselves to appeal to in 
supporting their respective claims. Their earlier qualia are inaccessible to them, and so 
cannot be compared against their present qualia. The conservative proposal that their present 
qualia can be infallibly known (which, Dennett states, is a response for which there is "a 
strong temptation") is, he suggests, "a mysterious doctrine".  
   For Dennett, Chase and Sanborn are in identical positions because there is nothing to their 
experiences over and above their responses and those responses match one another. There 
are no intrinsic qualitative properties over and above the evaluative and cognitive effects that 
the coffee has on each taster, so to ask whether such properties have changed or remained 
constant is to ask the wrong kind of question. The action-space account is in agreement with 
this thesis and provides a way of filling-out the kinds of cognitive effects that are relevant 
here. In the Chase and Sanborn discussion, Dennett focuses on the evaluative or affective 
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aspect of the perceivers' responses to the coffee; we are to consider the two tasters coming to 
dislike something that was once appealing to them. This can't be all that there is to the 
experience, though, because the affective component is in a sense too coarse-grained to 
secure the differences between particular experiences. Chase and Sanborn may like two 
different coffees equally, say, and thus exhibit the same set of affective responses in two 
different perceptual cases, but we are not tempted to say that their experiences in these cases 
are thus necessarily identical (a clearer case: a perceiver who likes coffee just as much as he 
likes tea, and so who exhibits an identical suite of such affective responses to both drinks. 
Stating that this affective component is all that there is to the experience in each case is 
unsatisfactory).  
 
   On the action-space story, following Pettit, the suite of responses that a perceiver exhibits 
upon perceptually encountering a property includes his manifest grasp of the ways in which 
he can sift, sort and track the property (skills to which Dennett gives little attention). These 
are more finely-grained than the perceiver's affective responses (his like or dislike of the 
property and the kinds of behaviour these result in) - coffee can be sifted, sorted and tracked 
over a different range of conditions than tea can be, for example. Once we include these 
kinds of skills in the set of responses to be considered in the Chase and Sanborn case (that is, 
if the two tasters have the same responses to the coffee in ways that include their dispositions 
to sift, sort and track it etc), it becomes still less clear that there is a sensible question to be 
asked about whether it is the responses or the qualia that have changed over time. Could it 
really be that Chase and Sanborn both dislike the Maxwell House, are able to judge its 
similarity to and difference from other brands of coffee (even if only on a practical level; i.e. 
that both are able to locate it on a scale of similarity and difference with the others when 
confronted with each), are able to recognise it on repeated trials and, perhaps, in combination 
with different flavours, but for its nevertheless to taste different to each of them? If not, then 
the putative separability of the taste of the coffee from its effects is a false distinction. The 
action-space account, in setting out clearly the range of effects that we ought to be 
considering in this case, has made this falsity more compelling. 
   The need to take abilities of sifting, sorting and tracking into account - in addition to the 
affective, emotional, evaluative responses suggested by Dennett in this case - is more 
obvious in cases where there is no clear affective component at all. For instance, it isn't 
obvious that perceivers always have preferences when it comes to colours, say, so there will 
be no unique set of such responses that we can appeal to in explaining colour experience. 
Here we can't ask, as we did in the Chase and Sanborn example, 'what is left over in the 
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experience of yellow (for instance) when we remove how the agent feels about yellow?', 
because it is likely (though perhaps not certain) that the agent has entirely neutral 
preferences as far as yellow is concerned. We can ask, though, 'what is left over when we 
subtract the perceiver's manifest ability to sift, sort and track the yellow object over a range 
of conditions?', and reasonably answer: nothing at all.  
 
   The second kind of case that the qualia enthusiast can appeal to is that of the Inverted 
Spectrum (see, for example, Block (1990)). Again, this is said to show the separability of 
qualia from their owners' responses and is, in effect, a limiting case of the scenario in which 
Chase and Sanborn find themselves. The story is familiar: we can imagine, according to the 
qualia-conservative, two agents who behave identically as far as their colour-relevant 
responses go but who enjoy colour sensations that are reversed - they have inverted spectra. 
Pillar-boxes, tomatoes, sunsets and so on look red to the first agent, but look green to the 
second (that is, they look the way grass, cucumbers and limes look to the first agent). Both 
agents use the same colour terms, of course, and exhibit the same suite of reactions and 
attitudes - both are relaxed by the presence of blue (including physiological responses such 
as a decrease in heart-rate), both call red 'warm' and green 'cold' and so on. 
   For Dennett (CE, chapter 12, section 4) the apparent possibility of inverted spectra is again 
an artefact of an unsustainable view of qualia and as such is no real possibility at all. Once 
the agents' responses are in place there is nothing more (nothing subjective or qualitative) 
that needs to be considered, nothing that could have explanatory value. There is no possible 
evidence that could settle the question of whether two perceivers' qualia were the same or 
different, and so the question has no answer.  
   By appealing to skills of sifting, sorting and tracking the action-space account can again 
reinforce Dennett's claim that explaining perceiver responses is all that there is to explaining 
experience. In order for the behaviour of the two perceivers to be identical, as the inverted-
spectra cases demand, they must exhibit the same pattern of similarity and difference 
judgements, the same pattern of sifting, sorting and tracking and so on. Pettit (2003, p235 
and following) notes that the effects associated with looking red, for example, are rich and 
complex, and include the ability to distinguish it from other coloured objects under different 
conditions of illumination and perspective, and across an extended period of time. He claims 
that it is impossible to conceive of an object's causing this range of effects without looking 
red (by implication just this shade of red, too). If this is right - and I concede that there is 
some more work to be done in specifying just which kinds of skills are to be appealed to here 
- then spectrum-inversion is not a possibility: sameness of effects entails sameness of look, 
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because the latter is constituted by the former.          
 
   In both of the above cases the burden of proof, at least, is on the qualia conservative; he 
must provide reasons to believe that there are effect-independent qualitative properties of 
experience. In light of the range of perceptual effects that the action-space account presents, 
it is not at all clear that there is any role for phenomenal properties on top of these.         
    
6.2.2: Ineffability & Privacy.   
 
   The second of the conservative's proposed features of qualia, closely related to the first, is 
that of ineffability. Phenomenal properties are said to have an essence that is inexpressible by 
the agent; he will be unable to communicate the 'what it is like-ness' of the taste of coffee, 
the redness of a ripe tomato, the timbre of a cornet. This feature stems from the intrinsicality 
condition above, according to which qualia are separable from their effects and are primitive 
or unanalysable. There are thus no terms available for the agent to describe his qualia, 
because they have no more simple components from which a description could be built.  
   The rejection of intrinsicality, then, goes a long way towards the elimination of ineffability 
- once we see that there is nothing that satisfies the condition of being an effect-independent, 
qualitative property of experience we can see that there is nothing that is delivered to the 
agent that has a mysterious, ineffable-in-principle nature. On the other hand, and as Dennett 
notes (CE, p376 and following), theories that reduce qualia to complex suites of responses 
and dispositions can appeal to practical ineffability. The complexity of an agent's perceptual 
responses - their affective component, the memories invoked, their effect on his ongoing 
behaviour, the ways in which the property can be manifestly sifted, sorted and tracked and so 
on - render them out of bounds to verbal report. Perceivers simply do not (and need not) 
have the conceptual or linguistic resources to provide descriptions of everything that takes 
place during a perceptual episode, and this is the source of the apparent ineffability therein. 
There is, however, no barrier in principle to a complete description of the effects that a 
perceiver's encounter with a property has on him were he to be provided with all of the 
relevant information (as Mary the Brilliant Colour Scientist has been, for example; more on 
this case below). On the deflationist or eliminativist view, of course, securing this 
description would amount to securing a description of 'what the experience is like'.   
 
   Where the vocabulary is available, furthermore, there is a great deal about the agent's 
experience that he can report, so the alleged ineffability of what is experienced has been 
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overplayed by the conservative. Although the action-space account does not require that each 
element of the manifestly afforded space of possibilities can be reported by the agent (it 
demands only the weaker claim that each element must show up at the personal-level), many 
of them can be. What does red look like? Well, it looks quite a lot like orange, and a lot less 
like blue. Normal human perceivers have a grip on the terms that can be used to describe the 
relative similarities and differences that hold within the colour-space; they have a quite 
finely-grained vocabulary that enables such description. For the other sensory modalities, 
however, there is a far more limited conceptual and linguistic apparatus available: in what 
respect is the taste of orange juice more similar to that of lemonade than of coffee? We don't 
have terms that naturally describe such cases; we don't have terms for each and every 
component of any action-space with which we can be confronted, and this is a further source 
of apparent or practical ineffability. Similarly, the agent has no access to the properties of 
objects (some microphysical reflectance properties, on standard accounts of the visual case) 
that ground his skills and judgements of similarity and difference. On the action-space 
model, abilities of sifting, sorting and tracking (etc) are enabled by the brain in light of its 
sensitivities to these properties, but only the sets of possible skills and actions themselves are 
available to the agent, so he cannot report what it is in virtue of which his skills are present. 
In perceptually encountering a red object, say, he will be manifestly empowered to sort it 
with other red objects, sift it from green objects and so on, but will have no knowledge of the 
properties or sensitivities that ground these abilities.  
   Again, once this suite of effects has been secured there is nothing more to be added: there 
is no further property of the experience (indeed it is unclear what it would mean for an 
experience to have properties; see the next section) that is made available to the agent but 
about which he can say nothing.        
   Privacy, too, can be given a deflationary treatment on the current approach. The privacy 
condition is, again, tied closely to the other features of qualia endorsed by the conservative. 
It is hard to separate clearly privacy from ineffability, but the key notion seems to be that one 
agent's qualia can in principle be known only by himself - they are unavailable to the second- 
or third-person perspective. Dennett (QQ, p544) states that privacy should be read as 
idiosyncrasy. An agent's detection-systems and perceptual responses are idiosyncratic in that 
they depend subtly on his physiology, his past experience, his preferences, his goals and so 
on. Given their complexity, no other agent is likely to share these features, although the 
extent to which they are shared by two or more agents will of course match the extent to 
which their experiences are similar, because their experiences are constituted by the sets of 
manifest responses on the current view.     
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   As with ineffability, there is no privacy-in-principle. Two perceivers with identical 
detection-systems and responses will undergo identical experiences when located in identical 
circumstances. The question of third-person access to an agent's experience will be 
addressed below, when considering Mary the colour-scientist.     
   The action-space story extends the field of possible perceiver-responses to make Dennett's 
idea of privacy as idiosyncrasy more compelling. Can we imagine two perceivers who when 
they encounter a property are confronted with identical action-spaces, including identical 
spaces of sifting and sorting etc, but who undergo different experiences? It's not obvious that 
we can, and even if our intuitions are simply unclear (rather than favouring the eliminativist 
position) this again demonstrates that the qualia-conservative owes us arguments in support 
of the existence of intrinsic phenomenal properties.   
 
6.3: Manifest Empowerment Again. 
 
   The focus of the action-space account on manifest empowerment allows us to expand upon 
the 'dispositions to behave' that crop up in Dennett's examples, and to emphasise the 
importance of controlled rather than uncontrolled behavioural responses again. Consider 
'Intuition-Pump #2' from 'Quining Qualia': 
 
"Could Gallo Brothers replace their human wine tasters with a machine? A 
computer-based "expert system" for quality control and classification is 
probably within the bounds of existing technology. We now know enough about 
the relevant chemistry to make the transducers that would replace taste buds and 
olfactory organs (delicate color vision would perhaps be more problematic), and 
we can imagine using the output of such transducers as the raw material--the 
"sense data" in effect--for elaborate evaluations, descriptions, classifications." 
(QQ, p522). 
 
and Dennett's imagined response from the qualia-conservative: 
 
"[B]ut surely no matter how "sensitive" and "discriminating" such a system 
becomes, it will never have, and enjoy, what we do when we taste a wine: the 
qualia of conscious experience!" (QQ, p522).    
 
   The abilities listed at the end of the first passage are identical to those suggested by Pettit 
as the basis for colour-looks, and are the kind of cognitive or epistemic actions that the 
action-space model seeks to similarly employ. But Dennett's use of such skills in this 
example is in danger of missing out on the manifestness condition that does the work in 
these theories: on the action-space account it's not enough that the mechanical wine-taster is 
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merely disposed to produce particular evaluations, descriptions and classifications (the text 
suggests that the system in question is purely input-output; whenever wine goes in, out 
comes the response), it needs to have its own abilities made available to the rest of the 
system, to its higher-level capacities of action-choice, planning and reasoning. If it lacks 
such sophistication it won't be a perceiver in anything like the way humans are.  
   As it stands, the wine-tasting machine only has qualia (or rather, the state of the wine-taster 
constitutes its having a phenomenal experience) on the ultra-liberal construal of qualia that 
we saw above, on which any system that is sensitive to information has them. This isn't the 
construal that the action-space theorist has to take - he can argue, instead, that only agents 
who are capable of controlling their actions, of integrating the possibilities for action into 
their plans and goals, have qualia (or rather, that explaining their manifest confrontation with 
those possibilities exhaustively explains their experiences, 'phenomenal properties' and all). 
Given Dennett's own discussion of Zombies and, particularly, of blindsight (CE, especially 
p327 and following), where he argues that nothing more needs to be added to explain qualia 
once normal behaviour has been explained (that is, behaviour that doesn't require external 
prompting), it seems clear that he has in mind something more than mere dispositions to 
respond. Normal, self-prompted behaviour (as I have called it) requires the agent to have a 
higher-level grasp of the kinds of things he can do, the kinds of ways he can act on and 
within his environment. This grasp is, on the action-space account, part of the suite of 
perceiver-responses that must be considered in explaining conscious experience, in addition 
to those that are not under his control.   
 
6.4: Qualia as Non-Representational Properties of Experience. 
 
   Another way of describing the intrinsic and effect-independent nature of qualia, popular in 
the literature, is to say that they are non-representational properties of experience; features 
of a perceptual episode that are not exhausted by its content. It is through this way of talking 
that the claim that qualia are properties of experiences is most explicit.  
   Although 'strong representationists' (e.g. Tye, 1995) reject this proposal by maintaining 
that the only properties available to the agent in perception are those that his experience 
represents the world as having, and so that even properties such as colours, tastes and pains 
are represented to him as being present, the qualia-phile is likely to be unhappy with this for 
a number of reasons. He can appeal, for example, to the apparently non-representational 
nature of some experiences (e.g. Rey, 1998), or to experiences that have the same content but 
different qualia (e.g. Peacocke, 1983). In experiences of these sorts, we are said to be able to 
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isolate properties that are possessed by sensations themselves, independently of what the 
agent takes his experiences to represent, and so to demonstrate that such sensations (qualia) 
exist.  
   Visual experiences, for instance, are said to possess non-representational visual-field 
properties that explain why (say) two trees located at different distances from the observer 
have different apparent heights in spite of being represented as having identical heights 
(Peacocke, 1983; p12). The nearer tree is said to look taller than the further one, in spite of 
both being taken to be the same height by the viewer, and this is because the nearer tree fills 
a greater expanse of the perceiver's 'visual field' than does the distant tree. The visual field is 
a mental arena on which visual qualia are located, and its existence (or that of something 
very like it) is entailed by any theory on which visual qualia are intrinsic properties of 
experience. Any such theory, after all, must locate visual qualia somewhere (even if only in 
the sense of answering the question of what they are supposed to be properties of) and, given 
the argument from illusion, they cannot be located in physical space (they cannot be the 
properties of physical objects). The sense-datum inference, which grounds the non-physical 
nature of the visual field, is made in the argument from illusion as follows: when an agent 
has an illusory or hallucinatory experience as of the presence of something green (that is, an 
experience of a green object that isn't there, or isn't green), there is something green in his 
experience, or towards which his experience is directed; this green thing isn't a physical 
object, by hypothesis, therefore it must be a non-physical thing. Given that veridical and 
non-veridical experiences are indistinguishable, the objects of veridical experiences, too, 
must be non-physical. The possibility of illusion in all of the agent's sensory modalities 
implies that the same is true of non-visual experience.   
 
   The action-space account has no need for non-representational properties of experience. 
All that the agent visually encounters are objects that look a particular way to her, where this 
can be explained in terms of manifest powers. Experiencing the world involves taking it to 
be a certain way, which in turn is constituted by the perceiver's manifest grasp of the 
possibilities it affords her for action, intervention and cognition. It rejects talk of a 'visual 
field' in favour of 'that part of the world that is visually available to the agent', and so the 
account must deny that the two trees look different sizes in Peacocke's example3. The content 
of the experience is exhausted by the perceiver's manifest grasp of the action-spaces afforded 
by the two trees (which, if their properties are identical, differ only in those actions that are 
determined by their respective distances from the agent). If it was the case that the two trees 
really did look to be different heights, then this look should show up in the dispositions of 
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the perceiver - she should be disposed to treat the trees differently, including her dispositions 
to judge their respective heights, to sift and sort their heights with others, to use the higher 
tree as a vantage point when needed and so on. No such dispositions are in place in normal 
perceivers, and so it is unclear in what sense the two trees are supposed to look unequal in 
height.  
   The supposed 'bigger in the visual-field' look of the nearer tree shows up, as far as I can see 
(and as I noted in Chapter 3), only in the tendency to think that if one were to paint a picture 
of the scene, the image of the nearer tree would take up a bigger portion of the canvas. This 
is right, of course, but it tells us nothing about mysterious, two-dimensional visual fields; the 
ability to think like an artist allows us to imagine the shapes that objects would project onto a 
two-dimensional screen but doesn't demonstrate that such a screen is present in experience4.  
   On the action-space account, the difference in the apparent size of the two trees can be 
explained, if it needs to be explained at all, in terms of the fact that the nearer tree obscures a 
larger portion of the rest of the world than the further tree does, from the perceiver's current 
position, and that the nearer tree fills a larger portion of egocentric space. Part of the action-
space that a particular object affords, then, is the set of interventions it curtails as far as the 
rest of the scene is concerned. The nearer tree prevents the agent from acting on a wider 
portion of the scene than does the further tree (at least insofar as it prevents him from 
discriminating, tracking and responding to the parts of the scene that are obscured). In order 
to keep track of the nearer tree, furthermore, and orient himself to act upon it, the agent must 
move in a wider arc - he must tilt his head to see its peak, for example, to a degree that is not 
required to see the top of the distant tree. This is what it means for the closer tree to fill a 
greater portion of his egocentric space. As with the other supposed properties of qualia, 
explaining this feature is all there is to explaining the 'apparent size' of the tree. The 
perceiver, then, does not take the two trees to be of unequal heights at all, so there is no 
evidence of non-representational properties of a visual-field5.  
 
   The burden of proof, once more, is on the qualia conservative to provide reasons to accept 
the existence of non-representational properties of experiences. He must provide, in the 
visual case, a sustainable account of what the visual field is, and what properties it is 
supposed to possess. I have introduced a competing explanation in action-oriented terms of 





6.5: Mary the Brilliant Colour Scientist. 
 
   The influential case of Mary the colour-scientist (Jackson, 1982) aims to establish that 
there are non-physical, intrinsically-phenomenal properties of experience, facts about which 
can only be known by agents who have undergone those experiences. In this section I argue 
that the Mary scenario does not establish an anti-physicalist conclusion, for there are no non-
physical facts that Mary comes to know. Insisting on an answer to questions about what an 
experience is like, I suggest, indicates an underlying (and, typically, question-begging) 
adherence to the qualia-conservative perspective that I reject. On the action-space account, 
explaining the qualitative aspect of conscious experience involves explaining how the world 
looks, feels, tastes, sounds and so on to the perceiver, and not how his experiences feel to 
him. Experiences are perceptual encounters during which spaces of possible action are 
represented in a form that is suitable for integration into the agent's ongoing planning and 
action-selection, and it is not clear what it would be for such encounters to bear phenomenal 
properties.  
 
   Mary, we are asked to imagine, has been captive from birth in a black-and-white room 
with no exposure to any coloured stimuli. She has, nonetheless, come to know all of the 
physical facts that there are to know about colour perception, from surface reflectance 
properties of objects to neural transactions in the visual cortex and their effects on the 
perceiver. The question, of course, is whether Mary learns anything new when she leaves the 
room and experiences a red rose (say) for the first time. The qualia-conservative answers in 
the affirmative, appealing to the strong intuition that Mary comes to know what it is like to 
see red, a fact that is not captured by her knowledge of physical processes and properties. 
The deflationist or eliminativist about qualia, on the other hand, holds that the facts about 
Mary's experience are exhausted by her knowledge of the physical. This doesn't mean, 
though, that Mary already knows 'what it is like' to see red prior to having the experience of 
red. Rather, and as I shall argue below, it means that such questions are inappropriate; they 
carry the assumption that there are qualitative properties of experience when in fact this is 
the very question at issue. Asking a subject what her experience is like amounts to asking her 
to describe its phenomenal properties. On the action-space account and its siblings there is 
no answer to questions of 'what it is like' that bear this assumption (although even Dennett, I 
suggest, seems to have missed this point when he pursues an answer to 'what it is like' 
questions in, e.g., 'What RoboMary Knows'). Instead, the relevant question concerns what 
the world is taken to be like in experience.  
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   As with Dennett's approach to these questions, the action-space account takes the business 
of explaining experiences to be one of explaining the effects that a perceptual encounter has 
upon its subject. Once we establish the suite of effects that a visual encounter, for example, 
has on the perceiver's sensory systems, and the beliefs and responses these engender, this 
counts as an exhaustive explanation of the experience. There are, I propose, a number of 
ways in which these effects can be cashed-out, and only once we focus on the space of 
enabled actions that are empowered by a particular perceptual encounter do we get a 
satisfactory explanatory framework. I will consider two responses that Dennett gives to his 
"blue-banana" example (which I take to illustrate simply the lessons of the original Mary 
case, to which I return), before defending the action-oriented view.   
 
   Dennett (CE, p399 and following) develops an alternative scenario to Jackson's original in 
which Mary is shown, upon leaving her black-and-white room, a blue banana. If the qualia 
conservative is right, Mary will be fooled by this: she won't realise that the colour of the 
banana in front of her doesn't match the normal colour of that fruit. In fact, even though she 
knows that bananas are yellow, she will come to think that that (the blue colour) is what 
yellow looks like. Dennett, in contrast, argues that once we take seriously the premise that 
Mary knows all of the physical facts, we can see that she will know enough to pass the test - 
enough to know in advance how bananas should look. Given Mary's knowledge of all of the 
physical, brain-level facts about visual perception, we can see that this includes some salient 
fact(s) about how her neural systems will respond to yellow, and which will allow her to tell 
when she isn't experiencing it. All she has to do is determine whether the salient 'yellow' 
effect is present, and if it isn't she knows that the experience she is having isn't of yellow 
(although she won't yet know which colour it is that she is experiencing). Taking on board 
her supposed omniscience about physical facts, Dennett continues, lets us see that she knows 
all of the relevant brain-level facts - and not just those that are peculiar to the perception of 
one colour over another - all of the details about how her brain responds to red, to yellow, to 
green and so on. So when she sees the blue-banana for the first time not only can she know 
that she's not experiencing yellow, she can know that she is experiencing blue by comparing 
the state of her brain to the state that she learnt her brain would go into upon encountering 
blue.       
  
   There is, however, a confusion on Dennett's part here, at least if the rules of Jackson's 
original Mary example are adhered to. For there is no requirement that Mary has omniscient 
access to her brain-states when she leaves the room, and so her neuroscientific knowledge 
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will not help her to pass the blue-banana test. When in the room, she comes to learn how her 
brain will respond to blue objects and to yellow objects (and so on), but in order to know 
which colour she is seeing upon leaving the room, she would have to compare the state her 
brain goes into on her encounter with the banana with her prior knowledge of the state her 
brain would go into when she sees each colour. This she cannot do, for she has no access to 
the state that her brain goes into upon seeing the banana, any more than you or I do. 
Likewise, prior knowledge of how her brain will respond to red objects will not be sufficient 
for Mary to know that she is seeing a red rose when she leaves the room. 
   What we need, instead, is some personal-level response that is peculiar to one colour rather 
than another (because it is only personal-level phenomena to which Mary has access when 
she leaves the room), and which she can compare to the responses that she has learned will 
be the effects of seeing particular colours. That is, to pass the blue-banana test, she needs to 
learn how she will react to different colours and then compare her actual response to these 
known responses. If she has the blue-response when she expects a yellow-response then she 
knows that something suspicious is afoot. 
 
   One suggestion that satisfies this constraint is that Mary can compare the beliefs that she 
comes to have upon leaving the room with those that she knows in advance that she would 
have in different perceptual situations:  
 
"[Mary says:] 'You have to remember that I know everything - absolutely 
everything - that could ever be known about the physical causes and effects of 
colour vision. So of course before you brought the banana in, I had already 
written down, in exquisite detail, exactly what physical impression a yellow 
object or a blue object (or a green object, etc.) would make on my nervous 
system. So I already knew exactly what thoughts I would have (because, after 
all, the "mere disposition" to think about this or that is not one of your famous 
qualia is it?).'"  
(CE, p399-400; emphasis in original). 
 
   Matthew Elton (2003) makes, on Dennett's behalf6, the implications of this position more 
explicit: coming to believe that the world is a certain way is all there is to perception; it is 
what constitutes perceiving the world to be that way. Seeing is believing. The differences 
between what we might call perceptual and non-perceptual beliefs can be explained, on this 
Dennettian view, in terms of the relative richness of their contents: 
 
"When one sees that the cat is on the mat one acquires a great deal of 
information that is lacking when one is simply told that the cat is on the mat. 
When one sees the cat one comes to know a great deal about its position, its 
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orientation, its colours, its size, the way it looks in the prevailing lighting 
conditions, how like or unlike it is to other cats one has known, and so on." 
(Elton, 2003; p152).  
 
   For a rose to 'look red', then, is for it to reliably produce the belief that it is red in normal 
perceivers under standard conditions of illumination. For it to look red to Mary is for it to 
produce beliefs concerning its redness in her. Importantly, there is nothing 'it is like' to 
entertain such perceptual beliefs.  
   Dennett appears to acknowledge, at least implicitly, that the focus on what Mary comes to 
believe is going to convince few qualia-conservatives. After all, their claim is that perceptual 
beliefs, and in particular beliefs about colour, are grounded in and dependent upon qualia - 
you believe that the rose is red because you undergo a red quale when you see it. It is 
cheating, Dennett thinks the response will be, to say that Mary's prior knowledge of her 
belief-states is sufficient to allow her to pass the blue-banana test. For the conservative, 
although there is a correlation between colour beliefs and colour experiences it is a causal 
correlation - Mary will come to believe that the rose is red because she experiences it as 
being red7. 
   In addition, it is not clear that the "acquisition of a great deal of information" in perception 
is best described in belief terms at all. Beliefs are conceptual and intellectual to an extent that 
seems separate from the role of perception, and such a construal would rule out young 
children and animals from the realm of conscious experience. What we need, and what the 
action-space theory provides, is a personal-level but nonconceptual suite of perceptual 
effects. 
 
   When one sees the cat on the mat, on this view, one represents the situation in a form that 
is suitable for integration with one's ongoing action planning, targeting and execution, and 
not (or not necessarily) in a form that is suitable for conceptualisation or verbal report. An 
object or scene's being represented in this way is what it takes for it to have a particular look 
from the point of view of the observer. It is not the case, this view maintains, that such 
representation feels a certain way to the perceiver; it is not the case that this perceptual 
taking bears phenomenal properties.  
   As with Elton/Dennett's seeing-is-believing proposal, where it was inappropriate to ask 
'what is it like to have a particular perceptual belief?', it is inappropriate to ask, for example, 
'what is it like to take the object to be blue?', at least where this assumes that there are 
properties of the perceptual episode that could be described in answering such a question. 
The qualia-conservative view relies upon this assumption, and takes it to be reasonable to 
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ask questions of this format. In addition to the effects that a scene has on the observer - in 
terms of his confrontation with the space of actions that it affords - there are said to be 
further phenomenal properties of the encounter, properties that specify not just what red is 
like, but what the experience of red is like.  
   Consider Peacocke's two-trees example again. For the conservative, the part of the visual 
experience representing the nearer tree bears a non-representational, phenomenal property of 
being larger-in-the-visual-field than that of the further tree. The action-space story, as I 
described above, accounts for this apparent discrepancy in size by appealing to features of 
the suites of actions that each tree manifestly empowers in the perceiver. The nearer tree 
obscures a larger portion of the environment, for example, and requires a wider arc of bodily 
movements in order to be kept track of by visual means. The experience of each tree 
involves representing these action-spaces in a way that poises the agent to act on the world in 
different ways. But it is not that such representation bears a qualitative feel of its own; there 
are no further phenomenal facts about being manifestly confronted with a space of actions.  
 
   There is no answer, on the action-space view, to 'what it is like' to see red once we subtract 
how red looks to the perceiver. That is, once we have explained what it is for a scene to look 
a particular way to the agent, this is all we need to explain to give a complete account of his 
experience of that scene. This is a crucial point to note, I think, and it is here that Dennett's 
account exhibits a second confusion. Dennett's story aims to eliminate phenomenal 
properties of experience along similar lines to those of the action-space theory. Once we 
describe all of the effects that a perceptual encounter has on the perceiver, there is nothing 
more to be said; no extra properties of the encounter that specify what the encounter is like.  
   Dennett's attempts (in 'What RoboMary knows') to answer further questions about 'what it 
is like' to have an experience hint at a failure to acknowledge that such attempts are 
inappropriate. There, Dennett aims to show that Mary doesn't need to have had a prior 
experience of redness in order to know what such experiences are like (and he discusses a 
series of convoluted set-ups in which Mary simulates having the experience rather than 
having it herself and so on), when in fact he should realise that such questions are redundant 
by the lights of his own theory. If experiencing is believing (or, more generally, for an agent 
to undergo certain perceptual effects), and this is supposed to explain away 'what it is like-
ness', then it is hopeless to subsequently ask 'but what is it like to have the perceptual beliefs 
or effects?'.  
 
   In the blue-banana case, we were looking for a suite of personal-level perceptual effects 
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that Mary could compare, upon leaving the house, with the knowledge that she gained inside 
the house of the effects that a visual encounter with a particular colour would engender. If 
she can compare the effects that the blue banana has on her with those that she knows she 
ought to have upon seeing a yellow object, she will not be fooled. Although manifestly 
empowered spaces of action are personal-level effects, I suggest that Mary will be unable to 
compare these to her prior knowledge and so that she won't be able to pass the blue-banana 
test. Again, this is not because they carry with them any non-physical, phenomenal 
properties, but only because they involve a form of representation that is nonconceptual, in 
contrast to the conceptual knowledge that Mary has of colour perception8.  
   When inside the black-and-white room, Mary learns all of the physical facts about colour 
and colour-perception, including details of the suites of perceptual discrimination and 
comparison that will be enabled by her visual processing. She learns them in propositional, 
conceptual form and can report them, reason about them and so on. The problem is that she 
is unable to compare these facts with those that she encounters in experience; in the former 
case they are represented in a format suitable for verbal report and conceptualisation, in the 
latter they are represented in a format suitable for integration into action-planning and goal-
directed behaviour.  
   Mary's failure to pass the blue-banana test (that is, to know that she is seeing a blue rather 
than a yellow banana) does not, of course, indicate that there are non-physical facts to which 
she doesn't have prior access, facts about phenomenal properties. It indicates only that the 
comparison she would need to make in order to pass the test - the comparison of actual 
perceptual effects with expected effects - is not available to her. In the room, she knows all 
the facts there are to know; in experience she represents (a subset of) the same facts, but for 
different purposes.  
   Consider the following analogy (which is not, I hasten to add, a direct parallel to the 
current case, but it is relevantly similar): Betty the Brilliant Fluid-Dynamicist has been 
locked in a dry room from birth, but has nonetheless come to learn all of the physical facts 
about three rivers labelled A, B and C. She knows all of the facts about their capacity, flow-
rate, turbulence and so on. Prior to her leaving the room for the first time, experimenters 
swap the three rivers' labels around, so that river A is labelled 'B' and vice-versa. Does Betty 
know that this switch has been performed when she comes to see the rivers for the first time? 
Her chances of noticing the discrepancy are determined by the extent to which she can map 
the observed features of the rivers onto the sets of facts that she knows in advance about each 
river. But if she isn't able to conceptualise (reason about, report) the facts that she represents 
in experience, this doesn't mean that there are facts - let alone non-physical facts - about the 
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rivers that she didn't know before. So it is possible for Betty to fail this test (which is, I 
suggest, the fluid-dynamical equivalent of the blue-banana case) without this violating the 
claim that she knew all the physical facts in advance.  
 
   Not only can Mary know all of the facts about her experiences in advance of having them 
but so can a third-person observer, provided he is furnished with the right kind of 
knowledge. As Mary did, he will have to learn which physical properties Mary's sensory 
systems are sensitive to and which sets of skills these sensitivities will enable in her. He will 
have to know which sets of properties she will take to be more or less similar than others, 
which properties she can track over particular lighting conditions and so on. Once the third-
person observer knows all of these facts, there is nothing more to knowing how Mary will 
take the red object to be - she will take it to present her with just this suite of possibilities for 
action and cognition. As noted in the section on Privacy, it may be that the third-person is 
incapable of taking red objects to be this way himself, in light of his idiosyncratic physiology 
and skill-set, if his brain is not sensitive to the same properties as Mary's (as would be the 
case if he was colour-blind, for example). In such a case he may take two objects to be more 
similar to one another than Mary does, for instance, and in doing so they will appear 
differently to him than to Mary. But provided we grant him an omniscient grasp of physical 
facts, there is nothing that he cannot know in principle about Mary's experience; nothing 
mysterious, ineffable or intrinsically phenomenal.     
 
   Does Mary learn anything new in Jackson's original case, according to the action-space 
account? Yes, albeit of a skilful rather than propositional nature. She gains the ability to 
perform certain actions fluently and intentionally, on a non-inferential basis that she lacked 
before she left the room. She comes to be able to sift and sort red objects from particular 
backgrounds, to track them over time, to compare and contrast them to others and so on, 
without having to go through complicated chains of reasoning using her prior propositional 
knowledge of colour and colour perception. She acquires the skill of picking out red objects 
from their backgrounds by sight, and thus of acting on them efficiently and figuring their 
presence into her ongoing plans and goals.  
   This accords well, I think, with our intuitive sense of what Mary can do when she leaves 
the room but lacks within the room. Her propositional knowledge isn't sufficient to provide 
her with the swift, world-engaging practical knowledge that she possesses upon perceptual 
exposure to colour. There is a present-and-future directedness to the space of actions that is 
empowered in perception that is missing from Mary's conceptual grasp of possible 
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perceptual scenarios. In being confronted by an action-space, Mary knows what she can do 
now, within the current environment, and she knows this directly and in a way that allows 
her to interact with the objects that empower her.  
 
6.6: Summary and Conclusions.  
 
   I began this chapter by locating the action-space theory's views on consciousness with 
respect to two extremes - the liberal view and the conservative view. Once suitably 
interpreted, the liberal view is the closest to that which the action-space account endorses: an 
agent who has direct, non-inferential access to a space of perceptually-enabled actions, 
including epistemic actions such as discrimination and comparison, and who can thus 
perform them unprompted is a conscious perceiver.  
   The qualia-conservative alternative, on which patterns of access-consciousness (that is, 
direct and non-inferential access) are simply insufficient for phenomenal consciousness, 
presents a significant challenge to the action-space view. I argued, however, that the 
intrinsic, private and ineffable phenomenal properties that it posits are either unsustainable or 
can be explained away using action-oriented resources, along Dennettian lines. My claim is 
that the considerations I presented shift the burden of proof onto the conservative, who must 
provide arguments in favour of qualitative properties of experience. Construed as intrinsic 
and effect-independent properties, qualia are mysterious. I resist, with Dennett, the 
separation of perceptual effects from qualitative character. Once we interpret perceptual 
effects in the full range of ways available to the action-space theorist it becomes hard to see 
what role, causal or explanatory, could be played by additional phenomenal features.  
   The apparent privacy and ineffability of so-called phenomenal properties, too, are 
accommodated by the action-space approach. Experiential content depends finely upon 
details of an agent's perceptual sensitivities, as mediated by her idiosyncratic sensory 
systems, and is nonconceptual. It is therefore largely inaccessible to verbal report and 
conceptual reasoning. 
 
   The action-space account is to be understood as a species of representationalism, where 
perceptual content is given an action-oriented treatment. Conscious experience involves 
spaces of possible action being represented in a format suitable for integration into an agent's 
action-planning and goal-directed response. Perceptual episodes do not bear qualitative 
features; so-called non-representational properties of experience can be explained in action-
oriented terms.     
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   Mary the brilliant colour-scientist does not come to know anything new when she leaves 
her black-and-white room. Instead, she comes to represent certain facts concerning which 
actions she can perform in a new way, a way that enables her to act swiftly and fluently 
within her environment, even though the same facts were already available to her through 
scientific, propositional knowledge. She gains the ability to discriminate, track, compare and 
contrast coloured objects by sight and to figure the possibilities they enable into her ongoing 
activity without prompting.    
 
   When it comes to consciousness, the action-space account has traded upon Clark's access-
implies-qualia strategy. We can see now, though, that the claim that access implies qualia is 
a little disingenuous: access doesn't imply qualia for there are no qualia, at least as 
traditionally conceived. Of his original proposal, Clark stated that:   
 
"[I]n this case, access-awareness... seems to imply that there is (or is reported to 
be) something it is like to detect the difference". (Clark, 2000; p2).  
 
   There are two suggestions here - the first that access implies that there really is something 
it is like, and the second that access ensures merely that the agent will report certain claims 
about his experiences, to the effect that there is something it is like to undergo them. My 
view is that the implications of the action-space model are situated at a mid-point between 
these two suggestions. In experience, construed as access to a space of enabled actions, there 
really is a way that the world appears - objects are taken by the perceiver to be a particular 
way, and these figure into her ongoing interactions with them. At the same time, though, the 
direct and non-inferential nature of the access, coupled with the nonconceptuality of action-
oriented content, means that perceivers will report that visually discriminable items, say, 'just 
seem different' to her. She has no access to the means by which discriminations are made 
(contra Clark's original suggestion), and the space of empowered actions is too finely-
grained to be reportable in full (in Dennett's terms it is practically ineffable). The verbal 
reports that perceivers make, that is, may suggest an analysis of conscious experience that is 




Chapter 6 Notes.  
 
Footnote 1: Self-prompting is to be taken to contrast with prompting by an external agent, as 
in the familiar blindsight examples when the subject must be told when to make a guess 
about a stimulus. However, it is not that the self-prompter plays the same role by telling 
himself when to guess; rather, the important feature is that the self-prompter needn't guess at 
all.   
 
Footnote 2: Where these will include, e.g., Chalmers, Block.  
 
Footnote 3: This point recapitulates my rejection of apparent properties as they came into 
Version-2 sensorimotor theories in chapters 2 and 3.  
 
Footnote 4: This point echoes that made in Schellenberg (2007, p608).  
 
Footnote 5: Can this kind of explanation be carried over to the case of auditory perception 
where, as I stated in chapter 4, I am willing to endorse apparent properties of, for example, 
volume? I think so, and without entailing the existence of non-representational properties of 
auditory experiences. There is a straightforward sense in which some sounds fill a bigger 
region of auditory space than others, where this can be accounted for in action-oriented terms 
as before. Loud, nearby noises obscure the detection of quieter or more distant noises, and 
facts like this help to determine the space of epistemic actions that such sounds manifestly 
empower. Two sounds can thus be perceived as having different volumes from here, given 
that from here they empower different action-spaces (different suites of comparisons, 
judgements and contrasts), without this being explained in terms of the experience of one 
bearing a louder quale than that of the other.  
 
Footnote 6: I doubt that Elton's interpretation is a completely faithful reconstruction of 
Dennett's views, but his focus on the perceiver's beliefs will help to illustrate my point here.  
 
Footnote 7: Note that this is in direct contrast to the direction of the Pettit-style approach on 
which perceptual skills are not based upon phenomenal feels, but rather qualitative properties 
are constituted by the manifest empowerment of those skills.   
 
Footnote 8: I will defend the proposed nonconceptual nature of action-oriented content in the 
next chapter.  
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Chapter 7: Content and Representation. 
 
   The action-space account maintains that experience is constituted by an agent's possession 
of various content-bearing mental states that present the world as an environment providing 
particular opportunities for action. Typically, representationalist accounts (e.g. those of 
Dretske and Tye) have taken the contents of experiential states to specify states of affairs (or 
facts, or objects) in a manner that is neutral over the ways in which the perceiver can act in 
or on them; they present to the agent shapes, colours, textures, loudness and so on. Although 
this kind of content can of course figure in the agent's selection of actions and interventions, 
such an influence would constitute a further step beyond the more fundamental presentation 
of action-neutral properties to the perceiver in experience.  
   This chapter motivates the proposal that perceptual representations are action-oriented, and 
elucidates more fully how the higher-level integration of such content into action-planning 
and reasoning is to be understood. I will argue that we can give a nonconceptual treatment of 
this relation by deflating the cognitive or intellectual resources that an agent requires in order 
for this integration to be in place, while still maintaining the genuinely world-directed nature 
of perception. Roughly, for a perceiver to be poised over an action-space in the relevant 
sense is for her to be capable of figuring the suite of possibilities that her environment 
presents into her ongoing intentional and world-engaging behaviour.  
 
   The reasons for favouring a nonconceptual account of perceptual content are threefold and 
familiar: perception is finely-grained; perception is belief-independent; perception is possible 
even for creatures with limited or no conceptual resources (a view that is denied by, for 
example, McDowell, 1994a). A nonconceptual action-space story must, of course, aim to 
satisfy all of these constraints. It must be possible, first of all, for an agent to integrate 
action-oriented contents into higher-level capacities in such a way that is faithful to the 
finely-grained character of experience. In the case of colour, say, he must be able to integrate 
the subtle details of his discriminatory abilities, his sifting, sorting, tracking and comparing 
skills and so on. Secondly, as we have seen in some examples of illusion, the higher-level 
capacities appealed to must be capable of coming apart from (and are therefore independent 
of) an agent's beliefs. The content of an experience of the Mueller-Lyer illusion, for instance, 
must poise the agent to act differently with respect to the figure's two parallel lines (to 
visually sift them apart from one another in terms of length, say), since this is what is 
constitutive of his experiencing them as different lengths, without its being the case that he 
believes their lengths to be different. Thirdly, the higher-level capacities must be those that 
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are available to all plausible candidate perceivers; they cannot be those that are not possessed 
by, for example, a dog or a cat. For this reason, it is implausible to demand that the action-
space content must be capable of forming part of a chain of inference, or of being verbally 
communicated.     
 
   Many of the explanatory tools to which the action-space theory can appeal are simply those 
that are employed by standard representationalist accounts. In light of this, the action-space 
approach can provide a natural explanation of cases of perceptual illusion and hallucination. 
Establishing the representational nature of perception along action-oriented lines, we shall 
see, has a number of advantages over traditional accounts when it comes to explaining the 
activity of real creatures under environmental constraints.   
 
   We can give, following Clark (1997), an essentially teleofunctional account of how mental 
states come to have the content they do, including those that specify possibilities for action. 
Traditionally, teleofunctional accounts assert that a particular brain state bears content that 
picks out the property of the world with which it was selected to co-vary. A state represents 
feature X when it is that state's function to be activated in the presence of Xs. The condition 
of evolutionary selection of function is a requirement in that it rules out having to conclude 
that a state represents any property with which it does in fact co-vary -- in the familiar case, 
it rules out having to say that the content of a frog's perceptual state is the disjunctive 'fly or 
black speck'. Here, the function of the representation (if it makes sense to call the state 
representational in the first place, that is) is to enable the frog to catch flies, to provide 
nutrition for the frog, and not to enable him to catch flies-or-specks. On a view like this, the 
content of the representation is the action-neutral property of being a fly. 
   On the action-space account, too, a mental state achieves its content through the functional 
role it has been selected to play in a wider cognitive system. Clark emphasises the rather 
more holistic focus of this view: 
 
"[A processing system is representational if] it depicts whole systems of 
identifiable inner states (local or distributed) or processes (temporal sequences 
of such states) as having the function of bearing specific types of information 
about external or bodily states of affairs." (Clark, 1997; p147). 
 
"The status of an inner state as a representation thus depends not so much on its 
detailed nature (e.g. whether it is like a word in an inner language, or an image, 
or something else entirely) as on the role it plays within the system." (op cit. 
p146).   
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   We need to look not only at the state of affairs by which a particular state is activated - as 
a more straightforward teleofunctional story might have it - but, in addition, at the role the 
state plays in interactions with a complex and interrelated suite of other states. It is this 
fuller, multi-directionally influential role that determines both a state’s content and its status 
as a representation. If something along these lines is correct, then we have a non-mysterious 
way in which it is sensible to ascribe action-oriented contents to particular mental states, for 
the same set of reasons that we might be tempted to ascribe action-neutral contents to a state.  
   The kind of access to a space of actions that the current approach wishes to endorse, then, 
should be equivalently non-mysterious: it is for content that describes a particular suite of 
possible actions to be made available to higher-level capacities akin to planning and 
reasoning; for the perceiver to be able to employ these contents in selecting targets and 
means by which his goals can be satisfied.    
 
7.1: Integration and the Nonconceptual Status of Action-Space Content.  
 
   The revised access-implies-qualia move that has been in play so far claims that when(ever) 
a particular pattern of access consciousness is in place an agent will undergo a 
phenomenally-conscious experience, where this pattern of access is to be construed as a 
direct and non-inferential form of knowledge about the possibilities for action that a scene 
presents. This strategy makes it the case that the (only) content that makes it into conscious 
experience is that which is understood by the agent, on a suitable interpretation of 
'understanding'. That is, that perceptual contents are fixed by an agent's cognitive resources 
as well as by the information to which his sensory systems are sensitive - fixed both from 
above and below, as it were. At the same time, the action-space theory wishes to remain free 
from conceptualist conclusions - the cognitive resources that constitute access are not to be 
taken as fully concept-involving, inferentially-promiscuous and so on, but simply as 
whatever largely practical understanding it takes for it to make sense to say that an agent has 
been apprised of a space of possibilities that informs intentional action. This condition, I 
have suggested, accords well with our intuitions about the kinds of creatures that undergo 
conscious experiences: the rejection of the conceptualist requirement rules in animals and 
young children, while the condition that genuine appraisal of a space of actions is required 
rules out mere information-sensitive devices and simple organisms such as paramaecia.  
   As with mainstream nonconceptualist accounts, of course, there is no requirement that all 
perceptual content is nonconceptual. The action-space story can permit further levels of 
content that are determined by the perceiver's conceptual resources. The commitment here - 
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an attractive one, as far as I can see - is only that there is some level of conscious perceptual 
content that can be shared by concept-users and non-concept-users alike, and which is 
constrained by an agent's grasp of the possible actions afforded by her environment.  
 
   The direct and non-inferential access to which the action-space account appeals cannot, on 
pain of circularity, be anything like 'access by way of qualitative experience', as that would 
result in a circular explanation of perceptual experience. While a standard account of 
discriminatory abilities takes perceptual skills to be grounded in how things look to the agent 
(tomatoes can be picked-out, tracked and sorted because they look red, for instance), the 
action-space account proceeds, with Pettit, in the reverse direction: manifest empowerment 
of the skills determines the look of a surface or object (tomatoes looks red just because they 
manifestly empower a characteristic suite of abilities). The access required by the action-
space account is to be given a deflationary interpretation - it is simply whatever is required 
for the agent to come to know, in a not-too-demanding sense to be developed below, without 
inference or reflection, what she can do in a particular situation. It is for action-oriented 
representational content to be delivered to her at the personal-level in such a way as to 
influence her intentional behaviour and, where present, her thought and deliberation. 
   A minimal characterisation, then, of higher-level integration is that it is exhibited by a 
creature who can figure a number of different possible actions into her ongoing goal-oriented 
activity in a way that enables her to act flexibly on a scene, and where she does not need to 
infer which actions are possible from antecedent information. Such a creature may, as a 
result of this capacity, act in a different way on the same scene upon two different occasions 
when she has different goals and projects in mind; she can control her actions relative to 
what she wants. 
 
   If conceptual content is defined as that which is apt for integration into reasoning, 
inference and so on, and which is open-endedly recombinable with other contents possessed 
by a thinker, then the understanding and integration implicated by the action-space account 
does not involve conceptual content1. 
   The integration of an action-oriented content into an agent's ongoing practical reasoning, 
action-selection and action-initiation capacities is a context-sensitive affair, and fails to 
imply the full generality that is definitive of concept-use. Nor does it entail that perceivers 
who bear this ability are capable of making inferential transitions regarding action-spaces, 
goals and opportunities, or themselves, or of verbally communicating these features. It does 
require, though, that perceivers are able to use action-space information to guide and control 
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behaviour towards the satisfaction of particular goals, over an extended period, where these 
goals are themselves nonconceptually entertained. 
 
 Susan Hurley points out that: 
 
"A conscious animal... has the ability to keep track of relationships between 
what it perceives and what it does. This ability enables it to use information 
about itself and its own states and activities as well as about its environment to 
meet its needs. It doesn't follow that it has the ability to reason systematically 
about aspects of itself, others and the environment in a variety of ways detached 
from its needs. Its abilities may be more or less context-bound" (Hurley, 1998; 
p16).  
 
   What we have, then, is a form of nonconceptual reasoning concerning possibilities for 
action and their relationship to the agent's goals and their satisfaction. Goals, plans and 
intentions may be temporally fleeting, existing only until their fulfilment perhaps, and the 
agent's understanding of how chains of means and ends can be carried out may be 
constrained by the particular circumstances in which she finds herself. Thus the extent to 
which the agent can be said to understand or grasp a space of perceptually-afforded actions 
may be limited (to a greater or lesser extent) by the task at hand, and needn't involve any 
capacity to generalise what may be understood in particular cases.    
   Nonconceptual reasoning of this form should be distinguished, too, from purely practical 
understanding of particular actions, at least where that is conceived of as knowing-how. An 
agent may have the latter without the former, although the division may not always be a 
sharp one. A blindsighted subject, for example, may be described as having knowledge-how 
of some physical activity but be unable to figure the performance of that activity into her 
ongoing behaviour where appropriate (unless externally prompted). The kind of integration 
into higher-level capacities that the action-space theory endorses, then, is one that demands 
that action-oriented content shows up at the personal level, in influencing goal-directed 
intentional behaviour, without this requiring full concept possession.  
 
   The action-space account has a particular set of resources at its disposal to explain the 
content of perceptual representations, namely Clark's model of Experience-Based Selection 
(hereafter “EBS”; Clark, 2001, 2006a). EBS is a response to conclusions drawn by dual-
streams theorists of vision (Milner & Goodale, 1995, 1998), purporting to show a deep 
division between vision-for-action and vision-for-experience. Clark argues that the role of 
the ventral visual stream - the one responsible for conscious perception - is to provide the 
agent with information about possible targets for action and possible types of action2. In this 
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respect (following Goodale, 1998) the two visual streams operate in a relationship that is 
rather like that involved in the use of a tele-assistance device.  
 
"The operator decides on the target and action-type (for example 'pick up the 
blue rock on the far left') and the robot uses its own sensing and acting routines 
to do the rest". 
(Clark, 2001; p36).  
 
   The fine details of action-guidance are carried out by way of the dorsal stream's sensitivity 
to the parameters of target objects, while the selection of those targets and of the kind of 
action to be performed are the job of conscious input. Thus on this approach the way that the 
world is described in experience is itself an action-oriented matter -- the environment is 
presented to the agent in a format suitable for her active, reasoned engagement. Part of what 
the agent is informed of perceptually, on a possible interpretation of the EBS proposal, is the 
appropriateness of particular actions, where appropriateness is relative both to the agent's 
goals and objectives and to the properties of the target object3. A full wineglass, for example, 
offers certain opportunities to the thirsty perceiver, and may be presented as a target for 
action, but the agent's implicit grasp of the glass's fragility, weight and so on - and of its 
status as full - make a difference to the suite of action-types that his experience presents as 
well. A full wine glass manifestly empowers different types of action to those empowered by 
an empty wine-glass, say, or by a full plastic receptacle of the same shape.    
   
   A further indication that conscious perceptual contents concern targets-for and types-of 
action emerges from certain cases of visual illusion. The fine details of bodily actions such 
as reaching and grasping are known to resist visual illusions like the Mueller-Lyer4. The 
width of a two-finger grip, for example, is scaled to the real length of each line rather than to 
its illusory length. The type of grip that is employed, on the other hand, is determined by the 
illusory contents of experience - a line that looks longer in the Ponzo illusion, for example, 
will be engaged with a power rather than a precision grip5. These results support the action-
space theory's view that the content of visual experience specifies quite high-level action-
type properties as opposed to finely-grained sensorimotor details.  
   On the current story perceptual content and its integration into higher-level capacities is 
nonconceptual and hence available to agents who don't possess intellectual reasoning 
abilities. As such, it is not unreasonable to expect it to be able to come apart from the content 
of beliefs and judgements for those who have these, under certain conditions.  
   The separation of 'integration into higher-level capacities' from judgement and 
conceptualisation, however, brings with it a difficult case: that in which the action-space 
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theory demands that a space of actions shows up in a perceiver's planning-for-action, but 
where this would actually conflict with her explicit judgments about what is possible or 
appropriate. An example is the situation the perceiver encounters in the Mueller-Lyer 
illusion. Perceptually, the two lines appear different lengths and the action-space theory 
entails that the agent will intentionally treat them differently (if, for example, she is asked to 
point to the line that is longer), as her perceiving them this way just is to be manifestly 
disposed to treat them this way. At the same time, of course, the informed perceiver is not at 
all tempted to point to either line, correctly judging them to be in fact equal in length. Is her 
belief that actions that would treat the lines as different would be inappropriate compatible 
with her being poised to treat them differently in her ongoing goal-oriented activity?  
   Two promising responses, at least, are available: i) The defender of the action-space theory 
may appeal to aptness for integration rather than actual integration6. Thus an action-oriented 
content is conscious not when the perceiver actually alters or initiates her behaviour on its 
basis, but when she is capable of doing so; when the content is available to influence her 
intentional activity. This is compatible with this content being in conflict with that of her 
beliefs - she simply possesses representational states whose contents are inconsistent, but 
these states are not in competition (just as in a standard representationalist story where a 
perceptual state can represent a different content from one's current belief states, even when 
both concern the same object or property).  
   I am concerned, though, that this response is a little obscure and that it may lose sight of 
the feature that makes the action-space model a compelling explanation of conscious 
experience. It is unclear whether we can adequately make sense of a content's being apt for 
integration into higher-level capacities when that integration itself is difficult to define. 
Furthermore, it isn't clear how a creature whose perceptually-acquired action-oriented states 
are (merely) apt for higher-level integration is any better off than a blindsight patient, if 
those states in fact make no difference to her planning and behaviour. Genuinely manifest 
empowerment, required to secure conscious experience on the action-space account, is 
difficult to make sense of without the condition that the actions really show up in how the 
perceiver plans and acts. A detailed and systematic analysis of what counts as aptness for 
integration (as yet undeveloped) may provide more support for this option.  
 
ii) Alternatively, the action-space theorist may stick to his guns and hold that the perceiver is 
poised to treat the two lines in the Mueller-Lyer diagram differently, but that this is trumped 
in this special case by his explicit judgement that he ought not to. The agent's sensory 
systems deliver (presumably for valid evolutionary reasons) action-oriented contents that are 
 154
different with respect to the two lines and these are directly, non-inferentially accessed by 
the agent. There is a sense in which the perceptual contents must be forced upon the agent, 
not only because he does not infer them from elsewhere but because they are resistant to 
change when they conflict with his beliefs. This is, of course, what we should expect of 
experience; experience is not a voluntary acquisition or use of content.  
   The disposition to treat the lines differently with respect to length will show up in the 
controlled behaviour of an uneducated perceiver (that is, a perceiver who doesn't know that 
the diagram induces an illusion) or a non-linguistic animal not in the fine-details of his 
actions but in the ways in which she sifts, sorts, classifies and discriminates the lines and 
how these affect the types of action she chooses to perform, and the targets of those actions. 
The idea is that in those limited cases in which there is a belief whose content is in conflict 
with that of perception, the belief content may be what determines the agent's choices over 
which actions to deploy, and on which targets. In standard cases, though, this work will be 
done by direct integration of perceptual, action-space content.  
 
7.2 Reasons to Favour Action-Oriented Content over Action-Neutral 
Content.  
 
   Why should we prefer a story on which perceptual content comes out as action-specifying 
rather than action-neutral? For a number of reasons. First of all, it is unclear whether the 
access-implies-qualia move can be carried out successfully without interpreting the 
necessary non-inferential understanding in an action-oriented way, as a direct feed into 
action targeting and selection. Recall that this move was made in order to defend the claim 
that superblindsighters are inconceivable - the idea being that once the relevant self-
prompting abilities are in place it no longer makes sense to describe the agent as a non-
conscious-perceiver. Self-prompting, on the action-space story, occurs when the agent has 
unmediated access to the space of possible actions afforded by a scene: when action-space 
content makes contact with higher-level capacities responsible for intentional action7. 
 
   An advocate of action-neutral perceptual content, though, would have to maintain one of 
the two following options in order to uphold the access-implies-qualia move, and both are 
problematic. The first possible strategy is to argue that conscious perceivers have in place a 
direct and non-inferential access to content that specifies the action-neutral properties of the 
world but still to construe that access in action-oriented terms. To claim, that is, that an agent 
has direct access to this content when he can integrate it into his ongoing action-planning and 
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reasoning. Self-prompting, on this option, would be possible when contents specifying 
shapes, colours and so on (the properties appealed to by standard representationalist 
accounts) are made available directly for the purposes of action.    
   This, however, is likely to constitute a form of mediated access, and so lacks the key 
feature of the action-space account. On this view, the system would have to firstly be 
apprised of the action-neutral properties and (only) then, following processing or inference, 
be able to assess the space of actions made possible by the presence of those properties.    
   The alternative is to interpret the direct, non-inferential access required for the implication 
of qualia not as the use of representational content for the purposes of action-selection but as 
content-use for some other personal-level abilities such as inference and belief. On this kind 
of story, a putative superblindsighter’s self-prompting would come from the content of some 
state that represents action-neutral properties being made non-inferentially available to her 
cognitive systems when(ever) those properties are present. For instance, for her to believe 
that a blue square is in front of her (and in contrast to the action-space content proposal, on 
which direct access is constituted by the use of content that specifies those actions that are 
appropriate to the presence of a blue square).    
   As noted above though, the access-implies-qualia move, when filled-out in terms of 
content making a difference to intentional action, is no barrier to non-concept-users being 
conscious perceivers. The account allows us to locate consciousness where we want it - 
ruling out mere information-sensitive creatures but not requiring full conceptual resources. 
The alternative that takes the relevant access to be to action-neutral content for the purposes 
of belief and inference, though, is subject to the familiar worries that face conceptualist 
theories: any creature who lacks capacities of belief and inference cannot be a conscious 
perceiver; for a creature to experience any property, he must be able to form a belief about it. 
Neither of these conditions is plausible, and so we have reason to prefer an account on which 
perceptual content is action-oriented rather than action-neutral if we want to exploit the 
access-implies-qualia argument.  
 
   The second reason to favour an account on which perception involves representing the 
world as an arena for actions rather than as neutral and objective is that being able to make 
use of action-oriented content directly is a computationally efficient strategy for creatures 
who need to survive in complex surroundings in real-time (Clark, 1997; Millikan, 1996). 
Agents who need to behave quickly and appropriately given the contents of their 
environments will be ill-served by having to represent that environment in objective, action-
neutral terms and only then assessing its possibilities for action and intervention. Conversely, 
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an agent who is presented with those possibilities in a format suitable for ongoing intentional 
action has fewer computational or inferential steps to perform prior to acting.  
   Millikan presents the case of the food call of a hen to its brood (Millikan, 1996; p5-6), a 
representation that has both descriptive and directive content (a 'pushmi-pullyu' 
representation in Millikan's idiom). Descriptive content depicts features of the environment 
in a neutral way while directive content picks out what can or ought to be done given the 
state of that environment. Mental representations, too, possess this dual-content - describing 
the world to the agent and directing her towards a particular course of action. In this case, the 
hen's call's descriptive content is 'there is food here now' or similar, while its directive 
content is 'come here now and eat!'.  
 
"[It is reasonable to assume] that the effect of the call on the chicks is not 
filtered through some all-purpose cognitive mechanism that operates by first 
forming a purely descriptive representation (a belief that there is food over 
there), then retrieving a relevant directive one (the desire to eat), then 
performing a practical inference and, finally, acting on the conclusion. Rather, 
the call connects directly with action ... directly translating the shape of the 
environment into the shape of a certain kind of conforming action." (Millikan, 
1996; p6).   
 
   Although this case is not a direct parallel to the claims of the action-space theory, as we 
shall see below, it illustrates the thinking behind the argument from efficiency: for the 
chicks' purposes, having to read-off possibilities for action from an all-purpose, objective 
representation of some feature of the world is a time-consuming and resource-hungry 
exercise. Far better, for their purposes, to be confronted with the directive content in an 
unmediated fashion. The perceptual representations undergone by the chicks, then, specify 
the directive content of the hen's call, and there is no need for them to specify the descriptive 
content (Millikan's treatment is a little unclear here: certainly the call itself bears both 
descriptive and directive content, but elsewhere Millikan describes perceptual 
representations as doing so too. Yet the use that the chicks make of perceptual content is 
purely directive in this case).   
   There are two salient differences between Millikan's case here and the cases that the 
action-space account takes to involve phenomenal consciousness. Firstly, the scenario as 
described appears to take it that the chicks respond automatically to the hen's food call: the 
presence of the directive content triggers a particular behaviour. This is, as per the quote 
above, in contrast to the alternative in which behaviours are inferred from action-neutral 
content. Again, though, the action-space account attempts to tread a mid-line between these 
two cases: conscious perception involves neither the direct triggering of an action nor the 
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representation of objective properties, but instead involves the representation of a space of 
possibilities for action. In Millikan's example, the chicks are not confronted with a space of 
options for action as they have no control over their behaviour; the directive content engages 
a single behavioural routine, that of moving to the food-source. Such an ability to respond 
appropriately but inflexibly is all well and good when one is an infant chicken, given that 
(when operating successfully, in accordance with its proper function) it satisfies what is in 
fact a necessary requirement for survival. Conscious perception - according to the action-
space story - is achieved only when a suite of options for action is made available to the 
perceiver to integrate with her own goals and plans, though. Only when (or if) the chick is 
apprised of the possibility of not acting on the food call (an action-space with only two 
possibilities; a binary action-space), or of acting in one of a suite of different ways (a 
complex action-space), will she be a conscious perceiver of the food call. Possessing states 
with directive content, then, is not in itself sufficient for an agent to be confronted with an 
action-space8.    
 
 7.3) Illusion and Hallucination: 
 
   The action-space approach must be able to deal with cases of illusion and hallucination, 
and its focus on action-oriented representations, one might think, presents this project with 
particular complications. In this section I develop an account of perceptual error that 
acknowledges the distinctive role of action-oriented content. An analysis of these kinds of 
cases, furthermore, allows us to see more clearly what the commitments of the action-space 
account are when it comes to the contents of veridical perception. So the investigation here 
is intended to accommodate more than simply certain special cases of experience; it aims to 
clarify the more general proposals of the earlier sections of this chapter. Getting clear on 
cases of illusion allows us to ascribe genuinely representational status to experiences on the 
action-space model (with representation comes the possibility of misrepresentation) and to 
determine the standard of normativity for those representations. The section closes with 
some brief remarks about the metaphysical status of colour. 
   The issues described here - especially those concerning the world-directedness of 
perception - will be dealt with more carefully in the following section, but they are helpfully 
introduced by way of familiar examples of illusion.     
 
   One failure of the sensorimotor approach, I argued in chapter 4, is its inability to plausibly 
account for the possibility of illusion and hallucination. Noë's most recent version of the 
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enactive story presents perception as being constituted by an agent's performance of certain 
sensorimotor skills; the bringing-to-bear of knowledge concerning how appearances change 
in response to movement. Appearances, here, are relational properties that hold between 
perceivers and objects - a circular plate, for instance, presents an elliptical appearance to an 
observer located away from and at an angle to it. Visual perception, for Noë, has two levels 
of content - that which specifies appearances (that plate looks elliptical), and that which 
specifies real properties (the plate looks round). The second level of content is brought about 
by way of the agent's exercising her sensorimotor know-how.  
   Some cases of illusion, I suggested, are amenable to description in these terms - the far-off 
square tower that looks round, for example, may present an ambiguous visual appearance 
that is resolved in the wrong way by the agent when she brings to bear her enactive 
knowledge (that is, if her expectations about how the tower's appearance will change with 
movement are typical of round rather than square objects). Other cases of illusion and all 
cases of hallucination, however, cannot be explained in enactive terms: they are cases in 
which even apparent properties are misperceived, and Noë has not provided us with the 
resources to account for such facts. When it comes to hallucination, he suggests that what 
goes wrong is that the agent acts in a way that is characteristic of a particular property, and 
thereby comes to perceive it in its absence. There is no reason, I objected, to suppose that 
acting in a particular way should result in any qualitative experience at all. 
 
   One prima facie worry for the action-space story is that its explanation of perceptual 
content as action-oriented renders it unable to describe cases of illusion in a natural way. 
Ordinarily, we want to be able to say that illusion involves an agent's experience getting 
something wrong about the world - as presenting her with a specification of the way her 
environment is that fails to match its real properties. Seeing the square tower as being round 
is an illusion because the experience presents the tower as being a way that it is not. Standard 
representationalist approaches can accommodate situations like this by applying the 
language of misrepresentation - a perceptual illusion is simply a case in which the content of 
an experience misdescribes the state of the world. On a possible reading of the action-space 
proposal, though, all that an experience tells the agent is what she can do in her present 
environment. Thus perceptual error, one might think, must - on this view - be a matter of 
getting something wrong about (misrepresenting) oneself, rather than being misinformed 
about the state of the external world. This is, potentially, quite an unnatural way of 
describing at least some cases of illusion.  
   The implications of this, though, are further-reaching. If the content of an action-space 
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representation fails to present the external world as being a certain way, then we lose the 
ability to describe them as being genuinely perceptual.  I shall argue, in this section and the 
next, that the action-space theorist need not be committed to so strong a thesis as this, and 
that far from being a source of difficulty for the account this feature can assist in the 
explanation of certain cases of illusion. There are at least some cases, that is, in which it is 
appropriate to describe a perceptual error as a failure to accurately assess what one can do in 
one's current environment.  
 
   To begin with I want to focus on what I take to be one of the most compelling cases in 
which perceptual content is constituted by poise over a space of actions, that of the 
perception of a noise (or some other feature of an object) as pulsating (Grush, 1998, from 
paragraph 18, following Evans, 1985). On Grush's story, which is in essence an action-space 
account, a perceiver has an experience of pulsatingness when she is "put into a position to" 
perform a certain body of skills (paragraph 18), where these skills are of exactly the kind I 
endorse:  
 
"[P]art of the content of pulsatingness, for us, is that it is something with which 
we can coordinate a number of sensorimotor skills. These skills include not only 
the capacity to play conductor, but to generate expectations, to compare the 
phase of different oscillating objects, and many others... If [an agent] cannot 
bring these skills to bear then it is difficult to see how he could be credited with 
a perception of the pulsation." (Grush, 1998; paragraph 21).  
 
   I take it that a perceiver's being 'put into a position' to perform suites of skills like these is, 
as the action-space story maintains, for her to be able to self-prompt their performance; to be 
directly confronted with their possibility. She needn't carry out any of the suite of poised 
skills in order for her experience to bear the relevant content. However, there is more to this 
poise over an action-space than merely knowing that a certain set of skills can be carried out. 
It's not just that the perceiver of pulsatingness knows that she can wave her hands in a 
particular rhythm - after all, she can do that when no pulsating sound is present at all - but 
that she knows, in some sense, the appropriateness of moving in this way given the presence 
and nature of the sound.  
 
"Our experience presents the oscillating thing as something one which we could 
bring any of a host of such skills to bear (I seem to recall the term 'affordance' 
being used for this sort of thing in the not-too-distant past)." (op cit. paragraph 
21; emphasis added).   
 
   The experiencer perceives the pulsatingness of the sound in knowing that she can wave her 
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hands (etc) in time with its rhythm. A perceptual illusion concerning pulsatingness, our 
ordinary usage of the term tells us, would involve the sound being presented in experience as 
pulsating at a different frequency from its actual one (where this includes its not pulsating at 
all). If such content is constituted by the perceiver's being poised to perform a space of 
actions, then such illusory content will involve being confronted with a space of actions that 
does not in fact match the rhythm of the noise; where the suite of actions are not 
appropriate. We can imagine a case like this occurring, I think, in a situation where a sound 
is echoed, say, or perhaps where its perception is influenced by the Doppler Effect.  
   Where there is an illusion concerning pulsatingness, then, the perceiver is not mistaken 
about what she can do, for we can stipulate that she is entirely capable of acting out any of 
the suite of movements she takes herself to be able to perform. She is, rather, wrong in 
taking the skill-set to match up with the pulsation of the sound; wrong in thinking, for 
example, that if she waves her hands like this, she will be able to conduct the noise correctly. 
Grush points out, too, that parts of the skill-set with which the agent is confronted are 
cognitive or epistemic (in the same way as those proposed by Philip Pettit): they consist of 
expectations, abilities to compare and contrast, sift, track and so on. Part of what it is to hear 
a sound as pulsating at a certain frequency is to be able to judge its phase relative to that of 
other noises. In the illusory case these judgements and comparisons will be in error as well; a 
sound whose frequency is experienced as being faster than it in fact is will be mentally 
sorted with a set of other pulsing noises with which it doesn't belong, for example.     
   The possibility of misrepresentation in this case allows us to see more clearly what the 
content of a veridical experience is. Although action-oriented, such content does not merely 
specify the kinds of action that can be performed at a time, but which actions it is appropriate 
to perform, which actions enable successful engagement with the environment, which 
actions are presented as opportunities by features of the world. As we shall see in the next 
section, this means that perception can be both action-oriented and properly world-directed.   
 
   A somewhat more difficult proposition for the action-space account is the case of colour-
perception and colour-illusion. I suggest, however, that the account has the resources to deal 
with these cases in a way that draws upon those features that are more clearly evident in the 
previous example. Consider, for instance, a white wall that looks pink under certain 
conditions of illumination. According to the action-space story (following Pettit, 2003), an 
object looks pink when it manifestly empowers her to perform a particular suite of sifting, 
sorting and tracking responses; when she is poised to judge the relative similarity of the 
surface to other environmental features, compare and contrast them and so on.  
 161
   The wall's looking pink is an illusion, then, when the space of perceptual discriminations, 
judgements and comparisons that the perceiver takes herself to be able to make comes apart 
either from those that she can make, or those that it is appropriate for her to make. The wall 
should not be sorted together with other pink objects, nor sifted from white objects; it is not 
more similar to red than to light grey. Likewise, the surface cannot be easily tracked across a 
white background under normal conditions, nor will it blend in against a reddish background. 
The agent's expectations about what she will be able to do are mistaken, as are her 
judgements of relative similarity and difference, and therefore she undergoes a perceptual 
illusion as to the colour of the object.  
   Colour illusion, and by extension the content of colour experience, shares the same 
structure as the pulsatingness case. In both, perceptual error involves getting something 
wrong about the state of the world, which fits with how we naturally want to describe 
illusions. One difference lies in the fact that the skills involved in the perception of pulsation 
are largely bodily in nature - they include the ability to 'conduct' the rhythm of the sound, to 
nod or sway in time with it and so on - while those involved in colour perception (and, I take 
it, for that of other secondary qualities) are mainly cognitive or epistemic - including 
comparing, judging, sifting. Both cases do contain elements of each kind of skill - a 
pulsating sound poises the perceiver to compare and judge, while the ability to track a 
coloured feature may involve moving one's eyes and body - and there is a continuum on 
which any action-space will lie between the mental and the bodily. An agent who is in error 
about whether he can perform either type of skill, though, will not only be wrong about his 
own state, but also about that of the world.  
 
   These considerations tell us, again, about the nature of representational content in veridical 
colour perception and, indeed, about the status of colours themselves. Following Pettit (and, 
as he puts it, "many philosophers"; 2003, p1), we can state that an object (or a surface, 
volume, or film) possesses the property of being a particular colour, say blue, just in case it 
looks blue to suitable perceivers under standard conditions of illumination. Different theories 
of colour perception are committed to different construals of what it is for an object to look a 
particular colour:  
   Qualiaphiles may fill this out by stating that an object's looking blue is constituted by its 
producing an experience with a blue quale. Here, blue-ness is a non-representational 
property of the experience itself.  
   A standard representationalist story - one on which action-neutral properties are those 
that are represented in experience - which aims to account for all of the features of 
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experience in terms of content (that is, that rejects additional intrinsically-qualitative 
properties) will assert that colour experiences represent objects as having colour properties, 
whether veridically or non-veridically. There are two ways that the representationalist can go 
on this: i) to endorse objectivism about colour and identify colours with (or reduce them to, 
or take them to be emergent from) physical properties of objects, or ii) to reject objectivism 
about colour, thus implying that all colour perception is systematically in error.    
   The action-space account states that an item has a certain colour-look iff it manifestly 
empowers a particular suite of sifting, sorting and tracking skills.  
 
   I argued in chapter 6, and following Dennett, that there are no intrinsically-phenomenal 
properties of experience, no colour qualia, and so the action-space account is in explicit 
opposition to the first of these possibilities. Both of the options in the second alternative, too, 
are problematic. Colour objectivism faces familiar criticism: there appear to be no plausible 
candidate agent-independent properties; metamers demonstrate that different physical 
(reflectance) properties can result in identical colour appearances; colours stand in 
relationships to one another (relationships of similarity and difference etc) that are not 
matched by those of any corresponding physical properties. A full treatment of these worries 
is beyond the scope of the current project, but if they bite then a representationalist account 
on which colours are real properties whose representation and misrepresentation is like that 
of any other is undermined.  
   The second option available to the representationalist is closer to what is implied by the 
action-space story. It states that objects are systematically misrepresented as having colour 
properties that they do not in fact possess, thus eliminating the need to provide suitable 
agent-independent correlates for them. Colour experiences are always wrong; objects, 
surfaces, volumes etc are not coloured after all. Two creatures who undergo different colour 
experiences when looking at the same surface, on this view, are both mistaken. On the 
action-space account, in contrast, these two perceivers are equally right. Their experiences 
accurately describe the space of sifting, sorting, tracking and comparing skills that the 
surface empowers, even though these spaces are different. Perceivers who have different 
colour experiences will make different similarity judgements, sort sets of coloured objects 
into different categories, have difficulty in tracking different objects across coloured 
backgrounds and so on.  
   There is another sense, however, in which an agent's colour experiences may be 
systematically in error, namely where the skills that he is poised to perform fail to track 
anything observer-independent. For example, a perceiver may be capable of visually sorting 
 163
together a set of objects even if they share no common intrinsic property, or of easily sifting 
apart two sets of objects that are barely different. Mohan Matthen (1999, 2005) has argued 
convincingly that colour experiences carve up the world in ways that are useful for the agent, 
sometimes at the expense of being faithful to its intrinsic nature. Visual similarity need not 
match similarity of surface spectral reflectance, for instance. The skill-set over which an 
agent is poised, then, may edit or exaggerate similarities and differences in the world in order 
to enable the agent to more efficiently engage with his environment. The structure of an 
animal's visual system may emphasise the contrast between ripe fruit and its surrounding 
foliage, say, in order to make the opportunity for food more salient. Illusions like the 
Mueller-Lyer, described above, demonstrate that systematic editing/exaggeration can present 
the agent with an action-space that fails to map onto the real structure of the world.  
   The action-space story, then, makes it the case that colour experiences are accurate in 
specifying the suite of perceptual skills that is enabled by a surface, but that skills such as 
sifting, sorting and comparing may not track any real dimensions of physical or structural 
similarity and difference.      
 
   Ordinary colour illusions involve an object looking a way that it does not look under 
standard conditions to standard perceivers. What constitutes a standard perceiver, of course, 
differs among species, and so what counts as a colour-illusion does too. A human perceiver 
undergoes an illusion when the action-space he takes to be empowered by a surface is not the 
one that the surface standardly empowers human perceivers under normal conditions (when 
he takes a surface that manifestly empowers the space of actions that is characteristic of 
green objects under normal lighting conditions, say, to empower him in ways that are 
characteristic of blue objects).  
 
   Hallucinations, on the action-space approach, involve situations in which the agent takes 
himself to be empowered in ways that completely come apart from the world, where she is 
entirely perceptually mistaken about what an object enables her to do because there is no 
such object. A hallucination of a red patch to one's right involves taking oneself to be poised 
to sift, sort and track the patch in a characteristic suite of ways (to sort it with pink-ish 
objects and apart from green-ish ones), and also to interact with the patch using a particular 
suite of bodily-movements (to reach out to the right in order to touch it, to shift to the left in 
order to avoid it). It's for that action-space to be represented, and the content to be integrated 
into higher-level capacities. It does not involve, contra the enactive story, actually moving in 
those ways, nor does it involve being confronted with a particular external appearance 
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property or understanding the way in which that appearance would change with movement, 
for there is no such property present.   
 
   The representation of a space of actions in experience may be non-veridical in any of a 
number of ways. An experience may misdescribe the suite of actions that is appropriate to a 
perceptually-encountered object (illusion) - in which case the agent will take herself either to 
be able to perform a suite of actions that she cannot in fact carry out, or to be able to perform 
actions that don't match those that the object would enable her to perform under standard 
conditions - or the experience may describe a suite of actions as pertaining to an object that 
isn't there at all (hallucination).  
 
7.4 Action-Space Content is World-Directed.  
 
   It is time to address more fully an issue that arose in the last section in relation to 
perceptual illusions but which - as I noted there - has wider implications for the status of 
perceptual representation more generally, namely the tension between the agent-involving 
content of action-oriented representations on the one hand, and the required world-involving 
nature of perception on the other. This section aims to show that the agent's grasp of action-
space content - variously described so far as its 'integration with higher-level capacities akin 
to planning and reasoning', the agent's being 'poised' or 'put into a position' to perform certain 
skills, or for her to have 'access' to them - can be accounted for in nonconceptual terms while 
at the same time posing no threat to the properly perceptual (i.e. world-directed) status of her 
experiences. The material here draws on and develops a proposal made by Bermudez & 
Macpherson (1998, especially paragraph 33), which is itself a response to Gareth Evans.  
   Recall that the claim that action-oriented content must be integrated with higher-level 
capacities tied to intentional action was made (chapters 4 and 5) in order to secure the 
phenomenal properties of experience. It is inconceivable, I suggested, for a creature to be 
confronted with a space of possible actions - for that space to make a difference to its 
ongoing action-and-interaction-planning - without thereby being conscious. Evans makes a 
similar move, but his aim is to secure genuine perceptual content. Contentful states - those 
that present part of the external world to the agent - are to be distinguished, on Evans' 
account, from states that are merely informational. A state is informational if it co-varies 
systematically with some feature of the world, via a channel of input, and this is in 
agreement with the teleofunctional model outlined above (the difference being that my 
proposal follows Clark in allowing that such states can have their informational content 
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influenced non-instrumentally by output as well as input; see section 7.5 below).  
   For Evans an informational state becomes truly contentful only when it is integrated into 
higher-level cognitive capacities. As Bermudez & Macpherson put it: 
 
"Evans claims that an informational state might loosely be thought to have 
[spatial content] just if it embodies purported information about the 
environment in virtue of belonging to a set of inputs which vary systematically 
with some spatial facts. However, he says that in order for an organism to be in 
a state that has spatial significance for that organism -- that is in order for it to 
contain spatial content in a strict sense -- more is required. The organism must 
exhibit complex input-output connections of a certain type."  
(Bermudez &Macpherson, 1998; paragraph 11).  
 
   It is not enough, though, that just any input-output arrangement is in place, even where 
such connections are sensitive to the right kinds of spatial facts about the environment. For, 
as Evans points out (1982, p157), it is obvious that evolution could have produced a creature 
advantageously sensitive to particular properties of the world without its being a conscious 
subject of experience. The crucial feature for Evans is that the input-output links are 
mediated by a "thinking, concept-applying and reasoning system" (p158). It is only when an 
informational state is made available to the agent for the purposes of thought and action-
planning that it becomes genuinely contentful. This is because it is only when such 
integration takes place that the perceived object is presented as being independent of the 
perceiver, and hence as objective. This is the issue touched upon in the previous section on 
illusion: the concern is that any theory of perception that emphasises action-oriented content 
runs the risk of failing to capture the world-directed nature of experience.   
   Adrian Cussins (1992) explains how Evans' appeal to integration with thinking and 
concept-applying aims to secure the presentation in experience of an objective world in spite 
of the skill-based character of perceptual content. In Cussins' language, the realm of 
reference is the objective world, while the realm of embodiment is the way in which 
perceivers of that world are capable of interacting with it using the skills, bodily and 
cognitive, that it enables them to perform. The problem, then, is whether an agent's access to 
the realm of embodiment is sufficient to count as access to or presentation of the realm of 
reference: 
 
"Does the organism enjoy a content that is specified via the realm of reference 
in virtue of having this experience which is specified via the realm of 
embodiment? Is a portion of the independent world (that which makes contents 
correct or incorrect) thereby presented to a subject (that which grasps contents, 
and acts on their basis)? That is, does a part of the realm of embodiment being 
given in experience-mediated knowing-how make it the case that a part of the 
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realm of reference (the objective world) is given to a subject?"  
(Cussins, 1992, p659; emphasis in original).  
    
   In the absence of integration into higher-level cognitive abilities, the argument goes, we 
must give a negative answer to this question, because confrontation with the realm of 
embodiment (confrontation with an action-space) fails to present the environment as 
independent of the observer: 
 
"[G]iven only the realm-of-embodiment-specified content, all the "subject" 
(experiencing organism) has is an experiential awareness of how to move etc. in 
response to local changes in its environment. If this is a subject's conception of 
a referent, it would be a conception of something as not independent of 
contingent characteristics of the subject itself. The necessary separation between 
subject and object would not have been achieved." (op cit. p659).   
 
   When it comes to the contents of thoughts, the necessary separation between subject and 
object (what Cussins calls "S/Ojectivity", the first syllable of which rhymes with 'toe') is 
achieved only when the Generality Constraint is satisfied (Evans, 1982) - only when the 
agent is able to open-endedly recombine the components of his thought with his other 
concepts. For instance, it is only accurate to describe an agent as the bearer of the thoughts 
'red dog' and 'blue cat' when he is also able to think 'blue dog' and 'red cat'. 
   The content of a nonconceptual, action-oriented experiential state too, on Evans' account, 
is transformed in such a way as to be properly world-presenting only when it serves as input 
into the perceiver's thinking and reasoning systems, because only then does it satisfy the 
Generality Constraint. To summarise, the move is this: action-space content only provides 
the agent with information about himself, or about how objects can be dealt with by himself; 
this isn't enough for him to grasp the independence of those objects from himself, and 
therefore doesn't count as perceptual representation; independence and objectivity only come 
through the satisfaction of the Generality Constraint, and so experiential states must feed into 
conceptual resources in order to acquire properly perceptual status.  
 
   But the requirement that a state only counts as perceptual when it's apt for integration into 
a concept-applying and reasoning system appears to violate all three of the reasons for 
favouring a nonconceptualist account of perception. An agent's conceptual repertoire is not 
so finely-grained as the content of his perceptual states; the contents of his experiences can 
come apart from what he believes and reasons about; concept-applying and reasoning 
systems are not possessed by young children and animals. It's too demanding a conception of 
what is required for the possession of perceptual states. The question, then, is whether the 
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integration of the content of action-oriented states into something less than full concept-
application (as the action-space model intends) can achieve S/Ojectivity and hence count as 
perception proper. The action-space approach maintains that the necessary integration is with 
the more limited and less cognitively-sophisticated systems devoted to action-planning and 
initiation, by way of what I have called nonconceptual reasoning. The key to S/Ojectivity, as 
we have seen, is that perceptual content presents objects in the world as independent of the 
perceiver. An agent can't be presented with features of the external environment in 
experience unless this holds. So the question becomes whether nonconceptual, action-
oriented content can present a perceiver-independent world or if, instead, it presents only 
what is dependent on contingent characteristics of the subject9.   
 
   There are reasons to believe that nonconceptual content can present an objective world to 
the perceiver. Bermudez and Macpherson (Bermudez, 1995, 1998; Bermudez & 
Macpherson, 1998), for example, argue that a creature can have a nonconceptual point of 
view that is grounded in certain Gibsonian perceptual contents (consistent with those 
endorsed by the action-space approach). Briefly, information about bodily invariants that 
bound the field of vision, information from visual kinesthesis about the movement of the 
perceiver, and information about possibilities for action and reaction that the environment 
affords the perceiver (B&M, paragraph 29) provides, in the visual case, the agent with 
primitive sense of self and other10. Such information, they note, is available to young infants 
and animals. 
   Secondly, it needs to be emphasised that the integration of possibilities for action into 
action-planning and initiation is a temporally-extended affair which reflects, again, the 
agent's trajectory through the world (B&M, paragraph 33). Part of what is involved in the 
perceiver's taking there to be certain opportunities for action, and in these opportunities 
influencing her ongoing planning, is her understanding of those possibilities as enduring 
rather than momentary11. At any time, it is not simply that the agent takes herself to be able 
to perform certain actions or skills now, but rather that there is an opportunity for action that 
can be returned to, form part of a chain of goal-satisfying actions, be employed both today 
and tomorrow and so on. Integration with action-planning and initiation involves temporal 
extension not only insofar as the opportunities for action afforded by the environment are 
grasped as ongoing, but also in that the agent's own interests, goals and so on are in constant 
flux. Action-spaces are grasped by the agent as impacting not only on his current needs and 
projects but as capable of satisfying future goals as and when they emerge. This grasp can 
still accord with the nonconceptual reasoning introduced above, as it is still context-specific 
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and not open-endedly reapplicable by the agent.  
 
   Bermudez and Macpherson claim that "it seems plausible to hold that one cannot 
determine to act in an environment-directed manner without an understanding of the spatial 
relations in which one stands to the relevant features of the environment."(B&M, paragraph 
24), where information about these spatial relations is perceptually-derived. I am tempted by 
the stronger claim that it is plausible to hold that one cannot determine to act (that is, act in a 
planned, intentional way) in an environment-directed manner without an understanding of 
the spatially and temporally extended space of opportunities for action that the environment 
affords. Any agent who lacks such a grasp, I suggest, may have a degree of sensory contact 
with the world, but is not capable of true, world-directed perception. In addition, on the 
action-space account the perceiver's understanding of spatial relations is itself given in 
action-oriented terms - it is not that the agent's capacity for world-engaging action rests on 
some prior grasp of action-neutral spatial relations but rather that it relies on his grasp of the 
space of possible interactions and behaviours.  
   On the enactive/sensorimotor account of perception, an agent has a genuinely perceptual 
experience when he understands the dynamic relationship between his movements and his 
sensory inputs. The sense of self and other is acquired through knowing, at some level, that 
one occupies a particular point of view on the world, reflected in the contingencies that hold 
between what one does and what one experiences. The point of view, here, is essentially an 
active one insofar as the agent is capable of moving around and within the environment. But 
it is also essentially a sensory one: the agent's grasp of S/Ojectivity is constituted by his 
understanding that he is located in a world that impinges on his sensory systems. The first 
two components of the nonconceptual point of view mentioned by Bermudez and 
Macpherson - information about one's bodily contours and how they constrain sensory input, 
and information about one's own movement through the world - are thus incorporated by the 
enactive approach.  
   On the action-space account, meanwhile, the agent's point of view is active insofar as the 
world is presented to him as an arena for action and interaction, as a space of opportunities 
for goal-satisfaction and extended, meaningful interplay. It is sensory only derivatively, 
insofar as access to action-spaces is perceptually mediated. As discussed in chapter 3, the 
fine sensorimotor contingency details do not necessarily figure in the agent's presentation of 
the world. What matters, instead, is the set of ways in which features of the environment 
afford the agent kinds of skilful interaction.  
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7.5 Hurley and the 'Classical Sandwich'. 
 
   Susan Hurley (1998, 2001) presents a further set of challenges to any theorist attempting to 
discern the relationship between perception and action. One traditional but problematic 
conception that must be avoided, she argues, is that of the 'classical sandwich' - the view that 
perceptual systems constitute channels of input to a central locus of cognitive processing 
while action systems constitute its output; with a serial input-cognition-output relationship 
holding among these components. Here, cognition is the sandwich-filling that separates the 
independent layers of perception and action. The sandwich is a classical one because the 
processing carried out by cognition, transactions among contentful states, conforms to 
traditional classical constraints of compositionality, recombinability and so on.  
   The sandwich model maps the personal-level capacities of conscious perception and 
intentional action onto, respectively, subpersonal level paths of input and output processing. 
Perception is essentially passive: in the visual case, information is received at the retina, 
processed, and a representation is constructed. Cognition comes next: judgements and beliefs 
are formed on the basis of perceptual content, followed by intentions to act. Finally, actions 
are performed.  
   Hurley's task - at which she is successful - is to demonstrate that this approach is 
fundamentally misguided. Empirical results, she shows, are at odds with this conception; 
examples are numerous in which the neat division of labour proposed by the sandwich 
picture breaks down, where distinctions at the subpersonal level fail to map onto those at the 
personal level, and where there are non-instrumental (that is, in some sense constitutive) 
links between perceptual and intentional content12.  
   Hurley notes that there are three broad ways of resisting the sandwich account (2001, p1 
and following): i) to put pressure on the notion that central cognition is classical in nature; ii) 
to question whether cognition is central and distinct from perception and action; iii) to 
propose ways in which action and perception are deeply and non-instrumentally connected to 
one another. The body of Hurley's discussion is devoted to the latter of these approaches, and 
the empirical cases she examines are most clearly intended as counterexamples to the claim 
that there is a strict separation between action and perception along input-output lines. The 
action-space account, I will argue, is consistent with Hurley's results in spite of bearing a 
superficial resemblance to the classical sandwich structure. In taking on board the 
implications of Hurley's conclusions, though, we can see that the analogy between the 
action-space account and the tele-assistance model of vision exploited by Clark is somewhat 
too restrictive, and needs to be amended. There is no presentation of targets for and types of 
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action on anything like a perceptual screen, nor is input the sole source of information 
concerning opportunities for action13.     
 
   Some of the language I've used so far in my treatment of the action-space account may 
appear to affirm a commitment to something like the classical sandwich picture or - and I 
take this to be less theoretically-weighty - to a rough equation of perception with input and 
action with output. For example, the account is set in terms of the agent's confrontation with 
a space of actions and of her use of contentful states for the purposes of the construction of 
intentions subsequent to action; there is a general perception → integration with cognition → 
action structure. Furthermore, teleofunctional stories have traditionally tied perceptual 
contents solely to inputs: a causal chain running from the external feature to the activation of 
an internal state by way of incoming stimulation is what determines that state's content. 
Millikan's account, mentioned above, follows this model, as does Gareth Evans' treatment of 
informational states, as we saw above.   
   More generally, the action-space account as I have developed it is a reaction to the flaws I 
take to be present in the sensorimotor, enactive approach to perception. That perspective, of 
course, is explicitly and diametrically in opposition to the classical sandwich model, 
emphasising as it does the constant dynamical interplay between perception and action. Any 
thesis that contradicts the enactive approach, then, runs the risk of going too far in the other 
direction and making the functional separation of perception and action too complete. The 
worry is that the action-space model fails to respect the essentially dynamical, feedback-
involving nature of this relationship14. 
 
   The empirical examples appealed to by Hurley amply demonstrate that there is no obvious 
simple alignment of perception with input and action with output. Instead, she suggests, we 
should consider there to be a relation of interdependence here, in such a way that both 
perceptual and intentional content can be seen to be functions of both inputs and outputs, or 
their relations (where being a function of, Hurley explains, can be treated as supervening on, 
being determined by or being constitutively dependent on). My suggestion is that these cases 
do not threaten the action-space approach and, indeed, may provide support for it.     
   One characteristic example, which has been closely focused on in the follow-up literature, 
emerges from C.R. Gallistel's case in which a patient's eye is partially paralysed (Gallistel, 
1980). When the patient tries to move her eye to the right, for example, the world appears to 
her to shift to the right, even though the eye does not move. Thus there is a change in the 
agent's visual content in spite of their being no change to the retinal image, demonstrating 
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that input is not the sole determinant of perceptual content. The influence of the intention to 
act (the intention to move the eyes to the right) is non-instrumental, in contrast to the 
straightforward instrumental dependence exhibited between perception and action in 
ordinary cases. Visual perceptual content depends on where the agent is looking, for 
instance, and so changes in the agent's perspective brought about by his actions result in 
changes in that content - an instrumental relationship. In the case of the paralysed-eye (and 
others dealt with by Hurley), the influence of intentional content on perception is not 
mediated by this kind of influence on the orientation of the body, since here there is no such 
influence, but is direct. In Gallistel's example, the non-instrumental dependence bears only 
upon the spatial content of the experience - there is an apparent shift in the location of the 
constituents of the scene.    
   The action-space account is consistent with these results. The explanation it provides of the 
spatial content of experience is a particularly compelling one, in contrast to the more difficult 
cases of secondary qualities. An object's looking to be situated on the agent's left, for 
instance, is to be explained in terms of the perceiver's grasp of the suite of actions that allow 
her to interact with the object, to reach out and pick it up, to turn and orient herself towards it 
and so on (Evans, 1985; Grush, 1998), in addition to those epistemic skills that allow her to 
re-identify the object, to class it with others etc. Perceiving the location of an object, on this 
view, is inseparable from being poised to perform certain actions upon, with or around it.  
   The world's 'appearing to swing to the right', then, is, on the action-space model, a matter 
of the agent's being poised over a new - or evolving - space of actions; for the agent to take 
herself to be able to track the motion of the scene, for instance. This, in turn, involves the 
action-oriented contents of particular states being integrated into the agent's ongoing 
planning and reasoning. The lesson to be taken from cases that exhibit non-instrumental 
influence of intentions on perceptual content is that this action-oriented content is not solely 
dependent upon input from the senses. The action-space account is entitled to make the same 
move in this respect as any other representationalist story - to allow that perceptual content 
can be a function of both input and output (to the extent that these distinctions make sense at 
all in a complex, feedback-involving system). This sits well with Clark's teleofunctional 
account of action-oriented content, on which the content of a state is determined by the role 
it plays in a wider complex of states. That role, it seems, need not be serial or unidirectional; 
perceptual states need not simply be part of a chain of input to central cognition, 
independently of action and intention.  
 
   This leads to something of a moderate revision of the teleassistance model of perceptual 
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processing which, on my view, carries unnecessary sandwich-model baggage. There remains 
a fairly sharp division of the action/perception labour on the teleassistance view, tied to the 
dual-processing-streams account of vision: one channel, the ventral stream, is responsible for 
conscious perception, which is the basis for intentions to act, which are then carried out 
under the guidance of the dorsal stream. As it stands, this picture leaves little room for the 
kind of recurrent influence of output on perceptual content demanded by the rejection of the 
sandwich story. What comes up on the screen of perceptual content looks to be fixed by the 
input to the ventral stream; what goes into the agent's deliberation and intentional action is 
what shows up on the screen.           
   This reading of the teleassistance model, then, must be revised to permit the possibility of 
non-instrumental dependence of perception on output, but this is a quite minor revision. 
Functionally, the basic story can remain the same - perception involves the agent's being able 
to take on board the possibilities for action presented by a scene for the purposes of 
informing his ongoing reasoned activity, perception presents her with targets for and types of 
action, and there is a separation between vision-for-perception and vision-for-action. All that 
is amended in response to cases like Gallistel's is the dependence of perceptual content on 
input only.  
   Clark acknowledges this concession himself, proposing that there might be a non-
instrumental role for 'gross motor intention' on perception (Clark, 1999; p14-16). Gross 
motor intentions are the result of the agent's selection of action-targets and -types, his 
initiation of a particular goal-based behaviour, and depend upon the processing of the ventral 
stream. Fine motor tuning, on the other hand, is the preserve of the dorsal stream.  
 
"The possibility remains open... that acts of gross motor selection might actually 
influence the conscious content of the visual experience even if fine motor 
tuning remains relatively insulated. It remains possible, for example, that had 
the gross motor command selected different action-types or different goal-
objects, the visual experience would have differed, and done so non-
instrumentally, i.e. without the need for any change in gross input."  
(Clark, 1999; p15; emphasis in original).  
 
   At this stage in his argument, Clark concurs with Hurley's claim that there is a non-
instrumental role in the fixation of perceptual content for processes other than input. It is 
worth noting, though, that this concession (and the conclusion to be drawn from cases like 
the paralysed-eye) remains neutral over the level at which this influence takes place. After 
all, it won't do, given the aim of rejecting the classical sandwich, to say simply that, because 
intentions can help to determine perceptions, there is a non-instrumental role for output, as 
this loses sight of the fact that the aim is to show that intentions, too, are a function of both 
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input and output (or their relations). That is, it would be a mistake to map output alone onto 
motor intention. The non-instrumental role for output is present, then, only insofar as it is 
involved in determining intentional content.    
   Clark subsequently offers an alternative reading of the influence of motor intentions on 
perception, one on which the relationship is instrumental and mediated by attention (op cit. 
p18 and following). Whereas in the ordinary case, intentions change what is perceived by 
changing the position or location of the body, Clark's suggestion is that they do so by 
changing the focus of attention (and he directs us towards the body of evidence for the claim 
that perceptual content is attention-dependent).  
   For this to be a successful move in the cases described by Hurley, it would have to be 
possible for attentional resources to be responsible for a particular change in the content of 
experience, and for that change not to require a corresponding change in input (for there is 
none in Hurley's examples). It isn't obvious to me that the paralysed-eye case, for one, 
satisfies these conditions. Those situations to which we might most readily appeal in arguing 
for the attention-dependence of perceptual content are those in which the perceived scene or 
event is complex, composed of many features in which the agent may be more or less 
interested and so on. The familiar inattentional blindness scenarios, for instance (e.g., Mack 
& Rock, 1998), have this structure. The job of attention appears to be to select particular 
features of the scene, to direct the agent's cognitive resources to salient properties (perhaps 
those that suit his ongoing interests), in such a way that can lead to the neglect of others.  
   I doubt that Gallistel's case can be given an instrumental, attentional-shift explanation in 
the way that some other cases can be. Covert attentional-shift can alter the contents of 
consciousness without changing gross input, and so it would have to be covert attention at 
play in the paralysed-eye example. But it is far from clear the apparent shift of the world to 
the right in the patient's experience can be put down to his covertly shifting his attention to 
some new part of the scene. It is the whole scene that appears to move, after all. If this is 
right, then there are at least some cases in which there is a direct, unmediated / non-
instrumental influence of intentional content (or, at least, of motor-command content) on 
perceptual content.  
 
   I am concerned, too, that there may be some cases - perhaps on the boundary between 
those in which a change in perceptual content is mediated by attentional shift and those in 
which the influence is direct - where it will simply be impossible to tell what the source of 
the content of experience is. It may be impossible to verify which of two competing 
hypotheses - the alternatives Clark develops - is the correct one, at least in the absence of a 
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worked-out theory of the nature of attention.  
   This worry aside, there doesn't appear to be a particular challenge to the action-space view 
from this feature of Hurley's rejection of the Classical Sandwich. Perceptual content of an 
action-oriented kind, it seems, can plausibly be a function of both input and output, or of the 
relations between them. This possibility, in fact, supports the claim made above that action-
oriented content is conducive to an agent's efficient interaction with his environment. If 
experiences don't have to 'wait for' new input before their new contents can be made 
available to the agent, but instead can be updated in response to ongoing loops of intention, 
expectation and feedback, then the perceiver can operate swiftly and effectively in response 
to new situations.   
   At present, I wish to remain neutral over the other commitments of the Anti-Sandwich 
model. The action-space account does not commit us necessarily to either a classical, 
connectionist or dynamical-systems approach to cognition, or hybrids of these (on the other 
hand, of course, the general approach of this account has been to understand conscious 
perception in the context of real, embodied-embedded creatures under biological constraints, 
so it is likely to favour non-classical options). The lesson from this section is simply that the 
action-space account's treatment of perceptual content is consistent with a Hurley-style 
rejection of a neat input-cognition-output division and is not threatened by the empirical 
results she appeals to.   
 
7.6: The Function of Consciousness. 
 
   On qualia-conservative views, where the qualitative features of experience are said to be 
intrinsic and irreducible, there is the possibility of separating phenomenal and functional 
properties and of asking what use the former have in light of this separation. The possibility 
of Zombies, on approaches of that sort, raises questions about the function of consciousness 
and the role it plays both at the level of individual creatures and at the level of the 
evolutionary development of intelligent behaviour. Epiphenomenalists, for instance, state 
that consciousness plays no causal role in a creature's life but is just a side-effect or by-
product of some causally-efficacious physical structure. Conscious Inessentialists, moreover, 
ask why it is that consciousness evolved given the supposition that everything that is done by 
consciousness for those creatures who have it could have been done without it.  
   If the action-space approach is correct, though, such separation is impossible. 
Consciousness just is confrontation with a space of actions; it just is a particular 
nonconceptual form of action-oriented content-use. This approach gives us the resources for 
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a compelling anti-epiphenomenalist position and - although perhaps not quite so compelling 
- for an anti-inessentialist one too. The functions of consciousness, it follows, are those 
whose operation is dependent upon the agent's manifest access to an action-space.  
 
   First of all, epiphenomenalism and conscious inessentialism must be clearly distinguished, 
for their claims have differing implications in spite of their superficial similarities. The 
version of epiphenomenalism in which I am interested states that there are qualitative 
properties of experience that have no causal weight. Their presence is incidental to the 
engine-room of causal interaction: the physical states that underpin the phenomenal 
properties. Even in our richly phenomenally-textured mental lives, it is the brain states and 
processes that underlie our experiences that perform the causal work. In order to defend an 
anti-epiphenomenalist viewpoint, then, it will be enough to show that there is in fact a causal 
role played by consciousness in the mental or behavioural lives of those creatures who 
possess it.  
   Conscious inessentialism is the weaker claim that, even though consciousness may play 
some functional role in us and similar creatures, it is not necessary for the performance of 
that function. Owen Flanagan puts it thus: 
 
"For any intelligent activity i, performed in any cognitive domain d, even if we 
do i with conscious accompaniments, i can in principle be done without these 
conscious accompaniments". (Flanagan, 1992; p129).  
 
   This view is implicit in any approach that accepts the possibility of Zombies, at least where 
they are conceived of as creatures who are outwardly, behaviourally identical to us but who 
lack inner qualitative lives. On these views there is no behaviour, no matter how cognitively 
demanding or apparently sensitive to phenomenal features, that cannot be performed by a 
Zombie.  
   Flanagan and Thomas Polger take the view further: 
 
"[Some philosophers] think that the hardest problem is explaining how brain 
states could give rise to phenomenal states. This is indeed a hard problem. But 
this problem is certainly no more difficult than the problem of why and how it is 
that there came to be conscious creatures at all. Why did evolution result in 
creatures who were more than just informationally sensitive? There are, to the 
best of our knowledge, no good theories about this, and it is one of the reasons 
for pressing the conscious inessentialism worry". 
(Flanagan & Polger, 1995; p15).  
 
   The concern seems to be that if being conscious is not a necessary condition on the 
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performance of any intelligent behaviour it is mysterious why it evolved in the first place. 
Unlike the epiphenomenalist, remember, the inessentialist can allow for a robust 
causal/functional role for those creatures who in fact possess it, and so the task in defending 
an anti-inessentialist position is not simply to show that such a function is present or even 
useful in some class of animals, but to show that consciousness is necessary for its 
performance.  
 
"[F]rom the fact that consciousness is inessential to highly evolved intelligent 
life, it does not follow that it is inessential to our particular type of intelligent 
life." (Flanagan, 1992; p129).   
 
   On the action-space account, Epiphenomenalism gets no purchase. Consciousness is not 
something that is contingently attached to particular mental states and not others; it is not a 
special kind of causally-inert, intrinsically-qualitative property possessed by certain 
perceptual contents and not others. Instead, functional facts about the agent determine her 
status as conscious or otherwise: she is conscious (the world appears to her to be a certain 
way) when she is poised over the space of actions that the world enables; she is non-
conscious when this condition fails to obtain. These functional facts, in conjunction with 
others, have causal efficacy. They help to explain the agent's goal-directed, flexible 
behaviour.  
   Conscious Inessentialism is harder to resist. To do so, we would have to find some ability 
that conscious creatures have that could not possibly be possessed by an unconscious 
creature - a type of skill or behaviour for which consciousness is genuinely necessary. 
Flanagan & Polger consider and reject a number of putative candidates. Firstly, they suggest, 
one might appeal to the essentially serial nature of consciousness. In contrast to the typically 
massively parallel processing undergone by most of the brain, we might suspect that the 
important governing and selecting role played by the one-content-after-another stream of 
consciousness is a necessary one. Flanagan & Polger think that there obviously is an 
advantage to be gained by having such a serial processor to filter out the best quality 
information, but they think that it still isn't obvious why this would have to involve 
conscious content - they argue that we can conceive of the same kind of mechanism being in 
place purely unconsciously. Secondly, we might think there are particular kinds of conscious 
sensory states that are necessary for certain kinds of behaviour, and so that consciousness 
might have evolved to allow these behaviours. We might think that feelings of pain or lust, 
for example, are required for the generation of behaviours that avoid sources of injury or that 
provide one with a suitable mate and so on. Again, though, Flanagan & Polger suggest that 
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we can conceive of all of the behaviours being the result of unconscious information-
sensitivity; for example insects can respond appropriately to pheromones from members of 
the opposite sex without being conscious ("Male luna moths are sensitive to certain female 
moth pheromones. Sensing these gets them flying miles to the right location for mating. 
(Humans have been known to travel even further, and often with less encouragement)". 
Flanagan & Polger, 1995; p17); and we might instead have reflexive behaviours that provide 
unconscious responses to damaging stimuli instead of their being accompanied by sensations 
of pain. Thirdly, it could be argued that learning and plasticity require consciousness, that 
only conscious creatures are capable of learning about their environments and themselves 
and of taking on new behavioural and cognitive tasks. The inessentialist can respond, as 
before, by claiming that all this can be done in the absence of consciousness. Much of our 
own learning is done unconsciously, for instance, and there are computers that approximate 
some forms of plasticity.  
   More promising, in my view, is the possibility that flexible behaviour is only possible for 
those creatures who are conscious. The account I have been developing holds that 
consciousness is to be identified as confrontation with an action-space, where this has the 
function of enabling certain kinds of flexible, goal-directed activities. The question now is 
whether consciousness, construed in this way, is necessary for that function: can agents 
exhibit richly flexible behaviour without being directly confronted with a space of 
possibilities for action? I wish to give a negative answer to this, albeit a somewhat tentative 
one, for reasons to be described below. My suggestion, then, is that consciousness is 
necessary for flexible behaviour and, indeed, cannot be separated from it.  
   'Flexible behaviour' here is simply to be contrasted (perhaps naïvely15) with automatic or 
non-intentional behaviour. An action is automatic just in case the agent has no control over 
its initiation; when he is incapable of doing otherwise in response to a stimulation. Flexible 
behaviour comes when the creature is informed about multiple possibilities for action and 
intervention (even, as noted before, where the possibilities may be only binary - to act or not 
to act) that are capable of satisfying ongoing plans and goals. On the action-space account, 
'possibilities for action and intervention' are taken to include those that are cognitive or 
epistemic in nature, not merely those that are bodily, and to be manifestly confronted with an 
action-space is to grasp it as a temporally-extended suite of opportunities. Without being 
confronted with the space of actions, a creature is unable to act in flexible ways in response 
to the same stimulus - unless he knows the different opportunities of which the stimulus is 
indicative, he can't act appropriately to his needs.  
   The action-space account has stressed that only manifest empowerment of a suite of 
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possibilities counts as perception. It is not enough to be merely empowered, as we can 
conceive of creatures who are able to perform some actions without thereby being conscious. 
Manifest empowerment, the account proposes, is empowerment that the agent has a grasp of 
- empowerment that feeds into planning and practical reasoning. In order to demonstrate that 
conscious perception is necessary for flexible behaviour, we must rule out the possibility that 
such behaviour could be carried out by an agent who lacks manifest empowerment - that is, 
whose grasp of the space of opportunities either fails to make a difference to her planning 
and reasoning or does so indirectly. I take it as a condition on genuinely flexible behaviour 
that the possibilities for action and interaction afforded for an agent by a scene are integrated 
into her capacities for action-planning and initiation, so a creature whose grasp of the 
different ways in which she can act in that environment makes no difference to what she 
does is not a flexible-actor.  
 
   Is an indirect access to a space of actions sufficient for flexible behaviour? Direct access to 
an action-space has been interpreted as non-inferential or unmediated access - a perceiver 
with direct access to the space of possible actions afforded by her environment can self-
prompt her actions without inferring them from antecedent information. There are two 
potential cases of indirect access to an action-space, though - 1) the case in which the agent 
(a blindsighter, for example) is accompanied by another agent who informs him of the space 
of possible actions by providing a running-commentary; 2) the case of the well-practised 
blindsighter who has learned that her 'guesses' about the state of the environment tend to be 
reliable and so can act without prompting. The first of these, I take it, is an example of 
mediated access to an action-space (the agent must be informed about the action-space by 
another system), while the second is an example of inferential access (the agent infers from 
past performance what it is possible for her to do). If either of these is capable of subserving 
flexible, goal-directed action for their bearers then we have possible counterexamples to the 
claim that consciousness is necessary for such behaviours.  
   The first option, where there is another agent who informs the creature about alternative 
possible actions, may permit flexible action of sorts, as when a blindfolded person is given 
instructions by others about what it is possible and appropriate to do at a given moment. So 
there is a (fairly uninteresting) sense in which consciousness - direct access to the action-
space - is not a necessity when it comes to complex behaviour. If we add the condition that 
genuine flexible action must be in some sense autonomous, though, we can rule this case out. 
We end up with the claim that consciousness is necessary for self-prompted flexible acting: 
flexible action that doesn't require accompaniment by another mediating intelligent agent. 
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Could there be a scenario in which this mediating role is played by an automated system as 
opposed to another sentient creature, and would this secure the relevant sense of autonomy? 
My suspicion is that an agent in such a position would count, in fact, as being conscious and 
so that this doesn't offer a real alternative to the action-space account. Consider a creature 
who possesses an appropriateness-meter16 that tells her what the current opportunities 
(action-types and -targets, plus cognitive/epistemic acts of comparison, sorting etc) are in a 
format suitable for integration with her goals and practical reasoning. If this system allows 
her to smoothly and flexibly operate in the world in accordance with her ongoing needs and 
projects, to navigate her environment successfully and so on, then we would be disinclined 
to believe her if she reported a lack of conscious awareness of the world. Indeed, it is 
difficult to conceive of a case in which all of the flexible, goal-directed behaviour is in place 
but report, verbal or otherwise, denies the presence of experience (as takes place in 
blindsight cases). In this case, the 'automated mediating system' would be playing precisely 
the role of whatever neural structures underpin our own action-oriented representation.  
 
   The same is true, I suggest, of the second option, where there is a putative inferential 
access to the action-space. Over time, blindsighted patients can learn to act or make 
judgements without the prompting of the experimenter, but nonetheless report that they have 
no conscious awareness. We can interpret this as an inference from past to present 
performance - the blindsighter comes to know what she can do now in light of what she has 
been able to do before. My intuition, again, is that if this ability becomes second-nature, and 
develops in such a way that the blindsighter is richly and smoothly capable of acting flexibly 
in a goal-directed way, then it will become unlikely that she will any longer report that she 
lacks conscious awareness. The 'inferentially mediated system', this time, would be doing the 
job of providing access to the action-space, and the line between direct and indirect access 
becomes a fuzzy one.   
   Any agent, then, who exhibits fluent, self-prompted behaviour that is geared towards the 
satisfaction of her goals and interests is necessarily a conscious perceiver. The world, as a 
domain of opportunities and affordances, necessarily appears to be a certain way to her. 
Thus consciousness, on the action-space story, permits of degree - it is not an all-or-nothing 
affair. Qualiaphiles, in contrast, are likely to be required to draw a line on the phylogenetic 
scale on only one side of which are qualitative properties present (it's not clear, to me at 
least, what half a quale would be like). For the action-space theorist the degree to which a 
creature is conscious - the richness of the appearance-properties that apply to her experiences 
- is dependent upon the extent to which spaces of opportunities for action are presented to 
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her. The more limited the suite of bodily and cognitive-epistemic activities she is apprised of 
(the suite that makes a difference to her practical reasoning and so on), the more constrained 
are the contents of her conscious experiences.  
   The function of consciousness, the action-space theory proposes, is to facilitate fast and 
fluid flexible engagement with the world. This is true both for us (and so epiphenomenalism 
is false) and it is a necessary role wherever such behaviour is instantiated (and so 
inessentialism is false).  
 
   A final difficult case for the action-space account indicates that there is still some work to 
be done in clarifying what counts as sufficient higher-level integration of action-oriented 
content. The account states that the integration that is consciousness-implying is whatever it 
takes for an agent to carry out an extended, goal-directed set of behaviours that enables her 
to navigate a space of obstacles and opportunities. It appears, however, that a sleepwalker is 
capable of doing this, in spite of lacking conscious experience17. A sleepwalker can act 
fluently in a complex environment, can select types-of and targets-for action appropriately, 
and can (apparently) follow some set of rudimentary goals and plans, or at least perform 
ongoing sequences of means-end chaining18.  
   Two possible responses are available to mitigate the force of this objection, although 
legislating between them would require a full investigation of sleepwalking phenomena, a 
task that is beyond the scope of the current project. Firstly, it may be possible to maintain 
that the sleepwalker does in fact undergo a conscious experience, but forgets that she has 
done so upon wakening. We thus explain the reported absence of experience by appeal to a 
deficit in the memory systems on which report is dependent, and not by denying that an 
experience occurred. On this view the sleepwalker is confronted with a space of actions, and 
this constitutes her experience as in the normal case.  
    Secondly, and I think more promisingly, it may be possible to describe the actions 
performed by the sleepwalker as extended sequences of utilisation behaviour - actions that 
are appropriate to the semantic properties of encountered objects but whose initiation is not 
under the agent's control. If this is a sustainable option then it would not be the case that the 
sleepwalker is manifestly confronted with an action-space, but only that certain action-
routines are triggered by her unconscious perceptual sensitivities. Sleepwalking thus does 
not involve the kinds of truly flexible behaviour that are made available by conscious 
experience.  
   I note this case only briefly to acknowledge that the action-space story requires some fine-
tuning. The details, though, are likely to involve empirical rather than philosophical 
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questions, and the existence of - in my view - plausible responses to the sleepwalking case 
indicates that even the most problematic examples are not decisive objections to the account.   
 
7.7: Summary & Conclusions.  
 
   The action-space account is a species of representationalism on which perceptual contents 
specify spaces of possible world-engaging action. The content of a perceptual state is 
determined by the role that the state plays within a wider framework of complex and 
interdependent representational systems. It is not necessarily the case that input alone fixes 
the content of a perceptual representation; it may be a function of either input or output or of 
the relations between the two. 
   A fruitful (if overly simplistic) way of thinking about action-oriented content in the visual 
case, I have suggested, is along the lines of Goodale's tele-assistance model, on which the 
conscious stream presents the agent with types-of and targets-for action. These contents may 
be systematically insensitive to fine sensorimotor details and may instead edit and 
exaggerate features of the world in order to emphasise what is important to the perceiver and 
her interests. 
   Experiences are conscious when perceptual contents are integrated into higher-level 
capacities devoted to flexible, goal-directed behaviour. Such integration constitutes a form of 
nonconceptual reasoning: action-types and -targets are presented to the agent in a way that 
allows him to assess their appropriateness to the satisfaction of his goals and plans, where 
these are themselves nonconceptually entertained. Action-oriented contents need not be 
open-endedly recombinable with other contents, or be inferentially promiscuous, but may be 
context sensitive and able to influence only a limited range of the agent's cognitive and 
behavioural activity.  
   The higher-level capacities into which perceptual contents are integrated, then, need not be 
fully conceptual, and this has advantageous consequences. Animals and infants are capable 
of contentful experience; we can explain the discrepancy in richness between perceptual and 
conceptual contents; we can deal with cases in which perceptual and belief contents come 
apart.  
   Although perceptual contents are essentially action-oriented they are importantly world-
directed too, and so it is true to say that the account is one on which perceivers confront a 
mind-independent environment in experience. In Cussins' terms, their grasp of the realm of 
embodiment does not render the realm of reference out of bounds. For Evans this leap is 
made only when realm of embodiment contents are made available for the purposes of 
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thought and conceptualisation, for it is through the satisfaction of the generality constraint 
that states become genuinely contentful. On the action-space model, the same work is done 
by the agent's grasp of the temporally and spatially extended range of possibilities for action 
that an environment affords. In experience the perceiver learns not only about himself but 
about what it is possible and appropriate for him to do given the state of the world. In this 
way his perceptual states grant him a sense of self-against-other, of world-directedness.  
 
   Cases of perceptual error - illusion and hallucination - can be given a straightforward 
action-space treatment. An illusion occurs when a perceiver takes himself to be poised over a 
space of actions that is not in fact enabled by or appropriate to the objects in his 
environment; when, for example, he takes himself to be able to conduct the rhythm of a 
pulsating sound at a frequency that is different from that at which the sound is oscillating. In 
this case his experience gets something right - namely, that he can perform a certain suite of 
actions - but it also gets something wrong - that this suite is appropriate to the properties of 
the perceived item. In a colour illusion, for instance, the perceiver would be in error over the 
kinds of sifting, sorting, tracking and comparing actions that he can carry out over a range of 
perceptual conditions.  
   A hallucination is simply an extreme case of perceptual illusion - the action-space that is 
represented in an agent's hallucinatory experience comes completely apart from the space of 
actions that she can actually perform given her current environment.  
   In either case the beliefs possessed by the perceiver may lead her to reject what is 
presented to her in experience, and so her intentional actions may not be affected by the 
illusory content. She may know, for instance, that the two Mueller-Lyer lines are identical in 
length, and so fail to act upon them differently. In the absence of such judgements, though, 
the agent's selection and targeting of actions will follow the illusory content of experience, as 
that content feeds directly into those capacities.      
 
   It is the function of consciousness, on the current view, to enable fast and fluent interaction 
with the world in a way that is suitable for the satisfaction of the perceiver's goals and 
interests. Consciousness simply is the direct presentation of a space of opportunities for 
action and intervention; it isn't anything intrinsically-qualitative over and above that 
presentation. There is no room for epiphenomenalism to get a hold on the action-space 
account; once we establish what consciousness is there is no question about what it does. 
   More controversially, my suggestion is that any creature capable of richly flexible, goal-
directed behaviour requires a direct appraisal of a space of possible actions and their 
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integration into planning and nonconceptual reasoning. If this is the case, then we have a 









Chapter 7 Notes.  
 
Footnote 1: This is a quite demanding definition of conceptuality, and it may be possible to 
defend a weaker conception on which the contents and integration proposed in this chapter 
turn out to be conceptual. Such a distinction would be terminological.  
 
Footnote 2: I noted in chapter 3 that the objection of sensorimotor chauvinism stems partly 
from the potential systematic insensitivity of conscious contents to fine sensorimotor details. 
My claim now is that the empirical work that supports the dual-streams hypothesis indicates 
that ventral stream contents specify targets-for and types-of action in a rather coarse-grained 
way.  
 
Footnote 3: From this we can conclude that non-conscious agents fail to grasp the 
appropriateness of certain actions given their environment. This seems to fit rather well with 
DF’s deficiencies.   
 
Footnote 4: See, e.g., Clark, (2001); Jacob & Jeannerod, (2003).  
 
Footnote 5: Jacob & Jeannerod, (2003). Thanks to Dave Ward for introducing me to this case 
and its role in the action-space explanation.  
 
Footnote 6: This is a view that Andy Clark has endorsed (in conversation). The distinction is 
akin to that which emerges in the literature on higher-order theories of consciousness, where 
the question is whether lower-level states must be potential or actual targets of higher-order 
states or processes in order to be conscious. 
 
Footnote 7: Some may consider it a misuse of the vocabulary of 'access' to equate this with 
content-use, but I retain such talk in spite of this construal to acknowledge the genesis of this 
view in Clark's paper.  
 
Footnote 8: Millikan does not claim that it is. These remarks are not intended as a criticism 
of her position, but simply as a clarification of the action-space proposal. 
 
Footnote 9: This question is related (but not identical) to that addressed by Clark & Mandik 
(2002), in their discussion of Umwelts. Their concern is to establish that features represented 
by different creatures in their respective environmental niches can form a part of the same 
objective world. My interest is in the previous step - whether agents represent their 
environments at all in experience, given the action-oriented nature of perception on my 
account.  
 
Footnote 10: A view which has roots in Merleau-Ponty (1945).  
 
Footnote 11: Or, indeed, as changing or evolving - the point is that opportunities for action 
are not merely instantaneous.   
 
Footnote 12: Following Hurley, by 'intentional content' I mean the content of an intention to 
act. 
 
Footnote 13: There is no commitment to such a screen in Clark, of course, and he makes - as 
I describe - a similar point himself.  
 
Footnote 14: Thanks to Susan Hurley for pointing this out. 
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Footnote 15: I doubt that there is a clear division between those actions that are automatic 
and those that are intentional. However, the distinction is, intuitively at least, sufficiently 
substantial for present purposes 
 
Footnote 16: This suggestion owes to Andy Clark.  
 
Footnote 17: This objection is made in Bermudez & Macpherson (1998); also explicitly to 
the action-space account by Macpherson, in conversation.  
 
Footnote 18: "Teen Sleepwalks to End of Crane", BBC News, 06/07/05. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and Further Work. 
 
   Perceiving is a kind of knowing, on the views that I have considered in this project. It is 
either a kind of knowing that concerns how the appearance of the environment changes from 
one's perspective as one moves in ways that probe and explore that environment, or it is a 
kind of knowing that concerns what one can do in a given perceptual situation. I have 
defended the latter proposal, arguing that conscious experience is constituted by direct and 
non-inferential access to a space of perceptually-enabled actions, and their integration into 
one's ongoing planning, reasoning and action selection. Thus I reject the very deep and direct 
relationship between embodied action and experience that is endorsed by the enactive 
approach, where the emphasis is on how movement and interaction influence perceptual 
input, in favour of a connection that emphasises how perception can enable intentional, 
world-engaging behaviour. In this final chapter I reiterate and summarise the reasons for 
favouring this thesis, highlight the advantages it presents over both sensorimotor competitors 
and traditional theories of perception, and examine some promising avenues for future 
research.    
 
8.1: The Enactive Approach. 
 
   I began the analysis of the sensorimotor perspective by dividing it into three variants, each 
of which shares the central features of the enactive framework but where differences lie in 
their respective interpretations of sensorimotor contingencies and knowledge thereof. The 
three versions conform in taking perception to be an active and exploratory pursuit - in order 
to experience one's environment, they assert, one must engage with it and bring to bear one's 
(implicit, skilful) understanding of the systematic ways in which its appearance alters as a 
consequence of one's movements around and within it. An understanding of these changes - 
these sensorimotor contingencies - is enough to count as a perceptual grasp of the 
constancies that underpin particular patterns of sensory change, namely real external 
features. 
   On the first version of this approach, attributable to O'Regan and Noë (2001), a 
sensorimotor understanding is an understanding of how subpersonal perceptual inputs 
change in response to movements, where properties of these inputs are dependent upon 
features of the perceived object and on the structure of the agent's perceptual apparatus. 
Sensorimotor knowledge works to extract information about constant external properties - 
shapes, colours, textures, spatial orientation and so on - from amid the idiosyncrasies of 
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changing perceptual stimulation. Perceptual consciousness, on this view, occurs when 
sensorimotor knowledge is recruited in the service of higher-level capacities of thought, 
planning and reasoning. For visual awareness to occur, for example, it is not enough that 
visual sensorimotor contingencies show up in the guidance of behaviour - as they may do, in 
the familiar case, during absent-minded car-driving - they must also be put in touch with 
more sophisticated cognitive abilities that enable the agent's rational interaction with her 
environment.     
   My major concern with this version of the enactive project is the discrepancy between the 
purported subpersonal level nature of sensorimotor contingencies (set up explicitly as 
holding between movements and, for instance, patterns of retinal imagery) and the requisite 
higher-level nature of the capacities with which such contingencies are said to be integrated. 
Retinal patterns and the like are simply not the kinds of thing that enter into an agent's 
judgements, plans and expectations. There is little doubt that the brain must be tuned to 
complex dynamics of movement and input in order to support the kinds of fluid engagement 
with the world of which we are capable, but this doesn't tell us what gets into the content of 
perception.  
 
   The second version of the enactive approach avoids this conflation of layers by pitching 
the sensory element of sensorimotor contingencies firmly at the personal level. Agents stand 
in a perceptual relation to so-called apparent properties, which are themselves individuated 
in relational terms. The apparent properties of an object are those that it presents to an agent 
located at a particular point in space. An apparent shape, for example, is the shape that an 
object would project onto a perspex screen arranged perpendicular to the observer's line of 
sight. A round plate projects an elliptical apparent shape to any perceiver located tangentially 
to it.  
   On this view perceptual content has two levels - one specifies apparent properties and the 
other specifies non-relational, real1 properties - and the second level is brought about by the 
agent's sensorimotor understanding of the first. A visual experience of the circular shape of a 
plate is brought about by the exercise of the agent's knowledge of how the plate's apparent 
elliptical shape changes (or would change) in response to her movements. Sensorimotor 
knowledge is thus responsible for the phenomenon of perceptual constancy - the perception 
of unchanging properties amid evolving appearances.  
   There are two sources of difficulty with this variation of the sensorimotor viewpoint. One 
is that it leaves the explanatory task of accounting for the perception of apparent properties, 
the first level of content, untouched. Are appearances represented by the perceiver? Is there 
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a direct perceptual relationship in place? As it stands, the second version of the sensorimotor 
approach is consistent with a number of possible responses here and hence the strongly 
enactive element of this thesis is undermined. If sensorimotor considerations apply only to 
the perception of invariant properties then their role is somewhat limited; if, on the other 
hand, the first level of content is to be construed as somehow enacted/enactive as well, it is 
not at all clear how this is supposed to work.  
   The second concern is that this version fails to do justice to the phenomenology of visual 
experience. It is open to us to reject the proposal that both apparent and real shapes, for 
instance, are perceived. Plates, we might maintain, don't look elliptical and round, they just 
look round (and with a spatial orientation of some kind). In the case of shape this 
disagreement might be a simple clash of intuitions, with no obvious way to settle the 
question, but the worry is more pressing in the case of spatial location (the perception of 
which is said to be a sensorimotor matter, on this view). If the location of an object is 
perceived by bringing to bear one's understanding of how its apparent shape or location 
changes in response to one's movements, then these apparent properties must get into the 
content of perception as well. For the plate to look to be located away from the perceiver and 
to her right, she must grasp the ways in which its apparent elliptical shape located on or 
moving across a perpendicular perspex screen would change in apparent size or location as 
she moves. This description does an injustice to visual phenomenology.   
 
   On the third possible reading of the enactive approach there are again two levels of 
perceptual content but what gets into each level, and hence the contribution provided by 
sensorimotor understanding, is different from the story given by the second version. Version 
3 eliminates visual apparent properties construed as profiles on a perpendicular flat screen in 
favour of a simple appeal to those parts of objects that are visually accessible from a 
particular location. Nothing diamond-shaped enters into the content of a visual experience of 
a square table viewed from an angle. Instead, the facing surface of the table (but not the side 
of the table that is occluded from the perceiver's point of view) is specified by the first level 
of content. Version 3 is not a strongly enactivist approach, and so we might give a 
representationalist account of how this content comes about, or a direct realist account, or 
any consistent alternative. There remains a role for sensorimotor skill, though, when it comes 
to content that goes beyond what is immediately available from the observer's current 
perspective. The agent's understanding of how her movements around an object will reveal 
its hitherto-unseen parts provides her perceptual sense of the presence of the whole, 
spatially-extended object. Similarly, her grasp of how she can move her hands in such a way 
 189
as to explore a large item presents her with a tactile perceptual sense of the whole object 
rather than only the small part of it with which she is in contact.  
   This version of the enactive view is a comparatively weak one in that it ascribes only this 
limited content-determining role to sensorimotor understanding. An explanation of the visual 
perception of the facing sides of objects (similarly the tactile perception of in-contact parts of 
surfaces and so on) has yet to be settled upon as far as this version is concerned, and I have 
speculated that a number of existing theories of perception may be consistent with the 
restricted sensorimotor contribution that this view endorses. One concern, though, is that the 
resources that a representationalist, for example, has at his disposal may render such a 
contribution unnecessary by explaining all of perceptual content without reference to 
enactive skills. Version 3, then, is put forward as a modest but plausible way of capturing the 
intuition that there is something perceptually significant about an agent's understanding of 
the ways in which he can change his perspective on objects, without having to commit to the 
stronger enactive theses.      
 
   There are a number of further, more general difficulties that face the enactive standpoint. 
Perception that is neither visual nor tactile, in particular, does not appear to be amenable to 
sensorimotor explanation due to its lacking the same essentially exploratory nature. Vision is 
deeply connected, even if only instrumentally, to movements of the eyes, head and trunk, 
while touch is importantly dependent upon skilful probing using hands, digits and so on. It is 
much less clear, though, that auditory, gustatory and olfactory perception share this active 
structure. Similarly, the enactivist proposes that perceptual content that specifies the real, 
underlying properties of objects is acquired by way of keeping track of changes to apparent 
properties that come with movements or with alterations in further conditions of observation, 
yet it is not obvious that non-visual perception is like this. When it comes to taste and smell, 
in particular, the putative division between real and apparent properties is not a natural one 
to draw. The distinctive content and character of experiences from non-visual modalities 
appears largely independent of sensorimotor understanding2, and so a unitary account of the 
senses may prove elusive from the enactive perspective. 
 
   Secondly, certain cases of perceptual error are difficult to characterise under the enactive 
framework. Although some examples of illusion are successfully dealt with by appeal to the 
perceiver's misapplication of sensorimotor knowledge - as, for instance, when expectancies 
about the shape of a far-off tower go awry - others cannot be so explained. Errors that take 
place at the first level of content, prior to the sensorimotor contribution, are such cases. It 
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seems conceivable that a perceiver could be mistaken about the apparent shape of an object, 
say, given that such properties are there to be perceived. The elliptical apparent shape of a 
plate may look elongated or foreshortened, perhaps. It remains unclear how such an error 
could be given an explanation in terms of the misapplication of sensorimotor understanding3.   
 
   Most seriously, the enactive view is challenged by a host of considerations that we can 
categorise under the heading of sensorimotor chauvinism. Empirical results4 indicate that the 
contents of conscious experiences may be systematically insensitive to finely grained 
sensorimotor details, and instead emphasise or edit certain features in rough-and-ready ways 
that suit fluent interaction with the environment and the operation of quite high-level 
classification, comparison and tracking abilities. Perceivers are presented with action-targets 
and action-types in experience, and these enable her to select and initiate actions and to 
figure the possibilities they offer into her ongoing planning and reasoning. The online 
guidance of motor interaction, meanwhile, is performed unconsciously and its encoding is 
largely separate from that of conscious perception.  
   On the enactive approach, at least according to a strong reading like Noë's, perceptual 
contents are determined by the exercise of bodies of sensorimotor knowledge, where these 
are sensitively tuned to enduring object properties. There is little room, on this view, for the 
kinds of selective smoothing-out or exaggeration in experience of differences or 
commonalities between encountered properties that evidence suggests are exhibited in real-
world perceptual engagements. It may be possible, however, to give an account on which a 
non-sensorimotor contribution that has these perceptual effects is consistent with the weaker, 
version-3 enactive model. A representationalist account, for instance, where sensorimotor 
factors contribute to content that specifies solidity and 3-dimensional extension but where 
representational states may be updated on-the-hoof in the service of real-time interaction 
with the environment, is a possibility.      
   The emphasis of strongly enactive theories on fine sensorimotor details, furthermore, 
obscures what is likely to matter to the agent in experience5. The empirical evidence 
confirms what we would expect to see from biologically-constrained perceptual systems, 
namely a potential insensitivity to the intricacies of sensorimotor dependence (which the 
agent doesn't need to know about) in favour of the delivery of representations that code for 
semantic features and those that bear significance for the perceiver's plans and interests.  
 
   This is the starting point for the action-space alternative, which involves a reinterpretation 
of the relationship between action and perception. On this account experience is not an 
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essentially active or exploratory achievement; it is the means by which agents become 
acquainted with the suite of possibilities for action and intervention that their environments 
afford. Spaces of action show up at the level of perceptual content - conscious experiences 
are episodes during which such spaces are represented in a format suitable for integration 
into the plans, reasons and intentions of the perceiver so as to empower richly flexible, goal-
directed behaviour. The aim is for this model to explain both the content and the qualitative 
character of perceptual experience.  
 
8.2: The Action-Space Theory - Perceptual Content.  
 
   The easy cases are those that involve spatial content in visual perception, where it is 
plausible that an object's looking to be located to one's left, say, is constituted by one's 
dispositions to act upon it in particular left-directed ways, and one's understanding of those 
dispositions. Certainly it is difficult to imagine a separation of such dispositions to act from 
the perception of the object as being so located. Notice that, contrary to the enactive view, it 
is not that the understanding concerns how the appearance of the object will change in 
response to left-wards movements but rather that it concerns the characteristic suite of 
actions that the object affords from the perceiver's point of view - including the ability to 
keep track of it over an extended period, to reach out and pick it up, to sort it with other 
similar objects and so on.    
   A second compelling example to which I have made reference (chapter 7, section 7.3, 
following Grush (1998)) is that of pulsatingness in auditory perception. Part of what it is to 
hear a sound as pulsating, on the current view, is for it to put one in a position to act in 
certain ways that reflect the sound's rhythm - to play at being a conductor, to tap or wave 
one's fingers in time with the rise and fall of the noise and so on. It isn't clear that an agent 
who has no sense of the space of actions that the perception of the noise empowers can be 
said to experience it as pulsating - a grasp of the action-space is integral to that component of 
the auditory content.  
   More challenging, of course, is the case of colour perception, where the link to action is 
much less apparent. Following Pettit, though, the action-space account appeals to cognitive 
or epistemic actions such as sifting, sorting, tracking, comparing and recognising. A surface 
looks red, for example, when it empowers a particular finely-grained suite of epistemic 
actions that consist of abilities to keep track of the surface as it shows up against a range of 
different backgrounds, to categorise it with other similarly coloured objects and discriminate 
it from those of different shades, to pick the surface out as one that has been encountered 
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before and so on. 
  
   Different scenes and environments, then, empower perceptually-sensitive agents in 
different and characteristic ways. Consider an embodied creature located on an empty, flat 
plain. His range of options and activities is severely curtailed; he can, perhaps, gesture, move 
parts of his body with respect to one another, and traverse and explore the ground in a 
number of ways. Populate the plain with one solid object, though, and the space of actions he 
can perform expands in ways that are constrained by that item's properties and by his own 
physiology. An immobile mound of material, say, can be climbed upon, avoided, pushed, 
seen-over, and used as a vantage point or to aid navigation. A sphere, meanwhile, can be 
lifted with two hands, rolled and moved, and - if uniform - does not have perceptually 
distinguishable sides. A cube, a line, an edge, a slope and so on all offer other distinctive 
suites of actions, as do combinations thereof. A complex environment constructed of such 
physical entities thus (potentially) offers the embodied perceiver an equivalently complex 
framework of obstacles and opportunities, depending upon the make-up of his body and his 
perceptual sensitivities.  
   Add to this solid, spatially-extended habitat properties of reflectance and conductance and 
the transmission of information through the air by various means, and a suitably sensitive 
perceiver will then be able to perform discriminations, comparisons and segregations at a 
distance, and to keep track of changes and constancies over time and in space. Each separate 
sensory modality will typically enable a suite of actions that has different components - 
vision, for instance, empowers sortings and siftings of surfaces under particular conditions of 
illumination, while tactile perception enables the discrimination of objects by touch on the 
basis of texture and consistency.        
   The action-spaces that enter into the contents of experience are constrained by peculiarities 
of embodiment - certain actions are only available to creatures who have a particular 
physical constitution; the experiences of an agent who cannot move around but who can 
employ individual body parts in goal-directed ways will differ from those of a creature who 
can do both. Similarly, some animals may not possess the perceptual sensitivities that are 
required for certain types of discrimination and classification (compare, for example, human 
colour perception to that of a pigeon). The shape of the action-space that an environment 
affords a perceiver, then, is determined by features of both agent and world - the perceiver 
comes to occupy a niche in which her sensitivities are tuned to what her environment can 
offer her.  
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   It is not enough, the action-space account proceeds, to be merely sensitive to possibilities 
for action, for we can conceive of creatures who possess such sensitivity in the absence of 
perceptual awareness (blindsighters; inattentive car-drivers; information-processors). What is 
required is that spaces of action are represented in such a way as to be available for 
integration into higher-level capacities of reasoning and planning (chapters 6 and 7). Note 
that this strategy mirrors that of the version-1 enactive account: mere information use does 
not count as perception, what matters is recruitment into thought and cognition, suitably 
construed.         
   This is the condition of manifestness - empowerment of an action-space is manifest when it 
is known about by the agent in question, when it is available to make a difference at the 
personal-level. When an action-space is manifestly empowered (and only then), there is a 
way that the world looks (sounds, feels etc) to the perceiver. I shall rehearse the reasons for 
thinking this in the section on consciousness below.  
   Integration into higher-level cognition is not to be understood as a conceptual affair - 
action-oriented contents need not be generally recombinable or inferentially-promiscuous. 
All that the account is committed to is that possible actions are figured into the agent's 
ongoing plans and goal-directed behaviour, in what may be a quite context-specific way. 
Knowing that such-and-such an option for action will assist in the completion of a particular 
task does not entail the ability to generalise that knowledge over an open-ended range of 
different tasks and circumstances. We are rightly reluctant to ascribe concept-use to most 
animals, but the range of abilities proposed by the action-space account, according to which 
possibilities for action are directly and non-inferentially figured into ongoing action-planning 
and response, are much more plausibly borne by non-humans. We can label this 
nonconceptual reasoning (see section 7.1), a kind of practical, direct and non-inferential 
evaluation of the appropriateness of particular world-engaging actions that is sufficient to 
ground flexibility of behaviour.  
   The nonconceptual nature of action-oriented perceptual content does not rule out the 
possibility that some creatures have experiences that bear conceptual content too, of course, 
where the extent of the latter will be constrained by the agent's conceptual repertoire, 
reasoning and linguistic abilities and so on. A task for the future is to assess how the 
proposal of nonconceptual action-space content fits into traditional philosophical questions 
concerning the justification or grounding of conceptual contents in experience.   
    
   The action-space account is compatible with the dual-visual-streams results, and the 
interpretation of the role of conscious experience that these indicate. Conscious content need 
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not be finely tuned to sensorimotor details but can instead highlight what is important to the 
agent by representing action-types and -targets, while online action guidance can be 
modulated by unconscious processing. On the sensorimotor approach, the actions that the 
agent is manifestly capable of performing are limited to those that have sensory 
consequences (for manifestness is spelled out in terms of the perceiver's understanding of 
these consequences on this view). The action-space theory is not bound by this constraint - 
all sorts of possibilities for action and intervention, both bodily and epistemic, can enter into 
the content of perception.   
   It is possible, furthermore, for the representation of types and targets for action to go 
wrong, resulting in perceptual error. An agent may take himself to be able to perform a suite 
of actions that is not in fact possible or appropriate given the state of his environment 
(illusion), or be poised to act on an object that isn't there at all (hallucination). In both of 
these cases there is a way the world looks to the perceiver, where this is constituted by her 
representing a space of actions, bodily and epistemic, for the purposes of goal-directed 
behaviour.    
 
   There are a couple of possibilities that allow that the action-space approach can permit of a 
sensorimotor contribution to experience and that suggest that to neglect the ways in which an 
agent's perceptual situation changes while she moves is to miss out an important feature of 
her experience as an embodied observer. At the same time, however, neither of the options to 
be considered detract from the characteristic action-space flavour of the account offered 
here, and nor do they make significant concessions to the criticisms levelled at the enactive 
approach in the early chapters.   
   We could, on the first alternative, pitch a sensorimotor story at the subpersonal level and 
appeal to it as part of the enabling conditions for personal-level action-space confrontation. 
A requirement on the possession of abilities of sifting, sorting and tracking, for example, is 
that the agent possesses perceptual sensitivities to relevant surface properties of objects (etc). 
An explanation of the subpersonal whirrings and grindings that underpin such sensitivities 
could readily appeal to mechanisms that have a sensorimotor nature - mechanisms that can 
be understood as predictive of future visual inputs, for instance. Perhaps more compelling 
are abilities that involve bodily engagement with objects. As is well-understood6, catching a 
moving ball relies on complex and multi-layered strategies at the subpersonal level - control 
systems that modulate the image of the ball on the retina, for example, on the basis of actual 
and expected input. Many of these are properly, if broadly, described as having a 
sensorimotor character.   
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   To allow that there may be an important subpersonal enactive component to perception is 
not to endorse what I called a version-1 sensorimotor account, though, and the reasons I gave 
against favouring that type of explanation still stand. On the current option, where 
subpersonal sensorimotor activity can be counted among the enabling conditions of 
conscious perception, what gets into the agent's high-level reasoning and planning abilities, 
suitably construed, are the types of possible action that are perceptually enabled by those 
conditions, and not the conditions themselves. Just what the enabling conditions are is an 
empirical question.  
 
   There is a second possible contribution that sensorimotor considerations may make to the 
action-space account, one that is consistent with the first but which takes the enactive 
component to be present at the personal level. We can begin this option by noting, as I did in 
chapter 7, that being poised over an action-space is an extended and dynamic affair - 
perceivers are not presented with mere time-slices of opportunities for action, but come to 
grasp that there are enduring and ongoing ways with which their environment can be 
engaged. The action-space theorist can concede that part of what determines this grasp is an 
understanding of the space of actions that an object or property would present to the agent 
were she located differently; an understanding of the relationships of continuity and change 
that hold between her movements and what she can do within her habitat. Perhaps, for 
example, the perceiver is standing in front of a solid cube of about head-height. Part of what 
fixes the content of her visual experience could then be not only the space of actions that is 
provided by the front-face of the cube, but also her grasp of what she would be able to do if 
located behind or on top of it, say. I take it that this essentially sensorimotor content is 
implicit in the action-space account as it has been presented and does not amount to a serious 
revision of the approach.  
 
   In the case of experiences that are neither visual nor tactile, it is less clear that a 
sensorimotor component is in operation at either the personal or subpersonal levels. As 
pointed out in chapter four, while it may make sense to explain the spatial content of 
olfactory perception, for example, by appeal to the agent's grasp of how a smell's intensity or 
salience increases and recedes as she moves, it is far less clear that the distinctive character 
of the odour can be given non-circularly in these terms. It may well be, for instance, that a 
dog experiences a rabbit as being over there in grasping the continuity and change that its 
smell exhibits as he moves or would move, but it is less clear how this explanation can be 
extended to the dog's experience of its particular rabbit-y scent. More generally, too, non-
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visual perception does not appear to share the essentially exploratory structure that the 
enactive view postulates, as the division between apparent and real properties is not a natural 
one to draw in these cases.  
   The action-space account, meanwhile, can draw upon (for example) the dog's implicit 
grasp of the temporally-extended dynamic of movement and scent-intensity (sensorimotor 
component) to explain the spatial content of his olfactory experience, but explain 'the rest' - 
the way that the rabbit smells to the dog - using the language of the dog's manifest sifting, 
sorting and tracking skills, his ability to integrate the significance of the scent into his 
ongoing behaviour and so on. In doing this we avoid the danger of the circular appeal to 
'changes in how things smell' that undermines the purely enactive approaches.  
 
   Combining the action-space and sensorimotor accounts in either or both of these ways (and 
the full extent to which they are compatible I leave as a task for future consideration) is 
advantageous for at least two reasons:  
 
1) There is something obviously right about the enactive story's assertion that a perceiver's 
actions are a source of sensory significance, and we seem to be able to capture this insight by 
elucidating that significance in terms of goal-satisfaction through intentional action. 
Sensorimotor mechanisms provide some of the means by which agents are capable of 
performing complex world-engaging activities that contribute to the fulfilment of their 
projects.  
   By giving an account of the sensori- side of sensorimotor dynamics in action-space 
language, too, we resist the need to talk of either patterns of subpersonal stimulation or of 
phenomenologically-dubious apparent properties entering into perceptual content. 
Perception doesn't involve keeping track of changes to how things look, at risk of circularity, 
but (partially) involves keeping track of changes to what can be done in a given situation.  
 
2) We retain the ability to account for much of the content of experience in terms that are 
isolated from the purely sensorimotor story. Entities in the world can be given in experience 
as solid objects, for example (insofar as they are presented as being resistant to force, as 
being something that can't be passed-through, as something that can be lifted, pushed, turned 
upside-down), rather than as loci of appearance-properties. That is, we retain what is likely 
to matter to perception, namely a description of what the important features of the 
environment are when it comes to the fulfilment of ongoing projects and goal-satisfaction, 
rather than the finely-grained details of changes to sensory input that come with movement.  
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   A personal-level sensorimotor element adds to the action-space account an anticipatory 
factor in perceptual content. On this view, expectations about what one will be able to do 
during or following certain kinds of movement help to determine an experience's content. 
The extent to which such an anticipatory contribution exists is open to debate, as is the 
relative priority of sensorimotor and non-sensorimotor considerations in content-fixation. As 
before, there is an extent to which at least some of this is implicit in the action-space account 
already, given that these features constrain the kinds of actions that embodied perceivers can 
perform (and so the spaces of actions that they integrate into their plans and intentions), 
especially given that an important physical object that must be understood is the agent's own 
body.        
 
   Two further complicating factors exist when it comes to perceptual content on the action-
space view. One is the possible contribution to experience of an agent's grasp not of what she 
can do in a situation, nor of how that will change as she moves, but of how objects behave in 
relation to one another7 - how they interact, collide, break, fall, bounce and so on. There is a 
question, too, as to the extent to which action-types and -targets include what might be called 
the semantic properties of objects. That is, whether quite high-level functional attributes of 
objects and the action-types they afford are perceived (for example, whether the visual 
experience of a chainsaw includes content that specifies its tree-cutting affordances), or if the 
actions that are presented in experience are limited to those that involve only primitive 
interaction with objects qua physical entities8.  
   The action-space story entails that perceptual contents are constrained by the perceiver's 
understanding of what she can do at a given time, which in turn depends upon her grasp of 
how objects behave and of the particular function of objects with which she is familiar. Do 
we, then, allow that any component of her understanding can influence what enters into the 
content of her experiences? This, again, is a task for future research, but for now we can note 
that these issues suggest, principally, that the lines between perception, understanding and 
action are not absolutely clear-cut (which is a conclusion to be expected, given the 
complexity of the issues hereabouts). The conceptual resources possessed by a perceiver may 
be difficult to determine, and there may be intermediate cases, and we can predict that the 
content of different perceivers' experiences may vary according to their cognitive powers9.  
 
   So far, the focus of the action-space theory has been on perceptual experience of external 
objects, where the central claim is that a direct and immediate grasp of the possibilities that 
such entities present for intentional action suffices for experience. An option for future 
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consideration, though, is the extent to which action-oriented contents can be appealed to in 
the explanation of other kinds of sensory awareness such as pains, itches and tickles; in 
accounting for bodily or body-image experiences10; or in explaining temporal experiences - 
the perception of time as unfolding. It may be possible, for example, to identify spaces of 
action and response that are characteristic of particular bodily sensations and to give them a 
manifest-empowerment treatment as before, or to appeal to the perceiver's grasp of spaces of 
action as extended and ongoing in accounting for her experience of temporal flow.   
 
8.3: The Action-Space Theory - Consciousness. 
 
   On the question of phenomenal consciousness, the action-space account is located between 
what we can call11 a liberal and a conservative view. The liberal view is that qualia are 
present wherever there is sensitivity to perceptual information, while the conservative view 
is that qualia enjoy a special status - they are intrinsically-phenomenal, private, irreducible 
properties of experience. The integration of action-space content into higher-level capacities 
of planning and reasoning that the account requires for consciousness entails that it is more 
than a liberal view - mere information processing is not enough; content that makes a 
difference to these capacities at the personal level is. The rejection of the conservative 
position is more involved and relies upon a Dennettian deflation of qualia, where the central 
assertion is that there is no conceivable separation of so-called phenomenal properties of 
experience from their effects (see chapter 6 for details). Explain the effects of a perceptual 
episode - where the action-space account sets these in terms of manifest empowerment, and 
so advances Dennett's own treatment - and this amounts to an explanation of the qualitative 
features of experience. There are no qualia as the conservative interprets them, no effect-
independent, ineffable properties of experience. Experiences are encounters with an 
environment, during which the perceiver takes the world to be a certain way for the purposes 
of engagement with it.  
   This notion of poise over an action-space aims to explain what it is for the world to appear 
a particular way to a perceiver and, correspondingly, what it is for it to sound, feel, smell and 
taste a certain way. This, I have suggested, is all it takes to account for the 'what it is like-
ness' of experience; it is just inconceivable that the features described by the action-space 
picture could all be in place - that a creature is poised over a suite of appropriate responses 
and interventions - and yet it not be the case that there is something it is like to be that 
creature. Maybe we can design a strictly non-conscious robot who can traverse an obstacle-
filled room without mishap, who is at least in some sense appropriately sensitive to the 
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opportunities for action that the layout of the scene affords him. But the idea is that once 
these opportunities and impediments are capable of feeding into the perceiver's formation of 
goals and plans directly and non-inferentially, we lose our sense of the agent's still being 
unconscious: there must be something it is like to be in her position. Superblindsighters - 
unconscious perceivers who are nonetheless able to perform perceptually-enabled actions 
without prompting - are thus inconceivable.   
 
   Susan Hurley and Alva Noë (2003) introduce a distinction between three kinds of 
explanatory gap: i) the absolute gap, the question of why physical activity in the brain should 
result in conscious experience at all; ii) the intermodal comparative gap, the question of why 
neural activity gives rise to experiences of one modality rather than another; iii) the 
intramodal comparative gap, the question of why neural activity gives rise to an experience 
with just this visual character (say) rather than that visual character (an experience of red 
rather than an experience of green, for example). 
   Hurley and Noë maintain that the two comparative explanatory gaps can be closed by 
appeal to sensorimotor dynamics, but that this leaves the absolute gap untouched. Each 
sensorimotor modality is underpinned by characteristic suites of sensorimotor dependence; 
an experience's being auditory, say, is due to its sensorimotor character and not due to the 
region or pathway of the brain that is activated. Each experience within a given modality is 
also constrained by a distinctive dynamic - red experiences correspond to a different 
sensorimotor signature to that of green experiences. It is a further question, they say, as to 
whether the absolute gap can be tackled using the resources of the enactive approach.  
 
   The action-space account could be taken as a competing solution to only the comparative 
gaps or, and this is the view that I endorse, as a solution to both the comparative gaps and the 
absolute gap. As with any representationalist account, it could manage the former by 
explaining differences in phenomenal feel by reference to different contents in experience, 
and could be willing to concede that this nonetheless fails to explain why possession of 
representational states should feel like anything at all. Thus a proponent of the action-space 
theory could claim, firstly, that different sensory modalities manifestly enable different kinds 
of action-space and, secondly, that particular experiences within a modality are constituted 
by the manifest enabling of a particular action-space that determines how that experience 
feels.  
   For even this moderate explanatory goal to be fulfilled, though, the action-space account 
must make plausible the claim that for each sensory modality there is a corresponding type 
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of action-space, where this entails simply that there are characteristic possibilities for action 
that are made available by each modality alone. Similarities, too, in the qualitative feel of 
experiences of different modalities should be explicable by reference to similarities across 
their related action-spaces (just as they would be by reference to similarities in sensorimotor 
dynamics on the enactive view).    
   Does the action-space theorist have the resources to explain the peculiarly visual 
phenomenology of visual experience, the characteristically auditory feel of hearing, and so 
on? I think so. We can enumerate a variety of dimensions along which the actions that are 
enabled by a particular sensory modality are peculiar to that modality. A modality may, for 
instance, enable actions that can be performed by employing particular parts of the body, or 
may require the movement of certain body-parts in order to enable its actions. A modality 
may enable actions that have particular spatial properties - the actions enabled by vision, for 
example, include those that are extended across space to objects that are outwith the reach of 
tactile perception. In line with the concession made above to the enactive approach, a 
modality may enable actions that have particular sensorimotor dynamics - actions whose 
temporally extended nature is of a particular kind. The cognitive or epistemic actions, too, 
that a modality enables may be distinctive - a certain type and range of sortings and 
comparings may be made available only by gustatory perception, for example. Finally and 
more generally, action-spaces enabled by separate modalities may be composed in unique 
ways - the suite of actions that are enabled together during an experience may be modality-
specific.  
   These and similar considerations make it plausible that an action-space solution can be 
given to the inter-modal comparative gap. As Pettit emphasised, we can extend this to the 
intra-modal case too - once we give a rich enough account of the skills that are enabled by 
perceptual contact with a surface of a particular colour, for example, we can see why it is 
that the surface looks that way rather than any other.       
 
   A cautious defender of the action-space view may stop there and look elsewhere for a 
solution to the absolute gap, or admit defeat on that question. Once we construe this 'gap' 
correctly, though, we can see that an action-space closure of the comparative gaps plausibly 
amounts to a solution of the absolute gap.  
   Nobody believes that neural activity alone is sufficient for consciousness: an isolated piece 
of brain tissue kept alive in a jar does not sustain phenomenal awareness. So the absolute gap 
cannot be the gap between a physical description of the activity of a certain neural region 
and a qualitative description of the experience generated by that activity, for there is none. 
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We must consider the absolute gap to be the question of why there is anything it is like to be 
a whole physical system undergoing certain perceptual effects, where these effects may or 
may not be separable from the agent's extended interaction with her environment12. 
   On the action-space model, 'what it is like-ness' is not to be interpreted in terms of the 
existence of intrinsically phenomenal properties borne by experiences. There being 
'something it is like' to undergo an experience is not to be explained by appeal to qualitative 
properties of that experience (whatever that would mean), but by reference to the way that 
the world looks (feels, sounds, smells, tastes) during the encounter, where this is filled out in 
terms of manifest empowerment. At the same time, though, the action-space account - and a 
Dennettian approach more generally - has certain resources to explain why it might seem to 
the agent that her experiences have qualia as the conservative construes them. This seeming, 
of course, is not itself to be taken to be a phenomenal matter, on pain of circularity; rather, 
the strategy is to show why certain qualia-conservative judgements and reports concerning 
experience may occur. There are three reasons why talk of qualia may crop up in a 
perceiver's description of her experiences: 
 
i) Directness: Access to a space of perceptually enabled actions is, the account has 
proposed, a direct and non-inferential matter. There is a sense in which the suite of 
possibilities is forced upon the agent, in that it is beyond his control. It is likely, as a result, 
that perceivers will report that the world just seems a certain way to them. They have no 
access to the means by which their discriminations are made or to what grounds the visual 
similarity and difference of, say, coloured surfaces. With the ability to recognise the 
modality that is being employed during a particular perceptual episode may come more 
specific 'seems-like' talk, such as "it just looks that way".  
   
ii) Practical Ineffability: Similarly, the finely-grained, nonconceptual nature of action-space 
content renders it inaccessible to verbal report and reasoning. Perception is content-use for 
the purposes of action-selection and goal-satisfaction, and may be isolated from conceptual 
and verbal abilities. Perceptual content is thus practically ineffable, and the vocabulary that 
we do have is typically insufficient to capture in detail all of the features of our experiences.  
 
iii) Apparent Properties: The action-space that a particular environment enables is partially 
dependent upon the perceiver's location within that environment. The suite of things that the 
agent can do with and around an object is constrained by the spatial relation that the object 
bears to her and to other objects in the scene. This results in a separation, as far as the agent 
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is concerned, between the ways things really are and the way things look from here; a 
separation that may show up in how she talks about her experience. To put the same point 
slightly differently, two objects that have the same intrinsic properties (shape, length etc) 
may manifestly empower the perceiver in different ways when she is situated at a particular 
location (as in the two-trees case discussed in section 6.4), and so be represented differently 
in her experience. She may then be tempted, incorrectly, to ascribe this difference to the 
experience itself (as when people say that the nearer tree looks bigger).   
 
   The action-space account tackles the problems of consciousness, then, using a two-pronged 
attack - firstly by deflating the conservative's notion of qualia and laying emphasis on what it 
takes for the world to look, sound, smell, taste and feel a particular way without these being 
construed as intrinsic properties of experience, and secondly by helping to explain why talk 
of qualia is so suggestive. The account is thus, as we might put it, innocently eliminativist in 
that it rejects the full-blown conservative analysis of qualia but does not deny that, for 
example, coloured objects look a certain way, textured surfaces feel a certain way and so on.   
 
8.4: The Action-Space Account in the Wider World.  
 
   The action-space theory shares certain features with a number of existing approaches to the 
problems of consciousness and perception, and it is the task of this penultimate section to 
position the view appropriately with respect to these. I will not provide an exhaustive 
description of the details of the views to which my approach is similar, however, and the 
discussion is intended simply to provide a flavour of where the action-space model is to be 
located.  
   Firstly, the action-space account is helpfully considered as a species of global state (or 
global-workspace) view, on which conscious contents are those that are available to 
influence thought and behaviour in a flexible range of ways, typically by way of entering 
working memory (e.g. Baars, 1997; van Gulick, 2004, 2006), or 'fame-in-the-brain' theory 
(e.g. Dennett, 1990) on which conscious contents are those that survive in such a way as to 
be reported or reasoned about. These kinds of account share with the action-space theory the 
proposal that certain contents can be represented for non-conscious purposes while others 
entail that the system is a conscious one; certain uses of content, that is, are privileged. One 
salient difference is that my focus is on contents that feed into specifically action-oriented 
capacities, contents that figure in the planning, selection and control of goal-satisfying 
activities, but we might sensibly call this either global-workspace-use or brain-fame. If we 
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include in the notion of report certain non-verbal responses that are indicative of a content's 
being available to the agent for the purposes of intentional action, then Dennett's condition is 
an acceptable one too. 
   Some of the purported differences between these kinds of approach, moreover, appear to 
me to be purely terminological - it seems to matter little whether we speak of content-use or 
of integration or of global availability, for example - and we might view them as a family of 
broadly deflationary explanations of consciousness. 
 
   A second suite of views that mark the division between conscious and unconscious states 
in a similar way are so-called higher-order theories of consciousness, according to which 
conscious states are those lower-level states that become the target of some higher-order 
state or process, either thought-like (HOT views; e.g. Rosenthal, 1986) or perceptual (HOP 
or 'inner-sense' views; e.g. Armstrong, 1984) in nature; they are states of which the agent is 
aware by way of the higher-order activity. It is tempting to align the action-space approach 
with these, on the grounds that it proposes that the difference between conscious and 
unconscious states is that the former are accessed while the latter are not. We might, that is, 
take the direct and non-inferential access to which my account appeals to be akin to an inner-
sense or the exercise of a higher-order thought. 
   This is not quite accurate, however, for it is not obvious that there is anything essentially 
higher-order about the action-space view. It is not the case (in contrast to HO views13) that 
lower-level unconscious states are the target of access here14, but rather that their contents 
are accessed, in the sense of their being made available to certain capacities that facilitate 
intentional action. We emerge with the following story: there are certain perceptually-
derived mental states whose content can be employed by a range of systems, only some of 
which count as making the agent himself aware of that content. This allows us to capture the 
plausible claim that conscious states are those that involve an awareness of the world (or an 
awareness as of the world) rather than an awareness of a perceptual state. The action-space 
view, then, should maintain some distance from the HO perspective in favour of the 
emphasis on global availability, suitably construed.   
   
   Thirdly, I wish to highlight the extent to which the action-space model is congenial to the 
influential embodied-embedded approach to cognition and perception, a paradigm that treats 
cognitive and perceptual capacities as essentially bound up with the complex dynamical 
interplay between an agent's body and her natural environment. On views of this sort the 
explanatory emphasis is on agents as physically embodied and environmentally embedded 
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(see Clark, 1999, for a review). Clark notes that there are two ways in which such 
approaches can be divided, and the action-space account squares very naturally with the first, 
and more moderate, of these. Clark's distinction is between simple cases "in which bodily 
and environmental properties merely constrain accounts that retain the focus on inner 
organisation and processing, and more radical appeals in which attention to bodily and 
environmental features is meant to transform both the subject matter and the theoretical 
framework of cognitive science" (Clark, 1999; introduction; emphasis added).  
   In retaining talk of representational states, the action-space theory corresponds to a simple 
case in which a focus is kept on internal structure; the content of a perceptual state is 
determined at least in part by the role that the state plays in the agent's overall cognitive 
architecture, where this is restricted to the brain and CNS15. At the same time, though, what 
the agent can do in a particular perceptual situation - which is of course what enters into the 
content of her experiences on the current view - is constrained by both her physical 
embodiment and her natural environment. Although the process not always infallible, the 
possibilities for action that are integrated into the perceiver's action-planning and selection 
will be those that she is capable of performing given the way her body is structured and the 
skills she has mastered. Similarly, the things that she can do depend on the world in which 
she is situated and that in which her ancestors were situated; her perceptual sensitivities to 
possibilities for action will have been shaped and fine-tuned over evolutionary time. The 
content and character of different perceivers' experiences is thus importantly dependent upon 
features of their brains and bodies and environments, as suggested by the options in Clark's 
first category.   
   As it stands, though, the action-space view need not extend its embodied-embedded 
commitments as far as the more radical options in Clark's second category. The approach 
involves no overhaul of the subject matter; we maintain traditional vocabulary and 
explananda - body and world must be taken into account but only insofar as they help to 
determine the contents of perceptual states.  
   A further possible future project is to assess whether the action-space account can be 
augmented by a treatment of the mind as extended (see, e.g., Clark & Chalmers, 1998). If 
cognitive resources are capable of extending beyond the body's boundaries, to include such 
scaffolding as written or diagrammatical material, memory aids and so on, then it is possible 
that the higher-level integration of action-space content (especially that which specifies 




8.5: Action and Experience. 
 
   Consider an animal who can run, unprompted, through a dense forest littered with fallen 
logs, wet mud and overhanging branches. Her fluent, extended interaction with the complex 
environment demonstrates a finely-grained sensitivity to features of the forest that far 
outstrips her ability to conceptualise (report, reason about) them, yet her actions are 
appropriately tuned to what is required to satisfy her goal of travelling through it. She has 
more than simply the physical ability to run, jump, dodge and duck - she has the ability to 
perform these actions when they satisfy opportunities and to refrain from them when they 
don't, and the content of her perceptual representations is apt to inform any of a range of her 
intentional actions as and when this is required (when, for example, she wants to select only 
forked twigs from the forest floor). She is manifestly empowered; empowered in a way that 
fits into her practical knowledge and enables her to keep track of parts of her environment, to 
discriminate and compare them and to assess what they offer to her goals and interests. This 
is what it is for her to be poised over the space of actions that the forest enables and, the 
action-space account proposes, this is enough for her to consciously experience her habitat.     
 
   The action-space account provides an explanation of conscious experience that is in 
keeping with existing and emerging trends in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. It 
makes progress in accounting for what it is for objects, surfaces, sounds, smells, colours and 
tastes to perceptually appear a certain way to an agent, offers a deflationary treatment of 
phenomenal consciousness that fits with naturalistic intuitions, and enables us to see why 
and how consciousness emerged among flexible, adaptive creatures under environmental 
constraints. While I have rejected the strong enactive thesis, the action-space model can 
accommodate the need to take physical embodiment and interaction into consideration and to 
locate consciousness appropriately: not in isolated and passive Cartesian minds, but in the 










Chapter 8 Notes. 
 
Footnote 1): Although apparent properties are real, in that they are observer-independent, I 
shall use 'real' as a shorthand for those properties that are intrinsic to objects.  
 
Footnote 2): One possible exception being that of spatial content, as when a dog tracks a 
rabbit by its scent, plausibly keeping track of changes in intensity that come with movement.  
 
Footnote 3): On a version-3 account, the nearest possible case (on which the facing side of 
an object is misperceived) can be given a representationalist treatment: the properties of the 
facing side are misrepresented.  
 
Footnote 4): In the case of vision, at least. See Milner & Goodale (1995); Jacob & Jeannerod 
(2003).  
 
Footnote 5): As Clark and Toribio put it. The 'chauvinism' idiom is theirs too.  
 
Footnote 6): See Hurley (1998) for details. 
 
Footnote 7): Where this is at least very close to what the psychology literature calls a 'naïve 
physics'. One of the most compelling cases in which perceptual content appears to be fixed 
by sensorimotor understanding is that in which a bottle is held in both hands and its whole 
shape, extension and solidity is perceived in spite of the limited tactile contact with its 
surface, due to the agent's grasp of how its feel would change with movement (see Noë, and 
my chapter 2). However, it is likely that this content may be partly determined by the 
perceiver's (practical, implicit) understanding of the dynamics of his interaction with the 
bottle; its weight, inertia, resistance to pressure and so on, rather than sensorimotor 
contingencies per se.  
 
Footnote 8): As noted below, Jacob & Jeannerod's Ponzo illusion analysis demonstrates that 
sufficient information of this kind is provided to influence the kind of finger-grip that is 
employed in a reaching and grasping task, for example.  
 
Footnote 9): A similar concern faces the sensorimotor view, since it is possible to question 
the nature and extent of the sensory changes that must be grasped by a perceiver. Must we, 
for example, include an agent's expectations concerning the ways the colours of leaves 
change during the course of a year? If sensorimotor contingencies are learned, then all sorts 
of learned changes to appearances may make a difference to perceptual content.  
 
Footnote 10): Adrian Smith (unpublished MSc thesis) has proposed the outline of an action-
space account of bodily awareness, for example.  
 
Footnote 11): Following Mandik, forthcoming; it isn't clear that anyone is a liberal about 
qualia (except possibly some higher-order theorists who talk of both phenomenal properties 
and, separately, the awareness of phenomenal properties) - as we saw in chapter 6, though, 
an opponent of the action-space view may argue that the account amounts to this implausible 
position.  
 
Footnote (12): See Hurley (1998, chapter 8) for an examination of these issues.   
 
Footnote (13): Although Carruthers' treatment of the higher-order view appears to equivocate 
over this issue - "A phenomenally conscious mental state is a mental state [that is] the object 
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of a higher-order representation of a certain sort." (Carruthers, 2001; section 1), but 
"[P]henomenally conscious states are those states which possess fine-grained intentional 
contents of which the subject is aware, being the target or potential target of some higher-
order representation." (op cit.). 
 
Footnote (14): See my discussion of Clark versus Mandik; section 6.1.  
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